The Congregational Quarterly

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The Congregational Quarterly

EDITORIAL.

TWENTY years after the war to end war and to establish the reign of peace, truth, and justice, Machiavellianism seems enthroned. The rulers of the earth, and especially the Dictators, seem to agree that the codes of honour accepted in private life do not apply in affairs of State: there the ordinary standards of truth do not run. Lying and the breaking of the plighted word are entirely legitimate in the supposed interests of the State. The Duce, although Italy is a signatory of the League Covenant and the Kellogg pact, openly prepares for war on another member of the League, and lauds nationalism and aggression—not in the excitement of a speech, but in an encyclopædia article written two years or so ago:

> Fascism . . . believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism—born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. All other trials are substitutes, which never really put men into the position where they have to make the great decision—the alternative of life and death. Thus a doctrine which is founded upon this harmful postulate of peace is hostile to Fascism. And thus hostile to the spirit of Fascism, though accepted for what use they can be in dealing with particular political situations, are all the international leagues and societies, which, as history will show, can be scattered to the winds when once strong national feeling is aroused by any motive—sentimental, ideal, or practical . . .
>
> We are becoming—and shall become so increasingly because this is our desire—a military nation. A militaristic nation, I will add, since we are not afraid of words. To complete the picture, warlike—that is to say, endowed ever to a higher degree with the virtues of obedience, sacrifice, and dedication to country. This means that the whole life of the nation, political, economic, and spiritual, must be systematically directed towards our military requirements.

Meanwhile we read of how in Germany before Hitler obtained office it was privately explained to a Capitalist subscriber to the Nazi Movement that the programme was only put forward "for reasons of diplomacy", for "we must talk the language of the embittered socialist workmen or else they wouldn't feel at home with us". Hitler himself wrote in his autobiography, though we believe the words have been omitted in all editions since 1932:

> The German has not the slightest notion how a people must be misled if the adherence of the masses is sought.

* * *

We have been asked why we did not comment in our last issue on the Manifesto and suggested Council of Action which achieved considerable notoriety, not least in religious circles. The reason was merely because the Editorial notes were already in the press when the Manifesto was published. In any event we do not think much comment would have been called for. From the point of view of the Churches the situation was perhaps summed up in the words of the Congregational minister who, reading the Manifesto in his morning paper, ejaculated, "He's got 'em". The identification of "he" and " 'em" may be safely left to our readers.

* * *

While we can smile at the way Free Churchmen generally evaded the net spread in the sight of the bird they must now be all the more earnest in efforts to secure that the Government labours in season and out of season both to reduce unemployment and to work for the things that make for peace. The Government made a poor show in the House of Commons in discussing Mr. P. M. Stewart's Report on the Distressed Areas, and the applause which hailed the reduction of the unemployment figures to below the two-million mark betrayed an all-too-common failure to recognize the meaning of unemployment to individuals and to families, a failure which is as callous as it is culpable. Nor can it be said that the Government has inspired confidence by its handling of foreign affairs. Here, as in regard to unemployment, there has been a tendency to adopt a waiting policy, to assume that if only we mark time long enough something will turn up to help the depressed areas or to change Mussolini's mind. Such an attitude is neither heroic nor statesmanlike, and while our rulers persist in it the business of Christian people is plain. If the leaders of the "National Government" conclude from the way in which Free Churchmen have declined to associate themselves with Mr. Lloyd George's movement that Nonconformists are satisfied with the achievements of the Government at home and abroad they will be sadly deluding themselves. If only the Labour Party had leadership of character and intellect—a few men like the much-to-be-lamented Willie Graham —it would not be long before they would sweep the country. Unfortunately such men are lacking at the moment, and so we seem doomed to another spell of a Government about whom nobody but Conservatives can enthuse, and of an Opposition feeble in personnel and policy.

* * *

The paragraph we wrote last quarter about the age of those who occupy a prominent position in the life of the State or the Church came back into our minds in listening to a debate in the House of Commons recently. Those who took part in it were Mr. George Hall (54), Admiral Campbell (49), Mr. Seymour Cocks (53), Colonel

Gretton (69), Admiral Taylor (59), Mr. Lloyd George (72), Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell (53?), Mr. Churchill (61), Mr. Lansbury (76). The debate was on naval affairs, and it might have been taking place before the War. Is it to be wondered at that one came away longing for someone with a vision of a world where national rivalries are unknown? If it be true that "where there is no vision the people perish", the listener to that debate would be justified in thinking that the people are doomed; and if we wish to be pedantic and translate "the people cast off restraint" we must be well on the way to revolution.

* * *

We wish some of Christianity's apologists would not be content with merely superficial consideration of the problem presented by modern paganism. There have been several examples recently where, confronted by the spectacle of men contentedly living quite godless lives, divines have declared that such men were not really happy, they were simply bluffing, and their pretended enjoyment of life was but a pose; really they longed for better things, were conscious of "the moral law within" and of a longing for immortality, and were afraid when, in the lonely dark, they looked forward to the future. This easy reply simply will not do, though, of course, it applies in some cases. Thousands of our fellow-countrymen are living without God; they follow their pleasures, obey their instincts, and are troubled by no conscientious scruples. They are in the far country, and maybe will one day come to themselves, but at present they are satisfied. Meanwhile what is the Church to do about them? To say they are bluffing is either to blind one's eyes or to shirk one's duty. It is far better to recognize that Mr. W. P. Montague's words accurately describe the situation.

> For the first time in Western history it is possible for entirely respectable people to leave the Christian Church entirely out of their opinions, practices, and emotions, and be entirely comfortable about it . . . . . for perhaps the first time in history we are confronted with the complete secularization of the opinions, the practices, and the emotions of mankind.

If these arresting sentences could sink into the hearts of Christian people it would not be long before they were up and doing: the mission field is at our doors.

* * *

There are some encouraging signs that the Churches are at last turning their attention to fundamental problems. Too often in recent years their concern with things not unimportant but still comparatively trivial—ceremonies, forms of worship, methods of administration—have seemed like the whimpering of mice in a forest fire. What is the Church? What is the Church's message? How can that

message be delivered to-day so that it will attract a pagan world? Questions like these are calling aloud for answer. A generation ago Neville Figgis urged Christians to cease "playing at being a majority" and address themselves to their specific tasks. If only the churches, and especially the Congregational churches, could live up to their ideals and set an example in fellowship, that would be the best service they could render to the world. There was a time when a Congregational church was a family; all its members knew one another, and the family cared for its sick and aged and poor. Now the State has taken over many of the functions once performed by the churches, and often, in large churches especially, one member would not recognize another if he passed him in the street, much less know anything about his distress or need. So far are our Church members from being acquainted with each other: how much more from the prescribed state when if one member suffer all the other members suffer with him. In the perplexing personal problems with which the Christian is confronted to-day why should he not be able to take counsel with his own Church fellowship and be guided thereby? If a young Christian in business is ordered to do something which troubles his conscience why should it not be the most natural thing in the world for him to bring the matter before his church? There sympathetic and prayerful consideration might show the way out. He could be advised whether he should protest to his employer; the church might encourage him to stand firm and itself make representations to the employer, and even, in the last resort, if the stand for righteousness resulted in unemployment, maintain the member until new employment was found. In ways such as this the Church will be performing its function, and impressing the world.

* * *

With all our boasted education we live in a half-baked age—or less than half! We like to assume that the fact that everybody in the country can read, the general use of the wireless, and the amount of money spent on education, means the growth of a cultured people. So far, however, the masses have nothing more than the little learning which is dangerous, and a survey of the situation shows how superficial is the veneer of culture. Our scrappy modern newspapers, the brisk talks on the radio sandwiched between jazz and that abomination of desolation, the crooner, the popularization of science and religion in journals whose motto is "make it snappy", the cinema habit which makes its fans bored and restless unless there is constant movement and action—all these are typical of our times. Our bright young things who pretend to knowledge of psychology and of sex, and who know so very little, who lust after speed regardless of where speed takes them, are a pathetic spectacle. Sometimes we wonder whether we are growing a generation incapable of concentration and

sustained thought, men and women anything like equal to the despised Victorians who built up businesses by the sweat of their brow, mastered difficult subjects by strenuous application, and served great causes with enthusiasm.

Sometimes when we listen to the conversation of our moderns we are reminded of Disraeli's delightful satire on those contemporaries of his who pretend to discuss *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*. Tancred has called on Lady Constance:

> After making herself very agreeable Lady Constance took up a book which was at hand, and said, "Do you know this?" And Tancred, opening a volume which he had never seen, and turning to its title-page, found it was *The Revelations of Chaos*, a startling work just published, and of which a rumour had reached him.
>
> "No," he replied, "I have not seen it."
>
> "I will lend it you if you like: it is one of those books one must read. It explains everything, and is written in a very agreeable style."
>
> "It explains everything!" said Tancred; "it must, indeed, be a very remarkable book!"
>
> "I think it will just suit you," said Lady Constance. "Do you know I thought so several times while I was reading it."
>
> "To judge from the title, the subject is rather obscure," said Tancred.
>
> "No longer so," said Lady Constance. "It is treated scientifically; everything is explained by geology and astronomy, and in that way. It shows you exactly how a star is formed; nothing can be so pretty! A cluster of vapour, the cream of the milky way, a sort of celestial cheese turned into light. You must read it, 'tis charming."
>
> "Nobody ever saw a star formed," said Tancred.
>
> "Perhaps not. You must read the *Revelations*; it is all explained. But what is most interesting is the way in which man has been developed. You know, all is development. The principle is perpetually going on. First, there was nothing, then there was something; then, I forget the next, I think there were shells, then fishes; then we came, let me see, did we come next? Never mind that, we came at last. And the next change there will be something very superior to us, something with wings. Ah! that's it; we were fishes, and I believe we shall be crows. But you must read it."
>
> "I don't believe I ever was a fish," said Tancred.
>
> "Oh! but it is all proved; you must not argue on my rapid sketch; read the book. It is impossible to contradict anything in it. You understand, it is all science; it is not like those books in which one says one thing and another the contrary, and both may be wrong. Everything is proved; by geology, you know. You see exactly how everything is made; how many worlds there have been; how long they lasted; what went before, what comes next. We are a link in the chain, as inferior animals were that preceded us; we in turn shall be inferior. All that will remain of us will be some relics in a new red sandstone. This is development. We had fins; we may have wings."
>
> Tancred grew silent and thoughtful; . . .
>
> "I was a fish and I shall be a crow," said Tancred to himself as the hall door closed on him. "What a spiritual mistress!" And that was the end of his courtship of Lady Constance.

* * *

In *The Relevance of the Church* Canon F. R. Barry, speaking in the light of his experience in the University Church at Oxford, says:

> A terrible nemesis waits for any Church which neglects its ministry to the Universities.

That has its application to Congregationalism in all the Universities, modern as well as ancient. At the moment we are more concerned with Oxford than with Cambridge, which, with the addition of Dr. Dodd as Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity to the Rev. H. C. Carter at Emmanuel Church, the Rev. J. S. Whale at Cheshunt, and Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Manning, and Mr. Ramsey in the Colleges, seems satisfactorily manned from a Congregational point of view. At Oxford, however, the story is very different. The Congregational Church at George Street has been closed, Mansfield Chapel is no longer filled on Sunday mornings as it was twenty-five years ago, and Congregational Dons are few and far between—Dr. W. G. Moore, who contributes to our pages in this issue, is a conspicuous exception.

Is the denomination doing all that might be done in regard to its witness in Oxford?

* * *

Not long ago we heard a man contend that the men who succeeded in life were those who were superior to their fellows in physical resources, who were endowed with stamina beyond that given to average mortals: Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Baldwin were instanced as men who in the political life of our country had "got there" only because of robust health. It is not to be denied, of course, that health counts for a great deal; but is it not true that life is full of instances where, despite physical weakness, men have carried on great businesses, made definite contributions to learning, and served the State?

The man with a sound constitution, a sturdy physical frame, and a good digestion nevertheless starts out with great initial advantages. Dr. Sherwood Eddy has recently told us that at 63 his body is only 50, he has never had a headache or a toothache, and has not a single dental cavity. Without doubt Dr. Eddy could not have stood his life of constant travel—in India, China, Russia, as well as Europe and the United States—had it not been for his physical fitness. Let not those who have this great boon waste it: they should do much more for the world than their less fortunate fellows: *noblesse oblige.*

* * *

From many quarters support has come for the views expressed in these pages on amateurs, sometimes ministers of religion, dabbling in psycho-analysis and psychotherapy. Some sensible words on the subject were recently written by a medical man, Dr. H. Flanders Dunbar, in an article on "The Clinical Training of Theological

Students" in *Religion in Life*:

> As a matter of fact the pastor who wishes the best for his people should shift a great part of this burden to other shoulders than his own—in our large cities to clinics and social agencies, in rural communities to the family doctor. If he finds himself surrounded by admiring and devoted parishioners he thinks he is succeeding. He seldom stops to look into their faces and ask himself what these particular people represent in the community and in terms of health. Should he do so, he would find very often that his most devoted admirers constitute a little army of neurotic people whom he is helping forward on their way to the mental and general hospital. Rare is the pastor with sufficient objectivity and holy indifference to enable him to avoid sticky transference situations which indicate immaturity in his personality. All this too often blinds him to the problem of incipient illness and to his responsibility for those who are well.

It will be noticed that Dr. Dunbar does not deny that the pastor may have a place in the ministry of healing. He would, however, definitely circumscribe it, and especially would he urge that ministers should first be conscious of the risks attached before they begin to "practise."

* * *

We offer warm congratulations to Sir H. Llewellyn Smith on the completion of the *New Survey of London Life and Labour,* which will long rank as an authoritative book of reference. Many readers will find the final volume, Vol. IX (King, 17s. 6d.), which deals with "Life and Leisure", the most interesting of the series. All the volumes have been marked by sympathy and understanding not always found in works of this kind, and that is pre-eminently the case with this volume. Amusements and Entertainments, Sports, Games, and Hobbies, Holidays and Outings, Adult Education, Workmen's Clubs, Social Organizations for Adolescents, Drink, Gambling, Sex-Delinquency, and Crime are dealt with in turn. Finally there are accounts of family life contributed by working men and women. It is impossible to summarize a volume dealing with so many subjects, but among the outstanding changes noted since Booth's Survey are the triumph of the cinema as the entertainment of the people, the growth of gambling on the one hand, and of organizations like Scouts and Guides on the other. It is encouraging to note that the Director's conclusions after the long and arduous experience of the Survey are decidedly optimistic:

> But if, in taking leave of the New Survey, it might be permitted to strike a personal note, that note would not be one of despondency. Of all the manifold impressions left upon my mind by the Survey, the deepest and most abiding is not the gravity and multiplicity of the still unsolved problems of London life and labour, but the energy and vitality of the human response to each new need as it has arisen. And so far there is no sign that the sources of this vital energy are running dry.

It is a matter for regret that the Survey had not included, as Booth's did, an attempt to describe and measure the value of the work done by religious organizations. That task remains for the venturesome. It ought to be done, despite the knowledge that its results would certainly be disquieting.

* * *

Amid the spate of books on Communism and on the Russian Five Year Plans a good deal can be gathered about the Soviet Anti-God Campaign. We wonder, however, whether Russian psychology is not as mistaken here as German psychology is apt to be in matters political. It may be doubted whether religion can ever be stamped out by propaganda, ridicule, or persecution, while the permission to teach religion to not more than five children may have just the reverse effect to that desired by the Bolshevist leaders. If there is any vitality at all in Russian religion its exponents will desire nothing better than to have small groups of children in their care. With groups of five how much more can be done than with classes of fifty!

* * *

Once again we print the papers of the Congregational Theological Conference. It is perhaps not invidious to say that the Rev. Malcolm Spencer's paper is extremely timely. The subject with which it deals, the attitude of the Churches to the social order, has been furiously discussed in Congregational circles in the United States during the last twelve months. We have been eagerly awaiting Dr. Douglas Horton's article on the subject, and commend it to the attention of readers. The nature of the "Life and Books" article this quarter is determined by many requests for "More Cricket." We hope it will come as an Indian Summer to those who read it. With this issue we end our thirteenth year, and we would not do so without thanking our readers for their loyal support. We would like to appeal to them to secure new subscribers, for we shall not feel happy about the future until we have doubled our circulation. It is increasing slowly out of England, but death and the depression have in recent years robbed us of many subscribers at home. We are anxious to fill the ranks, and urge every reader to secure another for 1936. A specimen copy will be sent to any address forwarded to us.

The Index for 1935, together with title-page for the volume, is ready, and can be obtained from the publishers free of charge on request.

* * *

Last quarter we promised readers more inspiration from the modern poets. Here are the last lines of Mr. T. S. Eliot's "The Hollow Men", the most beautiful of Mr. Eliot's poems, according to Dr. I. A. Richards:

Between the desire
And the spasm
Between the potency
And the existence
Between the essence
And the descent
Falls the Shadow.
For Thine is the Kingdom.

For Thine is
Life is
For Thine is the

This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper.

* * *

The *Methodist Times* has been drawing attention to "Wayside Pulpits" on church notice-boards in the same street in Barnstaple. They read: "Drink is your greatest enemy"; "Love your enemies." Meanwhile a suburban Congregational church notice-board announces the preachers week by week as "Pulpit Fixtures"; this must be a paraphrase of "stickit ministers."

There is much good reading and some excellent stories in *John Bailey, 1864-1931, Letters and Diaries* (Murray, 10s. 6d.) which has appeared while these pages are in the press. Take this from the Diary, 22nd July, 1907:

> the Eckhardstein who married Maple's daughter said of the Kaiser when in his service: "My master is an ass; when he goes to a christening he wants to be the baby; when he goes to a wedding he wants to be the bride; when he goes to a funeral he wants to be the corpse."

Even better is the account of a dinner of distinguished men, when

> that horrid creature, Frank Harris, the journalist, *Saturday Review*, etc. was present, and was sitting between Alfred [Lyttelton] and Arthur B[alfour]. He struggled to attract attention to himself, as such creatures do, and finally shouted—*à propos de bottes*—"The great curses of modern life are Christianity and journalism!" The falling of this bomb produced an absolute silence, in the midst of which Arthur Balfour quietly turned to Harris and said: "Christianity of course—but why journalism?" Alfred says that even Harris was quite extinguished.

We have also the account of Balfour saying in June, 1915:

> If only Winston would decide whether he is Wellington or Napoleon, we should be able to get on!"

* * *

THE AMERICAN CONGREGATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOCIAL ACTION.

> A Church interested chiefly in church extension cannot possibly maintain its morale in a day when the extension of churches has ceased to be a social necessity.
>
> The present Church Boards—for Home Missions, church erection, education, Sunday School extension—and Boards of Church maintenance like State Conferences cannot possibly furnish adequate causes to arouse the morale of our religious constituency. They occupy in American Church life a place proportionate to the gigantic struggle which the Church so successfully carried on in the last century. To have taken the voluntary offerings of people and with them planted churches from one end of the United States to the other is an accomplishment of which we may all be proud. But herein lies the key to our present embarrassment: from now on the work of the missionary agencies is secondary and not primary. They do not tap the sources of religious interest at the present time and they quicken no passionate response from the people.

Such was the first blast blown on the trumpet by Prof. Arthur E. Holt, of the Chicago Theological Seminary, in the spring of last year, when the tribes of Congregationalism were preparing to go up to their biennial General Council in Oberlin, Ohio. It was the burden of several of his addresses and of one of the articles he published.

In America the cooling of the missionary passion had been noticed long before the country sank into the general economic depression. Immediately after the war there had been a flare-up of enthusiasm for missions—doubtless a brief re-kindling of the idealism which, with much that was the opposite of idealism, had motivated the war—but this was not sustained. In the middle of the last decade the secretaries of the Home and Foreign Boards were aware of a general decline in giving on the part of the people, in spite of the fact that at that time the national income was reaching a peak previously unequalled in American history.

The Congregational Churches had been for some years on the search for an explanation of this diminution of giving, when Dr. Holt's clear statement was published. He did not argue that there was no further need for the planting of churches. (The not quite accurate title, "The End of Church Expansion", was affixed to his article by the editor of the magazine in which it was published.) He pointed out only that the necessity was less, and therefore the giving less. Indeed, there is not anything like the need for new churches in the United States to-day that there was when the frontier of population was still sweeping westward; and even in the foreign field, as is well known, there are now many localities where an increase in the

number of churches can mean only heightened interdenominational competition.

Dr. Holt added to his diagnosis of the decline a positive prescription for treatment and cure:

> We are now moving in the direction of an organic conception of society. Autonomy is giving way to socialization. Even though the Church may ignore society, society will not let the Church alone. Russia has decided that the Church is a social nuisance. Germany has decided that it is such an important adjunct that its support of the State must be assured beyond all question. The Supreme Court of the United States has decided that obedience to the State is more important than loyalty to God. The problems which are becoming so critical with reference to Church and State have also become critical in the relation of the Church to every other social group. The scourge of war threatens all foreign missionary adventures; race prejudice in our own neighbourhoods screeches defiance while we take up collections on Sunday morning to save the souls of individual members of the depressed races. The predatory behaviour of the great vocations defies all our preachments about the city of God. What society thinks about the Church and what the Church thinks about society have become matters of supreme importance. A new Christian spirit, operating on a wide scale, and intensively, bringing to bear the principles of love and faith and loyalty upon politics, vocational life, and the life of the family, alone can reunite our shattered culture into a spiritual whole.

The argument was simplicity itself: the hope of the world depends on the Christianizing not only of individuals but also of institutions, since it is not merely individuals which give character to institutions, but the latter which do so to the former. The Church has proved its ability in respect of individuals: the burning contemporary question is whether it can carry its Gospel into the complex of modern society. In this realm, rather than that of church extension, the interest of intelligent Christendom now focuses; in this realm alone, therefore, can the morale of the Church be re-discovered.

The accuracy of this analysis granted, there remained only to forge an instrument whereby to make the Church effective as an agent for social redemption.

While the delegates were assembling at the General Council of the Congregational Churches there was placed in their hands, through the medium of the denominational weekly, a proposal from their Social Relations Commission, of which Dr. Holt was chairman. This Commission had led an inoffensive existence since 1913, deriving the slender funds to pay the salary of its executive secretary, who would give it only part of his time, from the Congregational Education Society. Whether or not justifiably, it felt itself a fifth wheel on the denominational wagon. It had produced from time to time resolutions written in good English and relevant to the day,

but had lacked the authority to do much more. The proposal it now laid before the assembly was that it be

> . . . . . lifted to the grade of a major Society in the denominational structure, taking rank with the Societies which represent church extension at home and abroad; and that it be equipped with resources and personnel comparable to the magnitude of the demands upon it.
>
> Such a Society should have a Board of Directors constituted from such people as adequately represent the social interest of the denomination.
>
> In addition to the directors, there should be a general secretary and a suitable staff. Although the number and qualifications of the staff will be developed in acordance with the need, it seems that it should include the following:
>
> One specialist who will equip himself to give leadership in those matters which have to do with Church and State.
>
> One specialist who will equip himself to deal with the issues of the rural-urban conflict.
>
> One specialist who will equip himself to give leadership in the industrial conflict between capital and labour.
>
> One specialist who will deal with issues of social equity in the matter of racial relations.

This proposal became the talk of the Council, and was early referred to a committee. After three days this committee reported back a resolution to the effect that the General Council create a Council for Social Action "to help the churches make the Christian Gospel more effective in society through research, education, and action". This Council was to consist of eighteen members, serving voluntarily but commanding the services of five or six leaders in various social fields, and was to be granted by the denomination a budget of $60,000 annually for expenses. In this form Dr. Holt's original idea reached the General Council.

One other name should be mentioned with that of Dr. Holt—the name of the secretary for the Commission on Social Relations, already mentioned, Hubert C. Herring. The latter had not only served the Commision for many years with distinction, keeping its ideals before the people no less by his ready pen than by public utterance, but during the recent months had devoted himself, with Dr. Holt, to the very movement whereby the Commission was now to be broadened into a "Council". It was he who, on an early evening of the General Council, delivered what might be called the keynote address of the assembly, on the subject, "A Crusading Church in the Days of Revolution". In this he dealt frankly and unhesitatingly with the crucial social issues of the times. The ovation which greeted him at its close indicated that the atmosphere of the Council was now thoroughly hospitable to the proposal before it.

It might have been expected, when the time for voting came, that the Boards for Foreign and Home Missions would throw the weight of their immense prestige against the motion, for the obvious reason that, at least during the first years of the existence of the new Council, its budget of $60,000 a year must be subtracted from the giving to the already established Societies. The leaders of those Boards, however, took the long look; and during the debate no speech counted for more than that of Dr. Goodsell, Executive Vice-President of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, who expressed the belief that, though the passage of the motion would add, for the years immediately ahead, an almost intolerable burden to the financial load already being borne by the missionaries, those of a generation hence would rise up and call those Christians blessed who had announced and made effectual the Church's Gospel of social deliverance. The final vote was almost unanimous in favour of the resolution.

Judging by the mood of the General Council, one might have expected that the entire communion would welcome the creation of the new Council for Social Action; but it was not so to be. Criticism developed from two sources: the conservative believed that the C.S.A., as the new Council came to be called, went too far; the impatient, that it went not far enough. The Council itself, in the year now closing, the first of its existence, has sought the *via media,* but has had continually to answer to charges from both sides.

One little ghost that sat on the threshold of the enterprise was not noticed at the time of the Oberlin meetings: a set of resolutions concerning the social order, very radical in tone, introduced by a small and specially interested minority with only a fraction of the delegates present to vote, was passed at quite a different session and in quite a different connexion but almost immediately confused with the resolution which established the C.S.A. To Messrs. John Doe, Richard Doe, and the others who had not attended the Council but occupied pews in the churches back home, all the acts of the Assembly were a single piece. When the news of the meeting reached them, they could regard the extremist resolutions only as a declaration of policy for the Council for Social Action. All through the year the members of the C.S.A. have been dogged by the embarrassment resulting from this confusion.

There would be no reason for quoting from the resolutions here, since they have nothing to do directly with the Council, save that they clearly represent that precipitate temper of mind which desires from the Church not merely interest in social problems but definite programmes for their solution as well. It will be noticed, on the one hand, that the motion which created the Council, so far from advertising any social panacea, emphasizes only the urgency of the

situation. "Stirred by the deep need of humanity for justice, security, and spiritual freedom and growth . . . . "—so it begins. The resolutions, on the other hand, do not stop short of providing a blueprint for the kingdom of heaven:

> Be it resolved that we set ourselves to work toward
>
> The abolition of . . . . our present competitive profit-seeking . . . . system, by eliminating the system's incentives and habits, the legal forms which sustain it, and the moral ideals which justify it, and
>
> The inauguration of a genuinely co-operative social economy democratically planned to adjust production to consumption requirements, to modify or eliminate private ownership of the means of production or distribution wherever such ownership interferes with the social good.

The C.S.A. has encountered, especially on the part of certain ministers, a desire to commit the Church to well-articulated economic and political procedures, such as these resolutions call for. To do so, however, would require an omniscience in planning which no human Council can possess, and would inevitably produce division within the Church. These very resolutions would probably win the general assent of a majority of the thinking members of the Congregational Churches, but there are a multitude of other thinking members who would regard them as wholly subversive of the private initiative and independence of individual character which are conceived as the kernel of American business success. To bind the Church to such resolutions would be to ride roughshod over the consciences of this important minority, who could not but be estranged eventually. The C.S.A. will probably for a long time to come have to protect itself against those who believe it does too little.

Those who believe, on the other hand, that the Council does, or attempts to do, too much, are a more formidable company. Many responsible laymen hold that the Church overreaches itself in the establishment of a Council for any social action whatsoever. A high officer in one of the national oil companies published a dissenting pamphlet as soon as the minutes of the Oberlin meeting were available. The honorary treasurer of the Congregational Missionary Society of the city of Chicago resigned his office in protest. The president and general manager of one of the leading automotive companies of Detroit delivered an address repudiating the idea of social action through the Church; this has been published and distributed in quantities throughout the nation by the American Liberty League, an organization for the dissemination of propaganda against socialism. The closing sentences of this address reveal the viewpoint not only of the writer but of many others who constitute what might be called the Republican Party within American Congregationalism:

> This, then, is the duty of the Church and its ministers: to cease wasting time on the superficial, and devote its energy to the great

> fundamental problem of building Christian character. The duty of the Church is to make men and women of better and finer character, and only as it accomplishes this objective will it build a better and a finer Social Order.

The Church, in a word, is out of its province when it attempts to meddle with anything but an individual gospel to individual people, and the C.S.A. unchristian in its very conception.

As long as Dr. Holt stands at the tiller of the Council, it is probable that both the Scylla of political partisanship and the Charybdis of social indifference will be avoided. There will be no attempt *both* to point out areas where evil exists *and* to chart a solution for it, as the ecclesiastical Left would desire. On the other hand, there will be no disposition *neither* to point out social problems *nor* to outline solutions, as the Right would wish. The Church, through the C.S.A., *will* point out areas of problem but *will not* bind itself to any given solution or ally itself with any particular party of reform. "The son of man hath not where to lay his head"—not even an economic system, says Halford Luccock. None the less, he came "to seek and to save". These two texts might well serve as a *credo* for the C.S.A.

To point out places of social need requires more ability than might be suggested on first thought. It is indeed as a result of structural weakness at this point rather than because of external criticism that the Council would be most likely to fail, if it failed at all; for in order to point out an area of tension, it must, on the one hand, know human society as it is and, on the other, possess at least a latent knowledge of the perfect society, the kingdom of God, by comparison with which the defects of our actual society stand revealed.

It is this second qualification which constitutes both the glory and the anxiety of a *Church* council for social action. The reason, in the last analysis, that only the Church can redeem society is because the Church alone has an adequate awareness of what society is to be redeemed *to*. The Trades Unions may desire redemption to shorter hours and more pay, owners of capital to higher dividends and lower taxes: they look at life, naturally, through their own eyes, and see it partially. The Church alone essays to look at life through the eyes of God, to see it not in part but as a whole. Herein is revealed the divine uniqueness of the Church as the agency for delivering the human race: it perennially supplies to society an unappeasable standard of perfection. As it is only a person who appreciates beauty who can indicate at what point an artist has gone wrong, so it is only the Church, with its immediate sense of God's love and its knowledge of the meaning of man-to-man brotherhood, which can indicate where the race has gone wrong. The Church sensitized to the kingdom of heaven can intuitively recognize godlessness in racial

antipathy, in conflicts between capital and labour, and in international war, where the secular man would be likely simply to shrug his shoulders and take these things as the order of the day. This is the glory of the Church.

Our anxiety for the Church—and in particular for the C.S.A.—derives from the facility with which it falls short of its glory. Its knowledge of the perfect kingdom, which serves as standard for its judgments, is not cognitional but mystical. It cannot describe that kingdom in a formula, or even in a book. The kingdom is invisible. Secularity, however, is nothing if not visible—and the Church is forever being invited by the very vividness of the natural life about it to forget the one thing needful and consider only the beckonings of many things. It becomes conformed to this world. The most difficult problem for the C.S.A. will undoubtedly be to stand close to the altar, whence alone it can pour into the social *milieu* a constant and warm and positive criticism which is also humble self-criticism.

Besides keeping in touch with the kingdom, the Council must maintain its acquaintance, as already intimated, and as the members of it are thoroughly aware, with society as it is. Granted that the methodology of reform is no concern of the Church *per se,* where the conversations are of ultimates alone, granted that the entire factor of method must be left to business itself, to politics itself, to the universities and the other organizations which deal in tentatives, the C.S.A. will make its religion socially ridiculous unless it knows facts.

The young men chosen as its paid executives represent, each one of them, a general field of social endeavour, such as that of international, or racial, or economic relations. To that field they are asked to devote a share of their working time, cultivating not merely a book knowledge of it, but first-hand acquaintance. It is believed that it is only as they roll up their sleeves and work in these areas that they can come to speak with authority. Only so can they earn the right to prophecy. It is hoped that by this technique of enforced practical experience as many prophets of the kingdom will be developed as in the past there were personal evangelists of the spirit. If but one Dwight L. Moody of the social order could be touched into flame, the whole enterprise of the C.S.A. would be counted a success.

The Council, according to its charter, is to devote itself to research, education, and action.

The executives are each of them engaged in research in connexion with the work to which they have been assigned in their chosen field.

Their education of the churches and of public opinion in general follows. They pass up and down among the people of city parishes and country parishes, and with infinite tact and good will speak of the social needs they know best, to the end that all Church members

in any way in touch with the needs will bring to bear upon them the whole salutary pressure of their Christianity.

There are public addresses, and from time to time there are conferences for the training of volunteer leaders. It is obvious that there is need not only for subscribers who will give money to the Council, but also for an army of workers who will accept responsibility for carrying social action into their communities. The C.S.A. has indeed expressed the desire that its work should be done wholly by local groups, while it remained in the background to furnish counsel, information, and inspiration, as needed.

The Council publishes a magazine called *Social Action,* which appears twice a month. One of every pair of issues is a pamphlet concerned with some particular problem. One of the most widely influential of these pamphlets was devoted to a thorough examination of the causes that led to the rise and fall of the "Insull empire". No investor and no citizen who read this could fail to become cognizant of the outright antichristianity which masqueraded as business in the realm of the public utilities. Other projected pamphlets will treat of temperance, the profit motive, strikes and unionization, fascism, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, Mexico, and so on.

The second issue each month, as originally planned, was to be devoted to news of social action among the churches, but during the last year a broader scope has necessarily been given it, pending the development of the work of the Council within the denomination.

In the field of international relations the Council has been preparing and will this autumn present to the Congregational constituencies an opportunity to register opinion with regard to war and the duty of Christians in time of war. This will take the shape of a questionnaire similar to that of the peace ballot used in Great Britain recently. Care will be taken to collect the votes of students at colleges and from missionaries abroad, but the capital use of the plebiscite will be for peace education within the home churches.

In the sphere of race relations—a critical problem in the United States—the organized education must proceed more slowly, since there is little precedent to act upon. The programmes of those local churches which have already made a constructive approach to the problem are being published, so that other churches may be benefited. Conferences participated in by different racial groups are being sponsored. Articles are appearing in *Social Action* on Zoning Ordinances, Wage Discriminations, the Negro under the New Deal, and other kindred themes.

Similarly, in the sphere of economics, information is being disseminated on the Constitution of the United States, Public Ownership of Key Industries, Social Insurance, the Reformation of Capitalism, and other subjects now in the public mind.

Some have questioned the name of the Council, arguing that it is rather a Council for Social Research and Education than for Action; but the facts confirm its title. It is, in the first place, a Council for Action because, being a religious organization, it is always chiefly concerned with the motives that lead to action. But, in the second place, there are times when it may and will enter into direct action itself. When, after research and ample experience, the mind of the Church achieves unity and its conscience speaks without confusion, the Council will be ready to function. Though, to-day, there are vast areas of mental uncertainty concerning the remedies for social ills, yet on the matter of graft and corruption in cities, of tainted and impure food and drugs, on the iniquitous fomenting of wars by manufacturers of munitions, and a surprising number of other subjects, the Church is already at one. On these issues the C.S.A. will act directly, in behalf of the Church, even to the extent of lobbying in Congress and publishing the records of candidates for political office.

Finally—and here I have been asked to make a direct appeal—the Council for Social Action desires the co-operation of all other similar social agencies of the Church of Christ. It is already co-operating with the Friends' Service Commission by associating itself with the conferences on international relations inaugurated several years ago by the Commission. But for its real international bond, it looks naturally to the Congregational Churches of the British Empire.

If its work is significant within the limits of one nation, how much more so when national boundary lines are crossed! It is not difficult to see in the future the possibility of a Christian International fostered by the interchange of preachers, in co-operation with the World organization established for that purpose, by international summer conferences, and above all by the interchange of ideas, for which the *Congregational Quarterly* is so well adapted—which should definitely influence the feeling of the nations toward each other. Surely it is given to Congregationalism to reveal to the world something of the meaning of international co-operation for the ends of peace.

DOUGLAS HORTON.

FELLOWSHIP IN ITS DEEPEST SIGNIFICANCE.

Introduction.

The greatest need of the world to-day is for fellowship. The world is smaller than ever it was before; to-day we measure distance not by space but by time. All the peoples of the world have become neighbours; and we know what may happen when people become neighbours! Let a group of people grow up in a family relationship, and marry, and go their several ways to distant towns, and the result is a happy family party. But let all the brothers and sisters with their wives and husbands come to live together in the same street, and the result is—well, we all know what it may be! That is what has happened in this post-war world. All the members of the human family have come to live next door to each other, and there is plenty of scope for unneighbourly prying and interference. Our problem—our world problem—is how to get men so widely different as a Frenchman and a German, a Chinaman and a Jap, a Scotsman and a Welshman, to live together in the same street.

Democracy, we are told, has failed. And with the decent burial of democracy we are in danger of burying those elements of truth about personality and fellowship which it was feeling after. The world is full of new gospels—panaceas for all human ills—desperate remedies for desperate diseases. And they are mostly of the kind which are destructive of the only atmosphere in which personality and fellowship can live. It is all the more urgent that the Christian Church should show to the world a better way—the way of fellowship and love. For the Church was set in the world to be the witness to the possibility of fellowship. If the Church is to do this she must understand the meaning of fellowship in its deepest significance.

I. Fellowship is the Hidden Structure of Reality.

The whole story of Creation and Redemption is God's bid for fellowship. Unfortunately our Christian doctrines of Creation and Redemption have often come far short of understanding this basic principle.

There are three possible relationships which may exist between persons and things or between persons and persons.

(1) *Mechanical Relationships.* These may exist between (*a*) things and things, (*b*) persons and things, (*c*) persons and persons. (2) *Legal or Transactional Relationships.* These may exist between (*a*) persons and things, (*b*) persons and persons. (3) *True Personal Relationships.* These may exist only between (*a*) persons and persons.

In the first two of these realms the narrower logic of the schools holds good, but in the third realm it is never completely adequate to the field. There is a higher form of reason than logic, and it is nearer, as Bridges has shewn, to the spirit of the poets. It was at this "higher reason" that Anselm hinted when he satisfied himself with producing a theology of Redemption which was legal and transactional.

Now, our doctrines of Creation and Redemption have been, in the main, either mechanical or legal, and therefore sub-personal. They have never been wholly personal, for there is a sense in which all completely rational systems involve theologies which are sub-personal. For there is that in personality which is supra-rational. Personality is the real miracle of the universe, for there is something in personality which ultimately defies explanation, definition and classification. There is a subtle essence which cannot be captured and imprisoned, though it may be caught.

II. The Truth of This is Seen in Revelation.

The ground of this assertion, that the hidden structure of Reality is fellowship—that the whole business of Creation and Redemption is God's bid for fellowship—is witnessed to in Revelation, which is the unfolding of the hidden secret, a placarding of the fact on the plane of history—something objectively set forth. In nature God is not necessarily seen as personal, nor is the world seen ordered as a fellowship. The secret is never wholly revealed. But in Revelation —in the Word of God, in its manifoldness, first spoken and finally "made flesh"—it is completely set forth. This is the whole difference between Christianity and Pantheism, which I must not pause to elaborate here.

Passing over the Jewish prophets—not because they are unimportant, but because they find their fulfilment in "the Word made flesh," we come to Jesus, whose whole teaching and action were given to shew us that our conception of God in His relationship to us should be personal, and not mechanical nor legal. The first thing that strikes us about the teaching of Jesus is that it is, on His own claims, a reflection into human life of the Spirit of God. If we ask why men should order their relations by what appears to be such a topsy-turvy system of ethics, the answer is, Because the nature of God is such. It is therefore most important for human living that we should have a right conception of God, not in the narrower sense of the creeds, but in the sense of keeping ourselves from idols. For Jesus, God was personal—our Father—and the whole business of producing an ordered universe was the business of creating fellowship, which is the highest destiny of personality, and its only hope of salvation.

There is, of course, a realm of God's impersonal dealing, but it is not the realm in which religion and morality are to function. When religion enters this realm it degenerates into magic, and when morality concerns itself with it, it ceases to exist. This is the realm in which many religious people have tried to force the hand of God, have been over-anxious to push open doors which God has not opened. But Jesus taught us not to draw hasty conclusions about towers falling on people and the wholesale murders by tyrants who are half-demons. True religion finds its home in the realm of God's personal dealing with men and women, and a true social order can never be built except upon the foundation that this is an incontrovertible fact, and that personality therefore is of inestimable worth.''

If this is clear in the teaching of Jesus, it is even more clear in His actions. After the first period of His Galilean ministry, which was mainly devoted to public teaching and acts of mercy, we find Him alone with a specially chosen group. He is teaching, not openly by word of mouth, but by fellowship. It was a period of quiet meditation and intimate sharing of personality. Of this rich sharing we have only glimpses here and there, but glimpses sufficient to give some idea of its beauty and costliness. He was making a bid for fellowship with this heterogeneous group, made up of a loyalist, an extreme nationalist, and an anarchist, with a sprinkling of a few fisher-folk and others. In this, and in the final period of His ministry, He shews them by the most divine acts of witness that in a true fellowship love rules by service and not by power, for God was never so great as when He stooped so low; that in charitable mindedness love o'erleaps the hard and fast boundaries which logic and legalism set up. And yet such was the sorrow-laden path which now He trod—we find Him nearing Jerusalem with all the aching weight of human sin and folly bearing Him down, and His disciples so oblivious to it all that they are actually quarrelling among themselves as to who shall have first place in the Kingdom. Already they are at work casting lots for His seamless robe of fellowship and unity. Here in their hearts, at such a time, is the very spirit He has come to banish from the world for ever, a spirit which still holds us bound in chains. And so He who had a greater capacity than any for fellowship must go to the Cross alone, must die in utter loneliness—"they all forsook Him and fled"—must die that the spirit which makes for fellowship might live for ever and be re-born in the hearts of men and women the world over. And so, after Calvary the Church began—or re-began—as *the* Fellowship, and the Greek word *Koinonia* became filled with a new content, because Jesus had lived and died. So that the Church, in its deepest meaning, is now the revelation, on the plane of history, of the Divine Fellowship.

III. Fellowship is Based in Personality.

If then the whole meaning of Revelation is that the will of God for men is Fellowship, we must at once recognize that fellowship is based in personality. When we treat persons as things we blaspheme God. And when we treat persons as individuals we produce for ourselves a set of insoluble problems in the realm of social science, of philosophy, and of religion.

(*a*) *In Social Science.* The quarrel between nineteenth century individualism and the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx was based on this misunderstanding—the confusion of persons with individuals. The one cried out for individual liberty and freedom, and in its extreme form naturally developed into a policy of *laissez faire,* and adopted the philosophy of "every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost." The other was prepared—in the larger interest (so it claimed)—to sacrifice liberty for regimentation, and is always in great danger of setting up the bee-hive type of civilization, in which the whole of life is reduced to the process of an ugly routine, because, as Bertrand Russell says, the power motive has been substituted for the love motive.

Both of these systems of social order fail to understand that we have to deal with persons and not individuals. That persons in the mass are never like stones in a heap. These systems are products of a machine age, which can only build utopias without souls. They offer us a poorer for a richer synthesis; for they fail to realize that, in true personal relationships, we can be both bound and free.

(*b*) *In Philosophy.* Again, the problem of freedom and determinism is a problem which has arisen on the basis of a mechanistic interpretation of the universe, which leaves personality out of account. This mechanistic interpretation is dead in the field of mathematics and physics, and almost dead in the field of biology. But it has renewed its youth in the field of psychology, and presents the rather pitiable spectacle of a second childhood assuming the wisdom of a ripe old age. We must assert, in spite of certain schools of psychology, that in the realm of personal dealing we cannot finely divide between cause and effect, no more than we can "sift the warm breeze from the sun that quickens it." Whatever the ultimate truth at which metaphysics may arrive (and we may be sure it will be based on a deeper understanding of personal dealing in the universe), there is here and now enough freedom for religion and morality to function—for human striving and human loving.

(*c*) *In Religion.* And, finally, the whole problem of grace—of fore-ordination—is a problem which has no solution in the realm of mechanical and of legal and transactional dealing. If we are to think of God's personal dealing with us, we cannot neatly weigh

out what is given and what is received; what is of grace and what is of merit. We cannot, as Plato said, strike a bargain with God as with some skinflint of a moneylender. And God Himself cannot possess, overcome, nor buy and sell personalities. To do any of these things is to destroy them. You cannot hang gifts around the necks of persons, as around the neck of some heathen idol. That is why charity without personal relationship is less than Christian. To do such a thing is to rob men and women of their most precious possession. And we may be sure that any doctrine of grace which asserts that God does such things is not Christian and fails to understand the true nature of personality and personal relationships. We must go deeper, and realize that in a love relationship, as Oman says,

> We have nothing except what we receive, but we can receive nothing to profit, except we receive it as our own.

Moreover, in a love relationship there can be no question of merit-making. In such a relationship it is true "that when we have done all we are but unprofitable servants," for in a love relationship we never can do all, and there is no merit due to us. In a legal relationship we may do more than is our just requirement, and so arise works of supererogation and all other snares of the devil. Again, in a love relationship we transcend tit-for-tat justice; in fact justice is not a peculiarly Christian virtue at all. So that to offend against law may be serious or it may not, but to traduce a loyalty, to break the heart of love, is the work of a cad. And further, in a true personal relationship, the whole legal phraseology of bondage and freedom is transcended, for in a love relationship he who is most loyal is most free. Freedom is loyalty and loyalty is freedom.

> Make me Thy captive, Lord,
> And then I shall be free.
>
> Lord, it is coming to ourselves
> When thus we come to Thee:
> The bondage of Thy loveliness
> Is perfect liberty.

IV. The Mystery of Personality.

This means that personality is not a mathematical entity; it is of a higher order. When two personalities are joined in one, in a bond of love and fellowship, it is not a case of "one and one make two." Beyond personality there is a supra-personality—that is, fellowship—the most potent thing in all the world. This was the burden of Browning's poetry, and of Wordsworth's before him:

> But here is the finger of God, a flash of the will that can,
> Exist behind all laws, that made them and, lo, they are!
> And I know not if, save in this, such gift be allowed to man
> That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star.

So said Browning, echoing Wordsworth who had said it to the heart and not to the mind:

There is a comfort in the strength of love;
'Twill help to make endurable, what else
Would overset the brain and break the heart.
And life was different lived with him,
Who smiled when winter frowned, and knew
The secrets of that further shore.

And more recently it was the burden of all that Bridges wrote, who, in his *Testament of Beauty*, so clearly shows us that such an understanding of personality—an understanding which includes the idea of the interpenetration and sharing of personality, "an individualism which is man's true socialism,"—means a doctrine that God is manifold and not unitary—a doctrine which is preserved most adequately in the Christian conception of the Trinity.

Conclusion.

Finally, what does all this mean for us? It means that for the solution of all our difficulties in the realm of personal relationships, we must get back to the inescapable Christ—God's perfect manifestation, on the plane of history, of all that personality is and that fellowship may accomplish. Here is an objective picture which I take from the most beautiful book the second century has bequeathed to us:

> Was He sent, think you, as a man might suppose, to establish sovereignty, to inspire fear and terror? Not so, but in gentleness and meekness He sent Him, as a king might send a son who is a king. He sent Him as sending God; He sent Him as a man unto men; He sent Him as a Saviour; as using persuasion and not force, for force is no attribute of God. He sent Him as entreating, not as persecuting; He sent Him as loving, not as judging.

And again, here is the same writer's conclusion about the result of the vision of the inescapable Christ in our lives:

> For happiness consisteth not in lordship over one's neighbours, nor in desiring to have more than weaker men, nor in possessing wealth and using force to inferiors; neither can anyone imitate God in these matters, for His greatness is not of this order. But whosoever taketh upon himself the burden of his neighbour, whosoever desireth to benefit one that is worse off in that in which he himself is superior, whosoever by supplying to those who are in want possessions which he received from God . . . . he is an imitator of God . . . . And marvel not that a man can be an imitator of God in these things. He can if God will it.

W. Robinson.

ROGER WILLIAMS: APOSTLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

A TERCENTENARY TRIBUTE.

I.

THREE hundred years ago, in the second half of 1635, a young New England minister found himself in conflict with the General Court of Boston, and there began a struggle of historic importance. Roger Williams was barely thirty years old and had been in the American colonies only four and a half years, but on a number of vital issues he was in revolt against the commonly accepted theories and practices. On the relation of Church and State, on

> the propriety of administering an oath, which is an act of worship, to either the unwilling or the unregenerate,

on the methods of obtaining land from the Indians, and on a number of other questions the young man had decided views which he made no attempt to conceal, and before long the authorities became eager to be rid of him.

After some months of controversy, in October, 1635, the General Court met in Boston, and, Williams refusing to recant his views, the following sentence was passed:

> Whereas Mr. Roger Williams, one of the elders of the church of Salem, hath broached and divulged dyvers newe and dangerous opinions against the aucthorite of magistrates, as also with letters of defamcon, both of the magistrates and churches here, and that before any conviccon, and yet maintaineth the same without retraccon, it is therefore ordered, that the said Mr. Williams shall depte out of this jurisdiccon within sixe weekes nexte ensueing, wch if hee neglect to pforme, it shall be lawfull for the Gouv'r and two of the magistrates to send him to some place out of this jurisdiccon, not to returne any more without licence from the Court.

A stay of sentence was granted because of Williams's ill health, but he refused to refrain from advocating his opinions, and it was decided, early in 1636, to send him back to England. Warned in time, he set out alone into the forests. He had with him a sundial to tell the hours, and a pocket compass. The ground was covered with snow. A strong man would have been tried by the severe conditions, and Williams was not robust. Yet for fourteen wintry weeks he was a wanderer, and to old age bore the marks of his experiences. He made for the territory of the Indians, with whom he had previously had friendly contacts, and in April, his wife and two children, and four companions, were able to join him. After a few months they crossed the Seekonk River in a crude canoe, and were received in friendly fashion by the Indians on the Rhode Island shore with the salutation that has become famous, "What cheer?" For some miles they sailed along the coast, and at length landed at a

place where there was an inviting spring. On the ascending slopes of a hill a new settlement was planted, with the name "Providence" in gratitude to God for His mercy to them. Amid beautiful surroundings they made their plans. Land was purchased from the Indians. The leader made no attempt to become the proprietor of the new colony. His aims are best given in his own words:

> I desired that it might be for a shelter for persons distressed for conscience. I then considering the conditions of divers of my distressed countrymen, committed my said purchase unto my loving friends who desired to take shelter with me.

In due time a compact was drawn up.

> We, whose names are hereunder written, being desirous to inhabit in the town of Providence, do promise to submit ourselves in active and passive obedience, to all such orders or agreements as shall be made for the public good of the body, in an orderly way, by the major consent of the present inhabitants, masters of families, incorporated together into a township, and such others whom they shall admit unto the same, only in civil things.

The uniqueness of the compact lay in its last four words. A new idea had found at last concrete expression. "To Roger Williams," in the striking words of Professor Bury,

> belongs the glory of having founded the first modern State, which was really tolerant and was based on the principle of taking the control of religious matters entirely out of the hands of the civil government.

II.

The principle upon which Providence, Rhode Island, was established made its founding an important landmark in human history. Full religious freedom had never before been anywhere granted. Slowly the idea spread throughout the world, finding wide acceptance. That during this generation liberty has received so many checks and discomfitures, and has been in so many places abandoned, makes it the more important to understand what Roger Williams stood for and why. For his own sake, moreover, as well as for what he accomplished, he deserves remembrance.

It is now generally accepted that Williams was born in London, in the early years of the seventeenth century, the son of a merchant tailor. When he was but a lad he came under the notice of the great Sir Edward Coke, through having learned a recently discovered "shorthand," with which he took down sermons in church and speeches in the Court of Star Chamber. Coke is described by Professor Trevelyan as "an ambitious, pushing lawyer, a bully, and in his early years a sycophant," but by his work on the Common Law he made his own and subsequent generations his heavy debtors. He did also a great, though unconscious, service by his patronage of young Roger Williams. In 1621 he got the boy into Charterhouse School, of which he was a governor and legal adviser. A few years

later Williams passed with an exhibition from Charterhouse to Pembroke College, Cambridge, and there remained until 1626 or 1627.

Those were years of intellectual and spiritual ferment, and growing political tension. The struggle between the Stuarts and Parliament was developing. Both Puritanism and Separatism were making progress, and more and more eyes turned towards the colonies on the other side of the Atlantic, where a larger measure of freedom was obtainable. The Pilgrim Fathers had sailed from Amsterdam in 1620. Eight years later a large body of Puritans emigrated from England to Massachusetts Bay. While at Cambridge, or soon after, Roger Williams came to know a number of the younger Puritan leaders, and accepted their views. At the end of his course he was ordained, becoming chaplain to Sir William Masham at Otes, near Chelmsford. Otes was later the home of John Locke, whose philosophical defence of toleration is worthy of comparison with what Williams asserted from his religious premises.

In 1628 Laud had been made Bishop of London by Charles I. The position of Puritans became increasingly difficult owing to the attitude of the authorities, but apparently Williams had a number of offers of preferment made to him, which on conscientious grounds he felt bound to refuse. He was rapidly passing beyond the position occupied by the average Puritan and seems to have rejected the use of the Prayer Book altogether. A projected marriage came to nothing, but in 1630 he found a wife in Mary Warnard, an Essex girl, and reluctantly decided to try his fortunes in the freer atmosphere of the New World. They sailed from Bristol in the *Lyon* under Captain William Pierce, the friend of the Pilgrim Fathers, and after a stormy passage reached Boston in February, 1631. It is noteworthy that in ten years, while Laud was endeavouring to stamp out Puritanism by persecution, some two hundred ships and twenty thousand men and women crossed the Atlantic for conscience' sake.

Roger Williams, in the mid-twenties, must have been an attractive young man of obvious enthusiasm and ability. At once he was asked to become pastor of the Boston Church. When he discovered that it was maintaining its connexion with the Church of England he refused, and passed on to Salem, and thence to Plymouth. Here he was in the home of the strict Separatists, with links with the John Smyth tradition, and he seems to have been quickly accepted by the leaders. From 1632 comes an interesting account of a visit paid to the Plymouth Church by Governor Winthrop and others:

> On the Lord's Day there was a sacrament which they did partake in; and, in the afternoon, Mr. Roger Williams, according to their custom, propounded a question, to which the Pastor, Mr. Ralph Smith, spoke briefly; then Mr. Williams prophesied; and after the Governor of Plymouth spoke to the question . . . . Then the elder

> desired the Governor of Massachusetts and Mr. Wilson to speak to it, which they did. When this was ended, the deacon, Mr. Fuller, put the congregation in mind of their duty of contribution, upon which the Governor and all the rest went down to the deacon's seat, and put into the bag and then returned.

It was while at Plymouth that Roger Williams laid the foundations of his friendship with the Indians and his understanding of their language and ways. His stay there was not a lengthy one. It was already clear that he was a man of advanced views—some even feared of Anabaptist views—so that the staid Separatists of Plymouth were not altogether sorry when he accepted an invitation to return to Salem as pastor of the church there. But he had been only a few months in his new charge when his controversies with the authorities reached an acute stage. He failed to see what right the King had to grant lands which belonged to the Indians, unless they had been compounded with. He objected to the requirement of an oath of loyalty. He feared that if the ministers of the different Bay Colony churches met too often, some kind of presbytery or superintendency would develop, to the prejudice of local church liberty. He urged

> that there should be a general and unlimited toleration of all religions, and for any man to be punished for any matters of his conscience was persecution.

Such views were regarded as dangerously subversive by Puritans, and even by many Separatists. So there developed the momentous clash of 1635. In July of that year the elders of the General Court of Boston declared:

> He who would obstinately maintain such opinions (whereby a church might run into heresy, apostasy, or tyranny, and yet the civil Magistrates may not intermeddle) ought to be removed, and that the others churches ought to request the Magistrates so to do.

A few months later Roger Williams was a fugitive.

III.

One of his contemporaries said of Williams that he had "a windmill in his head." A modern writer has called him "one of the most erratic and unstable men of his time." He was, indeed, an awkward young fellow, for he refused to compromise with his convictions, and was determined "to follow the argument wheresoever it may lead." When he discovered what he took to be truth he had to proclaim it, when he detected error he felt bound to expose it, when he saw evil he tried to remedy it, when he could do good, even to his enemies, he did it. There was a simple sincerity and the unexpectedness of real originality and character about Williams. Many became deeply attached to him. Not a few left Plymouth for Salem when he returned there as pastor. He was followed to Providence by a number of his Salem members. In his Rhode Island home he became a trusted and loved leader, the father of his people. With

something of the symbolism dear to a Hebrew prophet, he named his second daughter "Freeborn," though her birth took place in the midst of his struggle with the authorities of Massachusetts. The penalties he had to pay throughout his life were those of the fearless and consistent pioneer.

His religious pilgrimage had not ended when he found himself at last in Providence, able to build a community on the principle of soul-liberty. From the ranks of the Puritans he had moved to those of the Separatists; from the latter he passed to identify himself with the Baptists. In Plymouth, Williams had come to know much about the opinions of John Smyth, and must have heard how he had baptized himself in obedience to the convictions reached through his study of the New Testament. When he had been some three years in Rhode Island, Williams felt that he must express his beliefs about the necessity of a regenerate church-membership, and the desirability of following the New Testament mode of baptism. Accordingly, there being no Baptist minister available, Ezekiel Holliman, one of his companions, baptized Roger Williams, and the latter then baptized Holliman and some ten others. Afterwards, the first Baptist church in America was formed. Doubts about the validity of his baptism soon began to trouble Williams. He had an ever restless conscience, and before long he withdrew from the church, and to the end of his days preferred to call himself "a Seeker," though in regard to liberty of conscience, the separation of Church and State, the rejection of paedobaptism, the supreme Lordship of Christ, and regeneration through the agency of the Holy Spirit, he remained always close to the main stream of Baptist witness.

In 1643 Williams paid a brief visit to England. The Civil War was in progress, but a Parliamentary patent was needed for the Rhode Island colony, and in securing it he had help from young Sir Henry Vane. It is known that during his stay in London, Williams sought out the friends of Thomas Helwys and John Murton, earliest of English Baptist leaders, eager no doubt to know more of their views regarding liberty. Williams was engaged in public controversy on the question of religious tolerance with a number of the Puritan leaders, notably John Cotton of Boston—a controversy conducted with the vigour of phrasing characteristic of the seventeenth century, though Williams spoke of his opponent as "that otherwise excellent and worthy man." While in London Williams published a substantial quarto volume, entitled *The Bloody Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience*[1]. It is the best written of his works

1 It was reprinted by the Hanserd Knollys Society in 1848. (A copy of the first edition is in the Congregational Library, London. The Library possessed a duplicate copy which was sold a year or two ago for £125.—Editor.) Large parts of it are based on John Murton's *An Humble Supplication*, 1620. The earliest declaration in favour of full religious freedom was made by Thomas Helwys in 1612. His *Mistery of Iniquity* has this year been published in facsimile by the Baptist Historical Society.

and is an animated defence of full liberty in religious matters. How far it was from meeting with general acceptance may be judged from the fact that Parliament ordered copies to be burned by the common hangman, and that even William Prynne, himself a notable sufferer at the hands of the Court of Star Chamber, described it as dangerous. Roger Williams and John Cotton continued their disputation in a series of strongly-worded tracts. As late as 1652, the former issued *The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody: by Mr. Cotton's endeavour to wash it white in the Blood of the Lambe.* Williams was well able to defend himself in the controversial style favoured by the age.

Of equal importance for an understanding of the man, however, was another publication issued in 1643, *A Key into the Language of America.* It was written on the voyage to England, and shows Williams as far ahead of most of his contemporaries in his interest in and concern for the Red Indians. It can indeed be claimed for him that he was the first missionary to the Indians, antedating John Eliot by more than a dozen years, for throughout his life by counsel and example he sought not only that justice and friendship should be shown to them, but also that the way of salvation in Christ should be made plain.

When he returned from England in 1644, Williams was warmly received in Providence. The next years were spent in the development of the colony, which had rapidly grown. From 1651 to 1654 he was again in his native land, this time in the company of Dr. John Clarke of Newport, a neighbouring Rhode Island settlement. The jealousy of the other colonies had made necessary further legal safeguards. Williams lodged "in St. Martin's, near the Shambles," and met a number of the leading men of the day. Those were the turbulent years when the Commonwealth became a Protectorate, and it is more than likely that he had contact with Oliver Cromwell. Certainly he became acquainted with John Milton, helping him with the study of Dutch. The great poet was slightly the younger of the two, and spoke of Williams as an extraordinary man, a noble confessor of religious liberty, who had sought and found a safe refuge for the sacred ark of conscience. They had, indeed, much in common—birth in London, study in Cambridge, pamphleteering gifts, radical notions of liberty, Baptist connexions, and so on. Milton's *Areopagitica* and *The Bloody Tenent of Persecution* had seen the light in the same year. Williams was again in touch with Sir Henry Vane, "the great anchor of our ship," and may have known John Owen and Richard Baxter. That this was the kind of company he kept helps to give us a picture of the man. He joined in the pleas then being made for the more generous treatment of the Jews. For three years after his return to Providence, Williams was the President

or Governor of the settlement. When the Restoration took place in England, there was some uncertainty as to what its effect would be on the New England colonies. In 1663 a Royal Charter confirmed the principle of complete religious liberty in Rhode Island.

The last years of Williams's life were chiefly notable for his relationships with the Quakers and the Indians. Attempts to banish Quakers from the colony he stoutly resisted, though he had no great sympathy with their views. Indeed, George Fox was actually in Providence in 1672; he and Williams did not meet, though subsequent controversies resulted in the latter's publishing a vigorous pamphlet in the worst style of the period, entitled *George Fox digg'd out of his Burrowes*. It is more pleasing to recall his continued concern for the Red Indians. He translated the Bible into their language, and regularly preached to those in his neighbourhood. On more than one occasion his persuasions kept safe those fellow-Englishmen who had earlier driven him from their settlements. But Massasoit, the Indian leader whose acquaintance Williams had made while at Plymouth, died in 1660, and his son Philip organized a war to exterminate the white colonists. It dragged on for many years. Twelve out of the ninety New England towns were completely destroyed, and forty others were the scene of fire and slaughter. When the Indians appeared on the heights above Providence, seventy year old Roger Williams, unarmed, rode out to counsel with them, and urged upon them the folly of what they were doing. They would not listen to him, "but as for you, Brother Williams," they said, "you are a good man, you have been kind to us many years, not a hair of your head shall be touched."

Roger Williams died in 1683. All the inhabitants of Providence gathered to do him honour, though the world at large did not realize his greatness. The coffin was carried up the slope of a hill on his own property, and was there laid to rest. At the end he was but a poor man, for personal ambition had had no part in his make-up, and what he had made he had given away to the needy.

IV.

Though in many respects he was clearly the child of his age, in two directions at least he was far in advance of most of his contemporaries. His treatment of the Indians, and his theory and practice regarding religious tolerance, put Roger Williams in the small category of those who break new paths for mankind.

Whence came these wide sympathies, and the consistency of his determination after freedom? Clearly he matured early. It would seem that his views were the result of a fresh, vigorous and independent judgment at work on the data of experience. "It was as bitter as death to me when I rode Windsor way to take ship at Bristol," he

declared. He was of a downright nature, with few fears and few initial prejudices. As a young man in New England he quickly came, of his own accord, to John Smyth's conclusion that "the Separation must either go back to England (*i.e.*, the Anglican Church) or go forward to a true baptism." Troeltsch describes the Congregationalist Puritans in the American colonies as holding

> the purely negative theory which forbids compulsion in religious matters, while at the same time no room is left at all for the positive existence of different religious communions alongside of one another.

Roger Williams, whom the great German thinker regards as "in many respects very original," saw little reason for asking for a freedom one was not prepared to give to others. He carried to their logical conclusion those imperfectly understood notions of liberty to which much lip-service was paid in the seventeenth century. His own conviction was that

> it is the will and command of God that, since the coming of His Son the Lord Jesus, a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or anti-Christian consciences and worship be granted to all men in all nations and countries: and they are only to be fought against with that sword which is only, in such matters, able to conquer: to wit, the Sword of God's Spirit, the word of God.

What Roger Williams strove for found its way ultimately into the American Constitution. It was accepted in England, and slowly won its way in Europe. Williams was tolerant in spite of the strength of his own convictions. In more recent days many seem to have believed in tolerance because of their lack of other beliefs. It is not impossible that the battle for spiritual freedom will have to be fought over again. Not only are there evidences that the old evil spirit of persecution is far from dead even in religious bodies, but the secular State in certain countries now advances on its own account totalitarian claims, which make it in effect, in Dr. Oldham's words, "not only a State but also a Church," and which may not be gainsaid with impunity. If we are called upon to think out afresh, in relation to the altered conditions of the twentieth century, the relationship of Church, Community, and State—as we surely are—we do well not to forget the story of the struggle that took place three hundred years ago, and to have in remembrance earlier champions of liberty, by no means least among whom was Roger Williams.

Ernest A. Payne.

WHY YOUNG MEN DON'T GO TO CHURCH.

It is difficult to answer such a question without letting it degenerate into, 'What I don't like about church.'' My only reason for making the attempt is that eleven years' experience of University life has convinced me that here is one of our toughest problems. The intelligent young man or woman found inside our churches is the exception rather than the rule. The majority of independently minded young people between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five are outside, and many of those inside are there for reasons of tradition or parental regard rather than by personal choice.

Is this an exaggerated impression? I hope so, but it is not a hasty one, and when I read in a recent letter to *The Times* that "out of a population of forty millions eighty to ninety per cent do not attend a place of worship," I fear it is confirmed. Whether it is exaggerated or not, how can we best find a remedy? There is no doubt that all sorts of remedies are already being tried. Churches have rarely shown such eagerness to experiment, to attract outsiders, to preach on up-to-date subjects, to produce interesting services, to cater for the full needs of their young people. And yet the drift goes on, and the University teacher sees the constant spectacle of young Free Churchmen welcoming their years of study as emancipation from, rather than an opportunity for deepening, their habitual religious observance.

The real answer to our question is to my mind not difficult in the sense of being hard to find; its difficulty lies in the charge it lays upon us to be true, to cease from deceiving ourselves, to look the facts in the face and take our courage in both hands with full trust in God.

There are two reasons why young people don't go to church. First, because they do not know what they are missing. They do not know how much that is lacking in their lives and happiness is due to the lack of times of quiet and of prayer, of aspiration such as we find in the great Christian hymns of all the ages, of that philosophy of life, with Christ and the Cross at its centre, that explains many of what to every generation are hideous hard facts. That they do not know these things is not always our fault; it is their great misfortune.

Secondly, I very much fear that, as Christians who value regular assembly for worship, we do not give to others either the right atmosphere, the infectious attraction to join us, or the key to life which they seek. This is for the most part our fault, and should be our more constant concern. It lies with us that our chapels are not full; with all that makes up the type of worship we support, with the lives

we lead, the prayers we pray, the sermons we preach and listen to, with the hymns we sing, with the Bible we read.

There is space only to speak of one or two of these things, but let us take the last first, as some may be surprised to see it included among the factors in the decline of our worship. We give it great importance in our Sunday gatherings. We believe it to be a source of encouragement and strength that passages should be read aloud, and we listen to three or four every Sunday. We are only justified in this belief, provided we take care to remove the difficulties that beset the real understanding of the Bible. It is to-day a sealed, or at least a dumb, book to those who have not been able to study it. We inhabit a different world from that of fifty or more years ago, when it could still be read in what now seems an uncritical way. We do not most of us deny the great services of scholars in revealing its real nature, but we keep most criminally silent about them. Can we expect people, especially young people, to believe us if we habitually read as words of Moses the great chapters in *Deuteronomy* which scholars agree to have been written hundreds of years later? Or to derive profit from such misleading and obscure English as "a highway shall be there and a way" or "wayfaring men though fools shall not err therein"? Or to sing frequently as a song of Christian praise a psalm (95) with a most unchristian ending? To elaborate this is not here possible, nor perhaps necessary, since remedies exist if we would use them, one of the most admirable that provided by the Rev. Francis Wrigley in his *Old Testament in the Light of Modern Scholarship* (Independent Press, 3s. 6d.). My point is that the Bible as often read in church is a stumbling-block, and irritates many whom we wish to help and inspire.

Of preaching a layman should only talk with sympathy, and I should like this to be apparent even in the brief remarks of this article. The preacher's job has perhaps never been harder than to-day, and I am tempted sometimes to agree with those well-qualified to judge who say that it has never been on the whole better accomplished. Yet I cannot at the same time resist the conviction that it fails in too many cases just with the people I have in mind, those between 18 and 35 years of age. Possibly many of these keep away from church because they cannot sing with sincerity as many hymns as they are required to sing; others because they believe that we are superstitiously clinging to a discredited Bible; but many, many more because preachers cannot or do not preach to their condition.

What do they want? Surely their deep if unspoken desire is to be brought face to face with the fundamental things of the Christian religion—its comfort, its truth, its power. No biblical incident, no personal view, no preacher's fancy will satisfy the hunger for the eternal, for that which is of compelling relevance to their own time

and state. Many preachers realize this, and make desperate efforts to deal with it. They take great texts and choose modern themes, and frequently display the closest acquaintance with the psychology behind modern literature, but this is a case where eloquence won't do, and where modernity won't do, because these truths can in the last resort only be explained by experience. We must all of us who preach at all realize that unless our words show what we are living, they pass over the heads of the keenest listeners. Sermons, for example, on Christ's view of money, or of society, are useless, if the preacher has not striven to make that view a part of his life. Christian love is a distant ideal unless it be active in the life and thought of him who undertakes to talk of it.

"The man in the street," said a recent writer in the *Spectator*, meaning all of us, "wants to know about God from those who take His name and profess knowledge of Him." What knowledge do our preachers give, that of the letter of the New Testament, or of personal struggle and experience? It may be that some in applying this test will find that they have little to say, but all who wish to influence others have to risk that discovery. Nothing can replace experience; references to the modern situation are only tolerable or helpful as born of it.

It may be uncomfortable, but it is fundamentally encouraging, that the youth of to-day want the right things, and are waiting for us within the churches to supply them. They want a working faith, a sensible and adequate doctrine, a bold attitude to the world about them. Christianity not only allows but creates these things, and if we are unsuccessful in our profession it must be that it has not created them for ourselves vitally enough to be passed on to others.

There are other things of which I have no space to write, the children's addresses, for instance, that weary youngsters with silly stories instead of winning them to church attendance by bold and imaginative plain speech. The Christian attitude born of experience can make religion a living thing to a person of any age; its absence goes far to explain the emptiness of our churches just as its presence accounts for the vitality of the Student Christian Movement and the Groups in their separate spheres. Its increase will achieve many things all Christian people desire, most of all perhaps that bridging of the disastrous differences of class and sect, in a common insistence on those things in which all denominations share, for which the world waits.

W. G. Moore.

THE UPLIFT OF BROTHERHOOD.

THE Diamond Jubilee of The Brotherhood Movement, the Presidency of which "Dick" Sheppard assumed in June, 1935, is a good time to emphasize the statement of the National Executive Committee that

> Christian Brotherhood is God's prophecy for mankind, and that the world is ripe for its proclamation and practice.

When thinking on the nature and possibilities of brotherhood, and the part it will play in the drama of the new age, I am carried back to the days of innocent childhood. I owe my early schooling to the daughters of Dean Williams of Llandaff. In one examination the question was asked: "What is charity?" I instantly replied, "Brotherly love." A good answer, you will admit, from a boy of nine years of age, dependent on charity for his meagre early education. Since then I have spent many years in ministerial service, and have received much good from all sorts and conditions of men. Small wonder that I have come to this solution of the problem of social reconstruction, that

> no sound ought to be heard in the Church but the healing voice of Christian Charity.

The world panacea for human ills is—*brotherly love.*

I. I submit that this is the spirit and mission of the Brotherhood Movement, under many names, and generating many organizations. It was the fruit of an ardent passion of Christian charity, and its persistence in unselfish concern for human welfare proves that there is no winter season in the Southern climes of love.

I knew the movement, many years ago, under the name of the P.S.A. John Blackham, its founder, was a man of God in the true Apostolic Succession, who introduced "many improvements" into the "old order," whilst fanning the flame of evangelism to white heat. But in whatever form of organization the Brotherhood Movement is embodied, it is a lifting-up agency. The ideal aimed at is "a new man" in a perfect social order. In the light of this conception every man is a brother, and our duty is to act the part of a brother, so that we may enrich our neighbour with that "good part" of the life wherwith we believe Christ hath enriched us. This is a much broader conception than the mere spiritual relation of church-membership, which, however, in its deep mystic meaning is both tender and beautiful.

The primary reference of brotherhood in the *New Testament* is, unquestionably, to "fellow-Christians," not to mankind as a whole. In no case is a fellow-man, as a "man," called "a brother" in the *New Testament.* In the early Church the term was limited to the circle of associated believers. Bearing in mind the inevitable demar-

cation between Christianity and paganism it could not be otherwise.

But the more clearly we recognize our relationship to Christ—"the firstborn among many brethren"—the more sincerely do we apprehend that wider brotherhood that includes every nation, tribe and tongue. McGiffert, in his *History of the Apostolic Age,* points out that

> the first step to the decline of the Christian Church was its lapse from the broad love of men which Jesus inspired to the narrower love of the brethren.

But the loud proclamation of brotherhood by the demagogue does not always mean infusing into the term the deep, broad, tolerant charity of Christ; and the Church of Christ will not regain the influence which she has lost until she restores this sense of spiritual unity and common relationship. The Fatherhood of God and the Sonship of Christ carry with them, logically, the Brotherhood of man. G. F. Watts said:

> The hunger for brotherhood is at the bottom of the unrest of the modern civilized world.

Growing out of this consciousness of the brotherhood of man through the Fatherhood of God and the divine Sonship of Christ comes the passion for the salvation of, and self-sacrificing service for, others. Jesus, Who is not ashamed to be called our brother, preaches a truth, enunciates a principle, gives Himself as an example, generates a *life-force* which, by imparting His own spirit and life to the individual, makes him a "new man," created in righteousness and true holiness. If Jesus Christ is a "brother born for adversity" these "bad times" should acclaim His popularity. Surely He should always and everywhere be honoured as the *President* of every Brotherhood organization. For, when a man appeals for admission to the Society of Jesus, however far "down and out" he may be, He takes him "by the right hand and lifts him up." This leads me to emphasize

II. *The Essentially Spiritual Genesis of the Brotherhood Movement.*

Of all the modern movements in which the Master's Spirit has been embodied, none is more striking than this movement; none illustrates more clearly the sanity of a working Christianity. It is one of the many movements which reflect the peculiar glory and express the elasticity and sacred freedom of our Free Church life. In its early inception it was frequently misunderstood, through a misinterpretation of its aims. Men had so long regarded religion as a moral censor, putting a ban on the native gaiety of the soul and spirit. They had forgotten that at God's right hand "there are pleasures for evermore"; and if joy is a condition of eternity, that is surely justification for making it one of the elements of human life in time. I have known many homes that never knew what laughter

meant until the elder Brother came, and charged the atmosphere with delight. On the other hand, I have met with men and women in religious associations who would have made better undertaker's bearers than Church members; in an epidemic they would make a fortune. With distorted vision, they look upon even sanctified sociability as treason.

H. M. Stanley once met an Englishman in the interior of a foreign land, miles from any other white men. "I greeted him," said Stanley,

> with a "Good Morning!" He did not answer me, but screwed on his eye-glass in a manner that must have been as painful to him as to me; and then, having deliberately viewed my horse and myself for the space of thirty seconds, passed on his way with as much coolness as if he had seen me a thousand times.

That similar characters exist in the religious world my own experience is witness. Leaders in all Christian societies might well give heed to the reminder of George MacDonald:

> You must cultivate, not a spirit of criticism, but the talents that attract people to the hearing of the word.

We must indeed make the Brotherhood movement bright, cheery, gladsome, as the spirit of brotherhood should be. Bright and genial, not as the sun glints on an iceberg, but radiant with the warm, bright light of a sanctified human love. It should be the Sunshine Department of every Church's activities. It must make religious life and service pleasant, scattering roses along the stony ways of life, making religion in its widest implications to correspond with the inspiration and splendour of its holy calling. We must cultivate within the circle of the brotherhood the geniality, kindness, and compassion of the Comrade Christ, that not only "lifts the man up," but supports him, and endeavours to keep him from falling afterwards: then shall we understand in practical life the Psalmist's eulogy of brotherhood,

> Behold how good and how pleasant a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.

III. *The Movement, moreover, is of great educational value, and of a high moral order.*

The Brotherhood movement aims at a happy union of sweetness and light: illumination of mind and inspiration of moral sentiment: a high estimate of intelligence, but the supremacy of virtue: the strength and beauty of the soul. We cannot set too high a value upon the Movement as a distributing agency of pure literature. The annual distribution of prizes in a Sunday School is a carnival of gladness. But for enthusiasm and manifest pride of possession, give me the Prize distribution of a Brotherhood or P.S.A. The Church of Christ has to make her power felt in literature.

Never was there greater need for the dissemination of pure literature than to-day. War literature (if it deserved the name) is dying.

The sex novel has left a nasty taste, and embittered many marital relationships.

The purpose of the Brotherhood movement being what it is, its patronage of pure literature is in every way calculated, not only to aid man in his warfare for truth, but also to be a means whereby he may nurture his soul, and be strong to live, as well as to think. It is piteous even to think that so many writers of books—and it is roughly calculated that writers of fiction number about ten thousand —should not only be so woefully ignorant of the souls of men, but so indifferent to the effect of their productions in the making or marring of character. The writer with a Christlike heart has a reverence for the immortal destiny of his reader. But much of the contents of a bookshop is not literature. Nor are all so-called literary men what Carlyle called "a perpetual priesthood." For journalism and books often prove to be a poisonous fungus that pollutes and debases the purest minds.

But books that are books are handmaids to the gospel of Jesus, and a well-selected and cosily-furnished book parlour might well deserve the consideration and inspire the generosity of Church committees.

I have but faint hopes of influencing a young man's heart on Sunday if for six days he has been imbibing mental poison. Why allow the seeds of uncleanness and crime to gather and germinate on our bookshelves, to destroy the mind, soul, body, and life that came in unsullied purity and beauty from God's hand.

During a discussion at the Church Congress some years ago, Mr. John Trevarthen (for some years superintendent of the Redhill Reformatory) instanced

> the case of a boy who was morally ruined by reading *Modern Babylon;* another boy took to thieving after reading "How bicycles are stolen", and stole eight bicycles a week, by acting on the information he read.

The antidote to this is the dissemination of pure literature. It is recorded that Sir Walter Scott said with deep emotion to a friend toward the close of his life,

> I have been, perhaps, the most voluminous author of the day, and it *is* a comfort to me to think that I have tried to unsettle no man's faith, to corrupt no man's principle, and that I have written nothing which, on my deathbed, I should wish to see blotted out.

The Brotherhood movement is much to be congratulated on this department of its work. The delight of poor men in the reception of their prizes is sufficient reward for the toil and anxiety of the year's work.

> He ate and drank the precious words,
> His spirit grew robust;
> He knew no more that he was poor,
> Nor that his frame was dust.
> He danced along the dingy days,

> And this bequest of wings
> Was but a book. What liberty
> A loosened spirit brings!

IV. More important still is *the emphasis of the Brotherhood movement on the divine and human partnership in building up the spiritual life of man.*

It is a bastard religion that relegates the spiritual and supernatural to a secondary place. *The brotherhood* works by means deeply spiritual. I hold that every attempt at industrial reform and social betterment, to obtain an ideal result, must rest on a spiritual basis. How many movements are supported, if not actually originated, by working men and their leaders, of which it may be said, as some have said of St. George on English tavern-signs—"Always riding on, but never getting anywhere."

A prominent London labour leader among the dockers, in a virulent diatribe, charged the Christian Church with always pandering to the dominant class:

> It has always been reactionary, darkened and polluted the fountains of knowledge, and conveniently postponed its action to some wonderful life beyond the grave.

A Daniel come to judgment! The question was put to him:

> Has your own experience of organized religion brought you to these rather remarkable conclusions?

The extraordinary reply was given:

> *I have had very little actual contact with religious movements for many years.*

And yet this severe censor of the Christian Church was confronted with the great work of Charrington in the Mile End Road; with the colossal headquarters of the Salvation Army; with Dr. Barnardo's Orphanages and Rescue Homes, whose ramifications run to earth's remotest bounds; with the wondrous work of "Whitefield's," "Claremont" and London's "West End Mission"; with the apostolic labours of Canon Barnett and his Toynbee Settlement, which inspired and utilized the brains, beauty, and wealth of Oxford to make the slums of Whitechapel a paradise of the Gods.

Such so-called "reformers" as this Labour leader need to be reminded that only men who are "workers together with God" can ever hope to "build the new Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land"; that good laws can only come through good men, that Christian organizations, industries, and institutions can only be the developments and offshoots of Christian men. The Kingdom of God has come as a fact of personal experience, but only so far as men personally know and do "the good and acceptable and perfect will of God."

The Brotherhood movement will, therefore, "lengthen its cords, strengthen its stakes," and extend the bounds of its habitation, as

it spiritualizes its character and work. The piety of the Middle Ages was very much like a closed fire in a great chimney: a large part of the heat went heavenward. To-day, there is just as much fire, but it is diffused, and warms the house.

An American writer, facing the question whether the prayer-meeting, as one of the forces of the work of the Church, has declined, said:

> As an Episcopalian, I am not particularly acquainted with that devotional feature of Church life. I believe, however, that the prayer-meeting was a form of expression which, perhaps, belonged to a different state of Church life from that on which we have now entered.

I do not know whether that holds good of the Episcopal Church in England, as the writer says it does of the Episcopal Church in the United States. Suffice it to say that the Church or movement that believes that the free and spontaneous access of the soul to God in prayer

> is a form of expression that belongs to a different state of Church life from the present

deserves commiseration. Prayer is the atmosphere in which every genuine Christian movement must live, move, and have its being. The flame of the Inward Light must be safeguarded, the fire must not die down to dusty embers upon the altar.

> To pray together, in whatever tongue or ritual, is the most *tender brotherhood of hope* and sympathy that men can contract in this life.

Let me urge, therefore, on all Brotherhood leaders the great blessings possible from concerted prayer. As McCheyne Edgar has pointed out, the purpose of the Father in heaven who overshadows all is the creation of the Christian brotherhood. In our prayers we fall in with the programme of love, and find that all things are co-operating to this end. In spiritual matters there is no practical limit to attainment through prayer.

V. Finally, I emphasize, *as the great outstanding feature of the Brotherhood movement, the spiritual oneness of all men in Christ.*

We have largely neglected—ignored in many cases, alas, despised—the brotherhood of men in Christ Jesus. Certain it is that in no single instance have we over-emphasized it. Never have we needed to press that charge against human society more than to-day, as much to servant as to master, as much to preacher as to hearer.

Dr. Washington Gladden, reviewing his long ministerial life, said:

> So far as I can see *religion is friendship*. Friendship sums it up on its Godward and human side.

I have found in the Brotherhood movement some of the most precious friendships of my life. We all need sympathy, human kindness. A rich friendship brings an abiding fellowship laden with gentle affection, a cheery inspiration in the midst of discouraging circumstances,

and it brings to bear on others an influence profound and continuous. After long years and changes untold the trace and memory of personal influence remain, "lingering like the sunset light of an evening sky, in the hearts and lives of others."

When a man, moved upward and onward, swayed and impelled by the love of Christ, begins to interest himself in the self-consuming purpose of the Master's heart, how his eyes are opened to see the grandeur and worth of his brother-man! And I believe that in this Brotherhood movement we have gone out, beyond narrow sectarian and sectional partisan limitations, to gather in those who hardly realized at all that Christ died for them. Knowing something of the agony of the Cross, we have endeavoured to persuade the outcast that "One is our Master, even Christ, and all . . . . are brethren." Any movement set on foot to bring that about—the mutual recognition of men as spiritually equal in the sight of God, that every man is his brother's keeper—aims at realizing one of the great, sublime purposes of the Saviour's life and death—"to draw all men unto Himself." If spiritual oneness in Christ were realized, the selfish strife of nations and the tumult of the peoples would be hushed in that deep peace in which "the bugles sound the truce of God to the whole world for ever."

The Jewish Rabbis say that once two affectionate brothers tilled the same farm. On a certain night after the reaping of the harvest, one of them said to his wife, "My brother is a lonely man, who has neither wife nor children, I will go out, and carry some of my sheaves into his field." It happened that on the same night the other said, "My brother has wife and children, and needs the harvest more than I, I will carry some of my sheaves into his field."

So, on the next morning, they each found their respective harvest-heaps unchanged; and thus it happened, night after night, until, at length, one moonlight night, the brothers met, face to face, with their arms full of sheaves; and the light of love in their eyes was brighter than the golden beams of the harvest moon. And on that spot, say the Rabbis, the Temple was built, because it was esteemed the place where earth was nearest heaven.

It is a beautiful illustration of that brotherhood in Christ which is the world's only remedy for all the ills to which flesh is heir. It portrays the noblest attitude of man to man, the conscious presence still in the world of the genial comrade Christ. It was the manifestation of such a spirit as this by Dr. Arnold of Rugby that led the poor to say of him,

> We never knew such a humble man as the Doctor: he comes and shakes us by the hand, as if he was one of us.

We must give forth, if we are to be enriched in return. We must impart to others our fullness of thought, affection, and life, if we, in

turn, are to become endowed with the wealth of other souls. This, emphatically, in my conception of it, is the essence and genius of the Brotherhood movement—love in action fulfilling the law of Christ.

Many a seal has been already set to its ministry. Men alienated from religious worship and the service of the churches have had a new vision of the grandeur of the soul and of the inspiration and spiritual helpfulness of religious association. Slowly, but surely, opinion is deepening to conviction that there is none to seek and save the outcast but saved men who are prepared with the old apostolic enthusiasm to become all things unto all men if by any means they may save some.

We are told that a great French preacher, whose personal life and ministry were specially winning and attractive—a man

> in his duty prompt at every call,
> He watch'd and wept, he pray'd and felt for all—

worked ever according to the counsel given him by his mother at the outset of his career, "Keep a mother's heart for men."

"Having a mother's heart for men" the Brotherhood movement takes every man by the right hand, and lifts him up to a higher altitude of life, and an ever-expanding hope.

The Jubilee of the Brotherhood Movement has reminded the Christian Churches of its great value as an auxiliary for Christian service of a high order. It is a fellowship of faith in man's practical worth to society, and an agent of practical service for world-betterment. The movement is a training school for character, citizenship, and good government. It makes the moral law the basis of social activities. It trains men to fight the legions which batten on current vices. It aims to reduce the strain upon over-burdened, impoverished, and distressed human strength and character. From my association with the Movement in years past I bear witness to its unique value as a Christian auxiliary. It has contributed to the Church's knowledge of the inner life of the home by sympathetic and systematic visitation of the home, emphasized the national need for social purity, the rights of religious freedom, and the solidarity of the human race. Full of earnestness and faith, it recalls men to a sense of duty and obligation. That church has an "understanding of the times" that are, and a sagacious vision of the future we hope to see, which enrolls the Brotherhood as one of its most efficient forces for the consummation of the new world wherein that righteousness shall dwell whose effect shall be "peace for evermore."

Of every worker in this Movement may it be written :

> He forgot his own soul for others,
> Himself to his neighbour lending;
> He found the Lord in his suffering brothers,
> And not in the clouds descending.

HUGH S. GRIFFITHS.

DEVELOPMENTS AND EXPERIMENTS.

This Section of our Journal aims at chronicling not only developments in theological thought and in ecclesiastical organization, but also practical experiments in all branches of religious life and service.

Often when successful attempts have been made to solve some problem in one part of the country, the rest of the Churches remain ignorant, and we trust that these pages will not only serve as a clearing-house of ideas and a record of changing emphasis, but also broadcast valuable information of progress in Church and denominational life.

Our representatives in the Colonies and the United States will from time to time contribute accounts of similar movements. The Editor will be glad to consider brief articles serving this purpose.

A SEMI-JUBILEE RETROSPECT.

KING GEORGE'S semi-jubilee has provoked many books of history and personal reflections. So far as my own reading permits me to judge—and time is too short to allow the busy parson to scan more than a few of the books recommended by reviewers—the writers have been more interested in events than ideas, and more concerned with secular than religious events. Perhaps these authors would maintain that in the last twenty-five years the Church has done little that deserves recording, and they might be right if by history they mean sensational happenings. But there has been much quiet work and some very strenuous thinking, and there is at least as much scope for a volume of ecclesiastical reviews as for Mr. Frank Swinnerton's *The Georgian Literary Scene*. As King George's reign almost exactly coincides with my own life in the Christian ministry I may be permitted to set down a very few of the thoughts that come to me when I compare the present time with those pre-war years when I emerged from a theological college full of faith that we were quickly to put the world right.

Had I to give a title to this amazing period I should be inclined to call it "The Age of Revolt," and had I to explain its antecedents I should be obliged to write paragraphs on such men as Shelley and Swinburne, Rousseau and Nietzsche and Ibsen. Were it necessary to analyze its parts and describe its course I should venture the judgment that it was not primarily a rational revolt but one of those instinctive movements which are frequently astonishing the student of history. But my aim is to describe rather than explain, and I shall view the scene frankly as a Churchman and more particularly as a Congregationalist.

The first thing that strikes me is that organized religion seems to be playing a much smaller part in the public life of the country than it did. Denominational leaders are now denominational leaders and

not, as they were, national figures. I mentioned some time ago to a group of students the name of one of our most honoured ministers and they had never heard of him. That set me thinking, and I concluded that in our great cities (it may be different in holiday resorts—and that in itself is a significant thing) we have no men who occupy the place Dale occupied in Birmingham or even the place that Arnold Thomas had in Bristol. The difference is most striking in the relationship of religion and politics. There is no need for me to describe the state of affairs say in 1906. Deacons' vestries were described as Liberal committee rooms. It was even hinted that pulpits were tuned by party organizations. If these things were uncharitable it is true that ministers were considerably indebted to A. G. G. in the then *Daily News* and that in the North the *Manchester Guardian* was regarded as almost verbally inspired. When elections came no one was surprised if pastors hurried from their week-night services where their eloquence was imperfectly appreciated to mass meetings where their points were received with vociferous applause. Those thrilling times have gone.

But how much is loss and how much is gain? It is a tremendous gain not to have Christian people divided into political camps almost coinciding with religious denominations. It is a great gain, too, for ministers to be kept to their own job. And my impression is that we are going deeper, speaking less on current topics, and speaking more on the eternal themes. There are more reasons than one for this. The war made us examine our foundations. Many movements help us to realize the inadequacy of the superficial optimism which was so much in vogue. Some of us had been travelling in Barth's direction before ever we heard of Barth, though few of us will go as far as he has gone. We feel that what used to be called the Social Gospel is too thin and bare for the deep realities of life. Our confidence in ourselves has been shaken, and if we have anything of worth for our generation it is that the shock has cast us through despair to God. In consequence, the Congregational ministry is changing before our eyes.

But the change has its dangers as well as its promise of good. There is the danger of remoteness from the people and the thought and aspirations of the people. In Sabatier's *Life of St. Francis of Assisi* it is emphasized again and again that one of the reasons of the success of the Franciscan movement was that Francis identified himself and his movement with the people: "He had their poetry and their aspirations, he espoused their claims." It has been the reason of our success, when we have succeeded. We should fear for ourselves and for our usefulness anything that tends to make our congregations like little gardens walled around. The study of Scripture and theology will not save us. Bishop Gore in *The Philosophy of the*

Good Life complained that philosophy had lost power because it had turned its strength to fine speculations and got out of touch with morals. And theology when there is inadequate contact with a work-a-day world may make wonderful systems but it will not make men: it may move logicians to admiration, but it will never move sinners to repentance.

There is another danger which calls for attention: the danger of returning to some old-fashioned theology and imagining that we are re-discovering the depths of the Gospel. That there are things to be learned from an old-fashioned theology—as indeed there are from the liberalism out of which we are passing—I should be the last to deny; but the way is forward, not back. Even as a matter of policy it is unsound to go back, for while the almost forgotten phrases may please the old they will alienate young people to whom they will be meaningless. But it is not a mere matter of policy. It is surely the very genius of our faith to say: "They must upward still, and onward, who would keep abreast of Truth." To keep clear-eyed to new revelations, to be amongst those who can still venture and still follow the gleam, is more important than finding ourselves in the majority. We need not deny progress because we deny some of the too optimistic things said about it.

But most of these observations apply to religious people generally. Let me now speak of things that concern us more particularly as Free Churchmen. Practically every denomination will admit to hard times, sparse congregations, and so on. But some denominations are affected more than others. So far as this country is concerned, churches that are quite unashamed of their Protestantism are finding it heavier going than the people who profess some form of Catholicism. When Newman wrote the *Apologia* he said that he was conscious not only of an accuser and an accusation (*i.e.*, the charges made by Charles Kingsley) but of

> the bias of the Court. It is the state of the atmosphere; it is the vibration all around, which will echo his bold assertion.

It is *we* who have to complain of the bias of the Court, the state of the atmosphere, to-day. We seem to be working against a prejudice that is widespread. The reasons for this are many, and perhaps no one person is capable of stating them all, but let me mention some of the things that have impressed me.

The first thing is the remarkable change that has taken place in the popular attitude to conscience. Most of us were brought up on that word. Our teachers may not have explained exactly what they meant by it, but somehow they made us understand that there is a Divine inward monitor and judge whose voice we dare not disobey. And the strength of the old preachers was that they set themselves deliberately to give to men what in the Scriptures is called "a good

conscience." There was Alex. Whyte treating the *Old Testament* as we could not and leaving our minds unsatisfied on some critical matters, but always aiming at that "inward monitor." There was John Henry Newman representing a different school and starting another tradition, but saying of conscience that it

> is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas.

And behind these popular teachers was a succession of great men like Wordsworth, with his Ode to Duty and the famous phrase "Stern Daughter of the Voice of God," and Kant, who said that two things bowed him down with wonder and awe, the starry heavens above and the moral law within; and Butler who said that "if conscience had might as it has right, it would absolutely govern the world." These were representatives of different types of thought, and what they taught was accepted by many who disagreed on other matters, but nowhere was it accepted more readily than amongst the men who became famous for the Nonconformist conscience.

But conscience is no longer a popular word. Some years ago an eminent dramatic critic said:

> The word conscience is a good bogy, but conscience-stricken people are really invalids.

That was startling then. It has become almost a commonplace now. After a service in which I had said something on the subject, a Cambridge graduate came and complained that he did not like this talk about conscience. He could not say exactly why he objected, but he did object. In some of our more serious literature the protest is still more emphatic. Professor Joad calls conscience

> our old Victorian acquaintance, the policeman of society, stationed within the individual citadel itself, a spy in the service of society.

He goes on

> Like a dog that does not stop us from passing, but that we cannot prevent from barking, conscience voices the disapproval of society.

The assumption behind that statement—and the same assumption shows itself in many other places, especially in certain books of psychology—is that conscience is nothing more or less than a social product. "Stern Daughter of the Voice of God"?—that is nonsense. Conscience is Mrs. Grundy; and if there is one thing a really modern person is determined upon it is that he is not going to be ruled by Mrs. Grundy. With that we sympathize, but also we know that when conscience is dethroned men become like sailors without compass on uncharted sea.

Or take another great word. Few things thrilled me as a lad more than the idea of Freedom. I used to read about the men who fought for liberty of conscience and speech, liberty of worship and the press. I soaked myself in anti-slavery and other poems by Whittier,

Lowell, Cowper, Wordsworth, and many more. And as a young minister there was nothing I so delighted to preach about as freedom. I laboured to understand Paul, especially on freedom from the Law. I gave series of addresses on "Fighters for Freedom and the Faith." And what I passionately longed for was a world free from legalism and poverty, militarism and economic tyranny, drunkenness, and all vice. And I was in the ministry because I believed that Christ came to preach deliverance to captives, and I was in the Congregational ministry because there I thought a man would have most elbow room. I speak of myself, but I was only one of many. We may have been unsophisticated and superficial, but we believed that we had been called to help in the great task of setting at liberty them that are bruised and of making a world of free men.

But to-day we are likely to be called ranters if we talk like that. Superior folk will arch their brows and answer us with an icy word. People have other things to talk about from political platforms and in some countries dictators of the extreme right or the extreme left have been hailed as the saviours of the people. People have other things to talk about at religious conferences where they are at least as interested in authority as liberty. Liberty has become a problem rather than a gospel, even with those of us who still call ourselves Free Churchmen. Here, again, there are many reasons, not the least being the exaggerations of men who thought that a free man was superior to restraint and discipline. Extravagant men like Shelley and Swinburne will always swell the ranks of the reactionaries—ultimately. They will always make it necessary for the true lover of freedom to explain that there is no freedom for those who refuse to make the moral law their law.

With the loss of respect for conscience and freedom there has been a diminishing interest in *preaching*. The Free Churches (and perhaps Congregationalism in particular) have been built up on preaching. Even after the Victorian era the preacher was held in great respect, and men accepted his ministry with gratitude. Think of the crowds that listened to Parker and Spurgeon, and the excellent congregations that listened to indifferent sermons all over the country. But it was a preaching age outside the Church as well as inside. Practically everyone who counted mounted some sort of pulpit. Macaulay wrote history, Browning and Tennyson wrote poems, Mrs. Gaskell and George Eliot wrote novels, but they all preached. Even the artists such as Holman Hunt and Ford Madox Brown and G. F. Watts loved to give good morals with their pictures. The world was full of preachers and preaching.

And to-day almost the whole world is in revolt. No one could paint pictures like "Hope" or "The Light of the World" without being called a Philistine. The poets are protesting that it is not their

business to save men's souls or to moralize. True, Mr. H. G. Wells sometimes dons the prophetic mantle and Mr. Bernard Shaw preaches —with his tongue in his cheek; but they have never out-grown the Victorian mentality. The men who imagine themselves to be leading the thought and habits of this post-war world would not dare to preach without many apologies. Even some in the Christian ministry have lost their faith in the power of the pulpit. They are concentrating on the study-group or the conference chamber—not without reason, for preaching had become too conventional both in its method and its content, and there are possibilities in the group which we no longer ignore. Others have turned to the altar and disparaged preaching in order to emphasize worship. The disparagement is to be regretted, though here also there are things to be learned. I share with the majority of my brethren in Congregationalism my respect for the Genevan type of worship, but surely all the liturgical wealth of the Church of all ages is ours and we impoverish ourselves needlessly if we refuse it.

But I still believe in preaching—that is real preaching with personal thought and conviction and experience and human sympathy in it. The mere commentator has had his day. He cannot compete with the many counter attractions of these crowded times. Expository preaching is needed; but it must be preaching born of a marriage between the written word and the living personality. Above all, we need preaching full of the spirit of Christ. Not necessarily full of the name of Christ but so full of His spirit that whatever the subject may be men feel that the regulating passion is the love of Christ. Preaching like that is no child's play. It is one of the most august tasks given to the children of men.

All this may sound depressing, for it suggests that all along the line we are suffering reverses. But one of these days we shall find—or those who come after us will find—that men have wearied of the fallacy of recoil. When that day will dawn no man knows, but I am not alone in thinking that there is a new light upon the horizon. We must not wait for tides to turn but go on with our work whether men will hear or whether they will forbear. Not proclaiming our Gospel with threats and bad temper but in love and forbearance and sweet reasonableness. And proclaiming it not only in the sermons and doctrines of the Church but in the power of a victorious life.

F. H. Ballard.

CONGREGATIONALISM TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW.

Congregationalism, if vital and active and thorough, produces a Church life free, elastic, adaptable, and free from that regimentation and standardization which has gripped religion and is rapidly

invading all spheres of life. This freedom from traditional rules and regulations and creeds gives the Spirit of Christ a chance to break out in new directions, and to seek its ends by new methods. This freedom is risky and even dangerous, but it is worth preserving and it is our task to preserve it. To drop it out of the life of the Church universal would be a tragedy. Congregationalism is not a fad which may be adopted or discarded at will: it is a principle essential to the life of the Church: without it the Church will lack a vital part of its function and experience.

My view of the past is that our forefathers were amply justified in creating Congregationalism, and that we to-day are equally justified in perpetuating it. *Are we doing this?* Are we living out truly the principle on which our churches are founded? In many ways, *No!* In what way are we failing?

The greatest threat to Congregationalism to-day comes not from without but from within, not from experiments in organization but from enervation of life. We cannot preserve our principles by regulations and organization and money, they can be preserved only by the vitality of our inner spiritual life. It is not the vote in a Church meeting which counts, it is the mind of Christ in the voter.

We are free to organize in any way we are guided by Christ, and we need not be afraid of experiments in organization; but there is all the difference in the world between organization brought in to buttress up a decaying Church and depleted coffers, and organization growing out of spiritual life and passion. If our present organization is thwarting and cramping our spiritual energy, let us scrap it, or reform it and make it an efficient servant of our life; but if it is lack of spiritual energy which is making our present organization creak and groan, that same lack of vitality will make any and every organization we may create creak and groan in the same way.

> 'Tis life of which our nerves are scant,
> More life and fuller that we want.

That life we must have if Congregationalism is to be preserved alive. The life is available for us, it is within our reach, and it will come to us along two definite lines:

1. *A more real and vital personal union with and loyalty to Christ on the part of every Church member.*

I utterly disagree with those who say there is no spiritual life in our churches. The spiritual urge which keeps some of our members with their noses to the grindstone, and their hands reaching deep into their pockets year in and year out, is something very great and vital. No amount of passing enthusiasm can ever take the place of that steady, persistent toil for Christ which, although it neither looks nor sounds romantic, yet bears upon it the authentic mark of Christ.

It is not in the central core but in the outer fringe where our failure lies, in those members who are seen at church once on a Sunday occasionally, never at a week-night service or Church meeting, whose spiritual link with their fellow-members is practically non-existent. If we could only bring these half-hearted souls to face Jesus Christ frankly and sincerely, and give Him the full loyalty of their lives, one of our greatest problems would be solved.

2. *A real vital spiritual fellowship of the whole Church membership.*

Without this there can be no true Congregationalism. I believe the time has now come when we must achieve a real Church meeting in every church. I do not mean a business meeting, but a meeting of the whole church in spiritual fellowship. The real business of a Church meeting is spiritual, not material; its essence is spiritual fellowship built up on personal spiritual life. Most of the routine business of a church could with advantage be delegated by the church to elected committees, and leave the Church meeting free to develop along its true lines. The time and place of the Church meeting should be carefully fixed, the Communion service might be the Church meeting, but not wedged in at the close of a service when people want to get home; the essential thing is that it should be a real fellowship of the whole church, a real experience and not an undefined vague feeling.

The one test of membership which I would impose would be regular attendance at such a Church meeting, unless reasonably excused. And I would like to see some real discipline and authority exercised in this matter. I think a Congregational Church has both right and authority to insist that if a man *joins* its fellowship, he shall *join in* it. If a man will not *join in* he should not *join up*. A roll of adherents is not the same thing as a roll of real Church members. Those people who are so ready to be present in spirit, and so rarely present in body, are blocking and not building up fellowship.

To revive in our churches a high personal spiritual life and a warm communal fellowship would solve most of our problems and overcome most of our difficulties. In that warm spiritual atmosphere of fellowship the petty quarrels and disagreements, the likes and dislikes, the prejudices and cliques, which are a serious danger to our existence, would melt away like mists in the sun. Out of such vigorous spiritual life would grow organization which would express our distinctive genius, and serve us efficiently in our crusade to bring the outsider in. It was such vigorous spiritual life and such warm spiritual fellowship which created our churches, and these alone can keep us alive now, and send us into the future with brave hearts.

What will that future be like? The answer depends upon how far ahead we look. I propose to have two looks ahead, one into the far future, say fifty years ahead, and one into the immediate future which faces us to-day.

What will our world be like fifty years ahead? My vision of it, which cannot be either proved or disproved, is set forth as a guide to future developments.

1. *Work and Leisure.* I believe everybody between say 18 and 60 will have to work three days a week, and everybody will have four days a week enforced leisure. These four days leisure will be available for cultural education and enjoyment of all kinds. This will affect greatly our ministry, for there will be a far greater scope for and use of voluntary workers.

2. *Poverty* will be no more. The thorough application of scientific machinery and methods, and the solving of the problem of distribution, will have made available for all a sufficiency of food, clothes, shelter, and warmth. The plenty which is now within our reach will then be within our grasp. This will affect our Church finances; money will take a far less important place in our work.

3. *The development of Radio and Television* and its availability by the pressing of a switch in every home, will have a great effect on the recreational and educational possibilities of life. The effect on Sunday Schools may be enormous. Real Christian education may reach great heights.

These are three revolutions we may expect to take place in the next fifty years. Others more wonderful may be just round the corner. The effect upon religion and Church organization will be very great. May I for a moment try to picture the Congregationalism of a large town fifty years ahead?

The present church buildings will long ago have been sold. There will be one big beautiful church, which will be common property to many churches of different types of thought; the Congregational use of the building may be on any one of the four days of leisure. There will be but one personally conducted service of public worship a week at which all Congregationalists will be present. There will be one Church roll, one financial account, one diaconate, one full-time minister, one organization for educating children in Christian worship, thought and service. Round this central church will be sectional groups meeting in various parts of the town for fellowship, prayer, and study along definite lines. These will be organized by voluntary workers, and will carry on missionary work to the outsider, visit the sick, and gather in new members. Radio and television on the exclusive Church wave-length will be extensively used both in these groups and in the central church building. The whole organization will be efficient but elastic, and it will ensure the intimacy of the small group and the inspiration of the big crowd. There will be thus in each town one Church, one body, one spirit, many members, diverse methods and various activities.

So much for fifty years ahead.

What of the immediate future which we are now facing?

No one can deny that we are faced to-day with great difficulties and perplexing problems, but this is no new experience for the Church of Christ. We need not worry because we live in hard times, for the Spirit of Christ, which has remained undaunted and unconquered for nearly 2000 years, will, if we possess it, give us the power to overcome.

I want to say a few words about three of our problems to-day, Finance, Grouping, and Buildings.

1. *Finance.* A very few words will suffice on this question. With declining numbers, we have less people to give, and a demand for more money to be given. To solve the problem, either our present people must give more, or we must gather in more people to give. The problem again is not in the centre, but in the circumference, of our churches. The only way to make our finance equal to our needs is to revive the spiritual life of our churches, especially the half-hearted fringe. If we do not and cannot revive the spiritual life of all our churches, it will not be many years before finance will not matter either way; you cannot keep dead churches going, even if you have the money. Meanwhile we must spend the money we have economically and wisely, and this leads us to our other problems.

2. *Grouping.* This is a very live topic to-day. The word "grouping" is becoming like the blessed word "Mesopotamia," a kind of fetish to be uttered when everything else has failed. The saddest fact about this urge for grouping is the motive behind it. True grouping is not a last refuge from bankruptcy; if we are driven into grouping only by financial pressure, it will be a ghastly failure. The only true aim of grouping is the more efficient working of the Church in carrying out the will of Christ, and unless there is behind it brotherly love and spiritual fellowship, no good can possibly come of it.

The method of grouping is not a simple, but a complex matter. Do we see clearly exactly what we are seeking to do? I can see at least five different types of grouping applicable to the various problems we are facing:

(*a*) Where two or more churches amalgamate and form one united church in one building.

(*b*) Where two or more churches amalgamate into one united church, but use two or more buildings.

(*c*) Where two or more churches co-operate and co-ordinate their work and finances, but each church retains its self-government within the group.

(*d*) Where two or more churches share the cost and services of a minister, without any co-ordination of their work or general finances.

(*e*) Where a strong church takes oversight and charge of a weak church or a group of weak churches.

When you say "Grouping," make sure you know what you are seeking to do, and whether it is suited to the problem you are facing. Grouping may mean more economical spending, but unless it means more efficient evangelizing it will not be worth it. The spiritual aim and motive and spirit must be uppermost in all schemes of grouping. I hope all our churches and officials will take great care that this is so.

3. *Buildings.* We are carrying to-day far too many big old buildings for either our health or efficiency. We are suffering from an overplus of vacant seats. In one district of eight churches there are every Sunday more than 3,000 empty seats, at least eight seats vacant for every one occupied. Can anything be more depressing to the insider and more repellent to the outsider than such a state of affairs? Our congregations to-day are in most cases too small for inspiration, and too large for intimacy of fellowship. We must not hang on to buildings as if the building were the church, or we shall be in danger of having a building hung round our necks, and being drowned in the depths of the sea of sentimental traditionalism.

We must also beware of putting too much of our money into new buildings, and especially in new areas. I must confess I feel a real concern about our policy in this matter. There are many costly buildings being erected to-day and saddled with debt, which have only the faintest chance of ever becoming strong churches. We have many problems of down-town churches; we shall have a bigger problem soon of new-area churches. To spend £10,000 to £12,000 on buildings, and raise £300 a year for a minister means in far too many cases a burden which the area cannot possibly carry.

Are we then to leave these areas unchurched? No! But there are other ways of doing the real job of gathering the people into a Church fellowship. Why not run a Church bus, calling for all who wish to attend church, bringing them in to one of the central churches, and taking them home again free of all charge to them? To spend £1 or more a week in this way would give new areas a chance of Church fellowship, and would fill the pews of the central church and revive its life. And if the time came when the numbers filled more than a double-decker bus, then would be the time to think of erecting buildings. The same applies to scholars for the Sunday School. I commend the idea, which is not so foolish as it may at first appear.

And when the time comes to erect buildings, why spend so much money in such permanent premises? I have talked this matter over with a well known architect, and he has prepared plans embodying ideas by which a church and schools can be built for as low a figure

as £1,750. The church has a seating capacity of 272 minimum and 420 maximum, the school will accommodate 148 minimum and 250 maximum. Provision is made for choir, organ chamber, two vestries, kitchen, lavatories, heating, drainage, *etc.* The building is good-looking, both outside and inside. It is designed for a life of 30 to 40 years, and considering the rapid changes of modern life this is quite long enough: the houses in some areas will not last much longer.

In these two ways an economy of our financial resources is possible which would liberate money for the real work of the Church and ministry. I commend these plans not only to our own denomination but to others facing the same problems.

J. W. G. Dew.

FILMS AND THE FIGHT FOR PEACE.

Attention has been repeatedly called to the power of the film as an instrument of peace. As a means of conveying vivid imagery the cinema is without equal. It can create habits and codes of morals, establish fashions and modes of speech, and turn out audiences of "fans," all admiring the same technique and behaviour and, in their own simple ways, emulating them. The number of would-be Garbos, all "groomed" to a pattern, and their attendant swains, mouthing admiration or disapproval in best Chicago vernacular is proof enough. From the same premises would it not be possible to create an anti-war mind or a "peace complex" sufficiently powerful to sway lukewarm politicians?

The answer is in the affirmative—but with strong qualifications. The very nature of moving picture entertainment imposes restrictions. Slowly, but surely, film caterers have educated their audiences to weather the emotional storms caused by scenes of horror and butchery. Your habitual picture-goer will tolerate the "shooting-up" of scores of victims in the short space of an hour without moving a muscle. Gone are the stifled screams and catches of breath, once heard, as human suffering is portrayed. The gangster and crook have dispelled all that. They have case-hardened the average film audience to such an extent that nothing short of prohibitive ghastliness will stir its feelings.

And what is the nature of such feelings once they are stirred? Simply a wave of emotion, talked about the day after and then forgotten. Habitual film-going dulls the susceptibilities by constant doses of a virus which in time renders the object immune from all but actual living experience. The vicarious appeal of books or films leaves us cold.

The efforts of the cinema trade are of little help in the cause of peace. Even the useful newsreel has become a monotonous repetition of manœuvres, reviews of troops, and international upheavals. The

"close-up" of a dying Cabinet minister or an assassinated king are of vastly more importance to the camera-man than the normal daily jobs of men living in a world at peace. Commentators thrill as they describe the latest additions to armories in field and air. They are unconscious recruiting sergeants to a younger generation who know not war and to whom the Forces and their movements are a break from the routine of men at peace. It is no fabrication to say that many bored young men of these days, unable to grasp the nature of the next war, would hail with joy an event which would give them access to the thrills and freedom of the Services which they only know through film contact.

Producers do little to help in peace propaganda. A brief vision of horror is soon blotted out in a burst of national pride or heroism. Theirs to portray the armies with banners, not the nerve-racked youngsters or the dressing station. And if some stark reality manages to creep in the film, it is soon antidoted by the glamour of war. More time is spent in admiring the power and efficiency of a mighty piece of artillery and the triumph of man's control over it than in the shocking results which follow its use.

So-called propaganda films have not yet succeeded in shaking us out of our apathy. The track of such is marked by no spurts in L.N.U. membership. They are too intent on incidents of war, productive of admiration and desire to emulate, than on constructive peace, which cries out for maintenance.

A survey of a few such films is disappointing. "Kamaradschaft" stands out as a lesson that human need and common interests transcend frontiers and politics. It is a constructive negation of the use of war. "The Man I Killed" was another impressive landmark, a monument to the folly of nations, as was "All Quiet on the Western Front." Such works should be constantly released to successive generations of film-goers. Most of the rest are negligible as peace propaganda. They present feats of heroism, which, alas, must be forgotten if the glamour of war is to be condemned. They postulate campaigns as necessities for heroism and comradeship and suffuse us with the unhealthy glow of the old war-fever which once we knew too well.

To insist on compulsory showing of propaganda or educational films of any kind is akin to enforcing half-time symphonies or Shakespearean recitals on football crowds. But forcible feeding is not the only way of breeding an idea or pointing a moral. The absurdities of so-called prohibition or the tyrannies of gangsters and "bosses" were not exposed to American audiences chafing under quotas of forced medicine. The pill was gilded and equally potent.

International friendship and brotherhood can be fostered by mutual understanding, and in this field of work the film-camera is

unrivalled. It can show a world of men working and playing and all activated by the same motives. It can promote sympathy and fellow-feeling. It can present moving accounts without the spice of political faction or party aims. Under the eye of the camera the old racial prejudices disappear as each nation discovers in the others the same joys and sorrows, the same good and evil, and the same underlying motives and strivings.

Nationalism and language are still barriers to the full understanding of other nations' points of view through the cinema. Talking films have added another difficulty unknown in "silent" days. We cannot understand their dialogue. This might be overcome by duplication of speaking parts or the super-imposing of printed translations if the ban of censorship (even in Britain !) were lifted. Quotas and prohibitions still deprive us of many masterpieces, which can only be seen at occasional private shows or film society meetings.

On the whole, however, in normal times the film is rather an over-rated means of propaganda. It is too superficial and of transient effect. Yet it is one ingredient in the reasoning process which leads to the conviction that war is folly. Better use might be made of this medium, which approaches nearest to actual reality. The Peace Ballot proves this generation's views of war. The film can supplement literature in passing on to a generation which knows not the horrors of battle the views and feelings of those who knew its pain and grief. Film companies and directors might bear this in mind as they make their moving records of our times.

H. BLUNDELL.

LEAVEN.

A SAYING of Jesus, warning his disciples about the "leaven" of his opponents occurs with variations in all the Synoptics.

> *Mk.* 8^{15}. Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and of Herod.
> *Matt.* 16^{6}. Take heed and beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and Sadduccees.
> *Lk.* 12^{1}. Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees which is hypocrisy.

The difficulty of relating the saying to the context is obvious from reference to the Commentaries. Dr. C. H. Turner in *Gore* on the Markan passage does not know what to do with the saying :

> The development of the episode, otherwise quite straightforward, is interrupted by an intrusive reference to the leaven of the Pharisees and Herod . . . . it seems best to treat it as purely parenthetical : the discussion about the loaves reminds the Evangelist of the saying about the leaven.

H. G. Wood in *Peake* on the same passage says it is a "genuine utterance" but "does not necessarily belong to its present context"—which doesn't help us much ! Godet and Plummer think the warning may have been given more than once. Perhaps—but what did it

mean? The line generally taken is that of Bartlet, on *Mk.* 8^{15}, *Cent. B.*

> The leaven of the Pharisees is defined in *Lk.* 12^{1} as religious formalism; and this is probably in Jesus' mind. The leaven of Herod would be worldliness of mind and the policy it leads to.

This seems to me to be unconvincing. If the context of any of the Gospels is right, a reference to hypocrisy is irrelevant.

The sequence of events seems to be as follows: Jesus feeds the vast crowd who have gathered round him. The effect, according to *John,* is that they try to make Him king. This would be fatal to His mission, as He conceived it, so He sends the disciples off, and Himself dismisses the crowd, and retires up the mountain side. We next see Jesus with the disciples on the other (Western) side of the Lake, near Tiberias. The Pharisees have sent a deputation to ascertain what their own attitude to Him shall be. They "seek a sign from heaven." But, as always, Jesus refuses to perform any wonder to their orders. "Why do the men of to-day seek a sign? I tell you no sign shall be given to the men of to-day" (*Mk.* 8^{12}, Moffatt). (*John* at this point says that a crowd gathers again, with a demand for a sign. The Jews say, "Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know?" The reply of Jesus is: "No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him.") Then follows the talk in the boat in which, according to *Mk.* and *Matt.,* the saying occurs. Surely the "leaven of the Pharisees" was a reference to this clamouring for signs and wonders with which Jesus was beset. People of their learning ought to have known better. "Beware of basing my credentials on physical happenings like the feeding of the crowd! This is what the Pharisees want me to do. My claims to leadership are on far different grounds—spiritual ones."

This interpretation makes the saying both relevant and understandable. For Jesus never based His claims on the doing of extraordinary things within the physical realm. That is not necessarily evidence of superior wisdom or spiritualty, and "Nine days' wonders" are notoriously short-lived.

The Lucan saying bears out our interpretation, if we omit the explanatory clause "which is hypocrisy." "Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees. For there is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, neither hid that shall not be known. Therefore whatsoever ye have spoken in darkness shall be heard in the light." Truth will out, in fact. There is no need to attempt to propagate it by performing tricks. As A. T. Cadoux remarks[1]:

> The evil in our opponents always tempts us to evil of like kind, We are apt to answer with the same unlawful weapons. The saying shows that even Jesus felt the same temptation.

[1] *The Parables of Jesus,* 203.

The warning is not out of date—*vide* the appeal to bodily healing and table rappings as evidence of spiritual truth and insight.

The "leaven of Herod" is generally interpreted as referring to political ambition. But again, where is its relevance here? Herod, so far as his attitude to John the Baptist and Jesus is concerned, is chiefly pictured as impressed with a kind of superstitious fear. Conscience made him a coward toward teachers who spoke the truth about his way of life. At one time he thought Jesus was John risen from the dead. But though he feared and to some extent respected John and Jesus, he never took their messages to heart, or allowed them to affect his character or conduct. Is not this the "leaven of Herod"—the paying to Jesus of the kind of reverence that amounts to superstition, because it does not lead to any real, inward bowing of the will to His commands, and of the minds to His truth? This, too, is an evil leaven which still works corruption in Christians, *e.g.*, in the singing of hymns extolling Christ, while the life remains unaffected and unsurrendered.

The above interpretation makes the saying relevant to the context, and refers to the kind of subtle danger to which we might expect Jesus to call attention by such a figure as the leaven.

E. C. D. Stanford.

HYMN FOR THE UNEMPLOYED.

O God, with man through Christ allied
To perfect Thy love's will,
On friends of ours for whom Christ died
We ask Thy mercy still.
They idle stand in market place,
By silent mill or yard,
Their strength unwanted in wealth's chase,
Their skill no man's regard.

We pray for workless workers, Lord,
Their wives and little ones,
And for ourselves, if our full board
Deprive our brethren's sons.
Strong as our hearts feel may minds plan
To take away want's fear:
Be love of Thee in love of man
Our urgent service here.

F. J. Shaw.

ON LIFE AND BOOKS.

SOME SUMMER DAYS.

I. *17th June.* Middlesex *v.* Yorkshire at Lord's.

Four of the Yorkshire team were engaged in the Test Match, and young Hutton, the boy of 18 whom Sutcliffe says is to be England's No. 1 in the future, had been taken ill. Loyalty demanded, however, that Yorkshire must be supported at Lord's, and so I hurried up from the West of England to be in time for the opening of the gates on Monday morning. There had been no play on Saturday and thunderstorms on Sunday, so cricket was by no means certain; as it was, a long day's play, full of events, rewarded the faithful.

Sellers was soon leading on to the field a Yorkshire team with an unfamiliar look about it. Bowes was not there, nor Verity, and even the keenest of partisans wondered whether the reserves would be able to beat a Middlesex team which was complete except for Robins, with Hearne and Hendren to threaten a long stand as aforetime. The fears of the doubters were soon found to be groundless. Within ten minutes Hart had spooned a ball to mid-off, Hendren had played a straight one with his pads, and Smailes had rudely disarranged the stumps of the immaculate Hearne. Three wickets down for 4 runs! Yorkshire II, taking control of the game in characteristic fashion, for all the world as if they were their elders! The bowlers swept away the opposition like chaff: Smailes hit the stumps 5 times and the scoreboard showed 8 for 32. But who is this son of Anak approaching the middle? He bears the commonest name in England, and a bat that looks like a child's toy. The fieldsmen made their way to the boundary, and Macaulay, who had taken a wicket with the previous ball, his first, looked fiercer than ever. Ten runs came from the rest of the over, to the bowler's evident indignation. Man after man went to the boundary until it was the easiest thing in the world to take singles or two's if desired; but it was the boundary and beyond that attracted Smith, and once when he swung his bat quite listlessly we were surprised to find the ball in the stand. Less than half-an-hour brought the score to 105, Smith's total being 57, while Muncer skilfully held the other end. The Yorkshire bowling and captaincy were strangely unimaginative at this period. Sellers stood ruminating on the boundary, changing the bowling from Macaulay to Smailes and Robinson at one end and from Turner to Fisher at the other, but apparently giving them no tips. In truth, they bowled far too well, throwing the ball well up to the fast-footed, if keen-eyed, Smith, who had nothing to do but stand and hit it. Wilfred Rhodes certainly—and Verity probably—would have made him go to the ball, flighting it to fall short of a length, or dropping it well to the off. It was only when Fisher did this that Smith mis-hit and was caught.

Middlesex were out for 108, and an old Yorkshireman sitting next to me said that on such a wicket (really it wasn't bad at all) the depleted Yorkshire eleven would find it difficult to get as many. I opined that Barber and Mitchell would pass the score, at which he offered to bet me a bottle of champagne that they would not. I replied that he was not risking much, and that ten bottles to one would be fairer. He demurred, but when after an hour and a half's delightfully free batting the score was 109 for 0, he said "I'd have been prepared to bet 10 to 1 that they couldn't have done it"! So speedily do men forget. But perhaps it was not surprising in this case.

The old man had been away from Yorkshire for many years and was always forgetting that his speech was supposed to be "South Country". A sentence like "I cahn't see them getting the ranns" or "If they play until 6.45 I shall be late for dinnah" would be followed by sentences which made up for lack of aspirates by the richness of their vowels.

Yorkshire were 207 before the first wicket fell—and they were 215 for 4. Peebles, not wanted in the Test Match, did not bowl well, though he tied up Fisher, who did not get to the pitch of the ball and deserved to fall a victim, as fall he did. Wood batted well, as he had done frequently in previous weeks. He has the courage of his convictions, gets his runs in front of the wicket, and hits the ball hard. The day closed with Yorkshire 307 for 6, scored in little more than four hours: almost invariably Yorkshire, whose slow scoring is a frequent theme of the London papers, score more quickly than their opponents. Next day it rained and there was no play, but the one day had served, as so often in the past, to make London Yorkshiremen cock-a-whoop.

II. *2nd July.* England *v.* South Africa, at Lord's.

The day opened with South Africa definitely on top. Yesterday we had seen English batting which was too bad to be true, and English bowling which lacked sting and variety. Why Robins, one of the best of cricketers to watch, had been left out of the team for a match to be played on a ground with whose tricks he is so familiar, is a mystery only the Selection Committee could solve. T. B. Mitchell, who had been preferred to him, proved quite unreliable, his erratic length contrasting with that of Balaskas, who scarcely bowled a loose ball in 2½ hours. The African Mitchell was still batting, and he continued to give a copy-book exhibition. He and Langton added another hundred runs before the latter was out, and Wade immediately declared. The less said about the English team this morning the better. Whether it was because they were carrying three crocks or not I do not know, but they were listless and dispirited. One thing that becomes more and more clear is that Wyatt is not a captain. He is a fine bat and Wade's equal in the field—both of them stopped many cannon balls at silly mid off—and no mean bowler, but to-day he utterly failed to enthuse his men. Mitchell he overbowled yesterday; to-day he gave him one over only; Verity was steady and kept down runs; Nichols worked hard as usual; Langridge caused the batsmen no trouble. Wyatt only bowled four overs himself, which was a pity, and it was strange he did not call upon Leyland, who, although his length is by no means irreproachable, can make the ball spin, and often gets a wicket when the stock bowlers fail. And to put Sutcliffe in the long field was asking for trouble: men over 40 cannot sprint, and Sutcliffe's pulled muscle might have been avoided.

And if England were disappointing in the field what can be said about their batting? Some of the spectators thought they would go for the runs—there was ample time—but Wyatt and Sutcliffe (accompanied by a runner) were content to keep their wickets intact and score 17 in the 40 minutes before lunch. One had memories of the way in which Wyatt and Walters set about the Players' bowling last year and won the match for the Gentlemen by fine, forcing cricket. Tactics of this kind could not have failed more disastrously than did those adopted by the English team. Perhaps the idea was to go for the runs after lunch, Sutcliffe holding the fort while his companions made the pace; there were indications of this, for Wyatt was out to a forcing stroke, and Hammond scored 27 by aggressive cricket reminiscent of the Hammond of his best years. Soon they were gone, and Leyland, too; and the rest was a procession. Holmes failed as lamentably

with the bat as he had done in the slips, Ames was uneasy in both innings, and the others never caused Wade to deviate from his plan by a hair's breadth.

England were beaten thoroughly, beaten at all points from the Selection Committee to the wicketkeeper—captain, batting, bowling, fielding, all included. The Selection Committee still has that tender feeling for amateurs which will not do in these days—*why* was E. R. T. Holmes brought into the team? Of course, one does not expect the M.C.C. to be democratic and appoint the best man captain, irrespective of whether he is an amateur or not: for a professional to captain England would be Bolshevism run riot. And yet one cannot help thinking that Hobbs or Rhodes yesterday, and Sutcliffe to-day, would have been able to give points to all the captains England has known since the War. Some professionals, of course, are impossible as captain, but so are some amateurs!

I hope that one result of the victory of the South Africans will be the development of aggressive batting in English cricket. There are signs that it is on the way; Barber of Yorkshire (whose success is specially gratifying to me because his native village is my own), and Dennis Smith of Derby are not content to leave the initiative to the bowler. Even Yorkshire's batting in recent years has lacked forcefulness in the middle: Leyland has toned down somewhat, and there has been no successor to George Hirst at No. 6 or thereabouts. Sometimes lately I have seen Yorkshire try to get runs quickly with dreadful results. Forcing cricketers of the type of H. B. Cameron, who hit, but not rashly or indiscriminately, are required to-day.

III. *1st August.* Surrey *v.* South Africa at the Oval.

To-day was a stolen day, and the fruit was refreshingly sweet. When I saw that the partnership of Mitchell and Rowan was still unbroken at 272, the Oval seemed the obvious place, for both are attractive batsmen, and there was a possibility of seeing Cameron as well. Scampering through work that had to be done, I was there for the first ball, and it was clear at once why such a score had been run up: the wicket was perfect and the bowling innocuous; Mitchell and Rowan treated it like country house stuff, and rightly. Holmes made a "psychic bid" and put F. R. Brown on to bowl instead of launching Gover at the batsmen right away. Later he called Brown back twice, but he never bowled a single ball to worry the batsmen: Brown is one of the most disappointing cricketers of the day; I have seen him tie Sutcliffe up over after over, and he used to be able to hit. Fender bowled at the pavilion end and occasionally had the batsmen thinking; he deserved to get Mitchell's wicket, but it went to Gover, who did manage to get a bit of life out of the pitch. Rowan, Nourse, and Mitchell got themselves out; Wade was beaten by a breakback from Holmes he never attempted to play; and then we had a delightful hour from Cameron and Dalton. Dalton was in great form, hitting hard in front of the wicket on both sides; Holmes was driven for three fours and a three in one over; altogether Dalton hit 15 fours in 75 minutes before being stumped. Cameron tried to give him the bowling, and foolishly ran himself out in the process. The South African tail was in evidence, but the innings closed with a lead of over 200.

When Surrey went in it was plain at once why the South Africans are on top when they meet England. The answer is a word of four letters—*Wade*. Wade was on the attack from the foot of the pavilion steps, though without his three main bowlers, Bell, Crisp, and Balaskas. He was determined to get Surrey out that afternoon, and give his men a free day. In the thirty minutes I was able to stay Sandham, Gregory, Squires, and

Barling had all been and gone, and Langton, Viljoen, Vincent (one over only), and Tomlinson had bowled. Wade was aggressive in the field himself, and he saw that the other fieldsmen were; he knew the strokes of all the batsmen and blocked them. I was not surprised to see later in the day that Surrey were well beaten by an innings.

Here is a nice point for the M.C.C., though I suppose a ruling has been given on it before. A run *five* is not infrequent at the Oval. If the batsmen are running a fifth when the ball crosses the boundary, should the umpire signal *five* or *four?* To-day Sandham deliberately allowed the ball to trickle to the boundary and the batsmen were given four instead of five. If that is correct why should not a fieldsman kick a possible five to the boards and save a run?

IV. Reflections. *20th August.*

Shall I use the half-page left to me to describe the last two days of the Oval Test Match, or to reflect on the comments made in the light of subsequent events? Perhaps the two can be combined. Fortunately some of the prophecies on which I ventured have not proved too wide of the mark, while the weeks have brought confirmation of some of the opinions I expressed. The free hitting of Dalton and Langton gave life to the game yesterday, and Cameron definitely saved South Africa by a few fours at a critical moment this afternoon, just as the forcing cricket of Leyland, Hammond, and Ames had given England a chance. Again we have seen that Wyatt is not a captain. Before this match began he said he wanted to win the toss, bat all day on Saturday, and have the hope of rain during the week-end. That was sound enough, and might have brought victory, even without rain. Had England batted first, and scored 538 at the rate they did, South Africa might have been sent in on the second day at 12.15 after their bowling had been flogged, and Bowes, Nicholls, and Read would have been as fresh as they were when the game started. Why he changed his plans does not appear, but watching his handling of the game yesterday and to-day revealed his weakness: his mind works too slowly. Time after time it would be clear to the keen observer what the next move ought to be, and Wyatt would invariably make it, but two or three overs late! It is probably here that the secret lies of the lack of snap and grip which have marked our team this year. If only Wyatt were as good a captain as he is a player—!

V. *23rd August.* Yorkshire are Champions.

Albert Peel.

WORTH NOTING FROM RECENT BOOKS.

Christianity is bound to protest against any social system which claims the whole of man and sets itself up as the final end of human action, for it asserts that man's essential nature transcends all political and economic forms. Civilization is a road by which man travels, not a house for him to dwell in. His true city is elsewhere.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, *Religion and the Modern State.*

One sees the low rooms on poor streets of cities long gone to dust, lighted by smoking yellow-flamed wicks, where the poor and enslaved were enjoined and challenged to lives of enduring goodness and spiritual glory. There in the shadows a new dawn arose, and their faces were touched with the light of it, a light compared with which Nero's Golden House was dark, a light the mystic apostle called some reflection of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. When they went out again under the stars something went with them which was to change the world.

That might be the exact situation of the Christian church to-day. There is no mistaking its strategic opportunity, or the difficulties the opportunity brings with it. For perhaps the first time in its history it is now reasonably possible for Christianity to offer its entire wisdom-about-life to an age capable of understanding it and greatly concerned about issues upon which it might be brought to bear. All the contact lines are open.

There has been in the last one hundred years an immeasurable growth in social intelligence. Human folk are ceasing to be altogether unconsidered counters in a blind and cruel game. We are beginning to see them in their capacity for suffering and happiness as living souls with soul value. There is an increasing sensitiveness to human ill-being and well-being.

G. GLENN ATKINS, *Preaching and the Mind of To-day.*

By degrees the fascinating and touching simplicity of the early Christians' belief forces itself upon the mind, as we realize how easily Paul's Corinthian stevedores could have been posed by theological questions. No matter how slowly one may progress, it is an immense gain to be surer and surer that the belief of those humble people was substantially the same as ours and as independent of written documents as may be that of an illiterate Italian woman. Perhaps Providence will leave me time enough to write a book on that "Secret of Christians" which is life.

That same October we had an English boy from Durham. The poor lad was homesick and in consequence was a great deal with me. It was he who really gave me my first impressions of English characteristics. He was much more mature than his French contemporaries. He had an absolute belief in his father and acted up to the least injunctions in his letters, but apart from that relation he showed much more independence of judgment and decision than our boys. He had a set of well-grounded opinions; he was not afraid of passing judgment on people's characters and he was not afraid of scorning them when he thought he ought to do so. He was gentle and obliging, but within the limits which, my future life was to show me, English people generally set to kindness. With tenacity and perseverance he was subject to frequent fits of despondency and seemed to be damped by obstacles which a French boy would have hardly noticed—the strange English antinomy which makes the conquest

of the world by the British a problem in psychology. In everyday intercourse he was honesty itself.

ERNEST DIMNET, *My Old World.*

We may remark this gradual secularization of literature during at least the last three hundred years. Bunyan, and to some extent Defoe, had moral purposes: the former is beyond suspicion, the latter may be suspect. But since Defoe the secularization of the novel has been continuous. There have been three chief phases. In the first, the novel took the Faith, in its contemporary version, for granted, and omitted it from its picture of life. Fielding, Dickens, and Thackeray belong to this phase. In the second, it doubted, worried about, or contested the Faith. To this phase belong George Eliot, George Meredith, and Thomas Hardy. To the third phase, in which we are living, belong nearly all contemporary novelists except Mr. James Joyce. It is the phase of those who have never heard the Christian Faith spoken of as anything but an anachronism.

T. S. ELIOT, in *Faith that Illuminates* (ed. V. A. Demant).

The Russian workpeople are more primitive; their collective spirit has not been extinguished by the atomization which Western competitive life has produced. I believe that the collective spirit in Russia is also due to religious influences; the Christianity of the simple Russian is surely nearer the Sermon on the Mount than that of practising Roman Catholics or Protestants in Central and Western Europe. No other modern Christian nation has produced a Dostoievsky or even a Tolstoy; and I do not believe that any Western novelist could have written on Tolstoy's personality as Gorki did. I used to attend meetings in Moscow where simple workingmen spoke. Listening to their speeches, I was struck by the pulpit tone into which they unconsciously fell. The Gospel spirit and the Russian Church culture, I often thought, must have contributed their share to the advance of the Bolshevist experiment. "Let us live in community!" This is what the simple Russian worker knows of Bolshevism. He does not like isolation; he prefers to eat and drink and live together with his friends and his comrades.

And let my British readers not be offended. In the mass of the British Labour Party there is a leaven of English, Scottish, and Welsh Nonconformity, of the Primitive Christian spirit of the Chapel. The old Independent Labour Party, with its leaders, Keir Hardie and Bruce Glasier, and Ebenezer Elliot's [*sic*] verses as hymns, was essentially a Nonconformist chapel, with primitive Christianity as its creed. That was one of the main factors in its success, while the Social Democratic Federation, with its economists and philosophers arguing on economic-scientific grounds, never appealed to the British workman, whose real Socialist academy was the Chapel and its pulpit the Oxford Union. All the sophistry of some theological writers will not avail to eliminate the spirit of the humble poor and their longing for community, which lent so much propagandist force to the primitive Christians in their amazing advance through the Roman Empire.

M. BEER, *Fifty Years of International Socialism.*

FOREIGN IMPRESSIONS AND REVIEWS.

JAKOB WILHELM HAUER.

An Impression.

Dr. Selbie's note on Prof. J. W. Hauer, "prophet" of the German Faith movement, in the Editorial of the July *Congregational Quarterly* was of great interest, especially to those who only know Hauer in these present days. Having recently enjoyed a year of close fellowship with him as his student in the University of Tübingen, I have often wished I could have known him in his earlier days. Dr. Selbie's description of the Hauer of 1914 could still be applied to him to-day, "He was a good speaker and could keep his end up well in any discussion and was altogether a charming and forceful personality". Dr. Selbie, however, goes on to say, "How such a man could give himself to the German Faith propaganda passes my comprehension". Hauer's reply to this would be that his present position is the logical outcome of his whole past thought and experience. I am not sure that this statement of Dr. Selbie's would not offend Hauer, just as it offended Charles Bradlaugh (in many ways a very similar type of man) to be told that they were too Christian at heart really to believe their own expressed doctrines. I have heard Christian folk say this sort of thing to Hauer in all good faith, and I have seen how angry it made him. This was one of the two things that irritated Hauer most in the attitude of Christians towards him. The other was unthinking condemnation. It is with apologies to Dr. Selbie that I say that Hauer held both attitudes to be a display of superiority which he felt unjustified. The impression Hauer left on me, confirmed by remarks in private conversation, was that in his case the child was undoubtedly father of the man, and that in his progress from builder's yard to University chair essentially the same spirit has been manifested.

I have before me a snapshot which I took one morning in the summer of 1934. It is a characteristic pose—what a pity the *Congregational Quarterly* is illustrated only in its advertisement pages! He is standing on his verandah, a thick-set man of 50 to 55. His straight back and square shoulders testify to his early military training better than the certificates which Dr. Selbie tells us were found on him at Oxford. He has an enormous head, with masses of brown hair brushed straight back from a high forehead. All his features are large; he has large blue eyes surmounted by bushy eyebrows and beneath a large straight nose is a "walrus" moustache —he is proud of the *Schnurrbart* and curled it specially for the snap! His hands are broad, with the veins standing out clearly. It is the hand of an artisan—in fact I often thought he was artisan from the *Schnurrbart* downwards. But the forehead, nose, and eyes are those of the professor. He is in truth a striking embodiment of the Nazi ideal at its best—there is a *Swastika* in his buttonhole: he bridges in his own personality the gulf between the brain-worker and the hand worker. His excellent physique contributes not a little to the "forceful personality" which, according to Dr. Selbie, characterized even his Oxford days.

To call him a nature worshipper would be misleading; nevertheless, he is a born nature lover, and that is no doubt the reason why he chose the finest site in Tübingen for his house; it is two miles from the University and the road in winter is sometimes well-nigh impassable. But from the verandah or study windows one gets one of the most magnificent views in Württenburg. In the foreground the land slips steeply down through

orchards to the hollow in which the old town lies, with the tower of the *Stiftskirche* in its centre. Beyond the town the land rises up to the Swabian Jura mountains. Facing this view, every morning almost as soon as it is light, Hauer performs exercises on his verandah—his interest in Yoga is far from being purely academic.

It is really small wonder that Hauer preferred to hold his Sanskrit classes in his own study, instead of in the stuffy little *Orientalisches Seminar* facing the University. In the seminar one was surrounded by books, a somewhat queer and not too comprehensive assortment. In the study on the *Eberhardshöhe* there were books enough, but there was also that view over the mountains to bring us nearer the minds of those lovers of nature who wrote the hymns of the Rigveda. We were just a tiny company who met there at eight in the morning to read the Vedas with Hauer—an Indian professor, a German girl, one or two storm troopers, and I, we were the only students reading Sanskrit for *Promotion*.

To us Hauer was a *Guru*; the Indian almost worshipped him. Hauer always had an original interpretation to offer of any piece we were reading. He had the utmost contempt for scholars who treated Sanskrit merely from a philological standpoint. His method was *Religionsgeschichtlich*—that of Comparative Religions. Our task was not so much to study grammatical forms, though this had its place—as to get at the religious phenomenon expressed in the passage. His other classes were of a more popular nature. One afternoon a week Hauer conducted a Seminar on the Comparative Study of Religions. This was held in the *Orientalisches Seminar* and became more and more a training ground for his disciples of the *Glaubensbewegung*, and the discussions always came back to the same point: what is the difference between the Aryan and the Jewish Christian religions[1]. The discussions were also scientific. Hauer was the arch-enemy of loose thinking, whether in support or in opposition to his own views. "*Wir müssen es gründlich durchschauen*", "we must thoroughly examine the matter", was his constant rebuke to those who put forward weak arguments. I remember how he poured vials of wrath upon a young theological student in this seminar for arguing that no one who was not a Christian was competent to pronounce judgments on the Christian Scriptures, as though the truth of the Scriptures was esoteric, revealed only to initiates. Hauer had met this view among Christians of the more pious sects (he had himself belonged to the *Johannesgemeinde* in his youth) and felt it a challenge to the very existence of a Comparative Study of Religions. On the other hand, Hauer could be just as fierce against his own "beloved disciple", one of our storm trooper Sanskritists, rumoured to be the "Paul" of the movement, an ex-theologian, eloquent, clever, and enthusiastic, but lacking in the graciousness and courtesy which characterized Hauer's own attitude to the genuine inquirer.

I have mentioned that the central points of discussion in Hauer's Seminar on Comparative Religions (and indeed in all his classes) is the difference between Aryan and Semitic religion. This is so because Hauer holds that a religion must be consonant with the race of the believers ("*Die Religion muss rassengemäss sein*"). This does not mean that religion is worship of the race, still less worship of the State. "Race idolatry", says Hauer, "is a *rationalismus* which has nothing to do with the real depth and life of true race consciousness". There is a difference between race consciousness and race self-consciousness. Hauer claims that it is *not* race-worship when man, finding the traditional expression of the will of

1 The discussions in the Summer Semester of 1934 form the basis of Hauer's book, *Eine indo-arische Metaphysik des Kampfes und der Tat* (Stuttgart, 1934).

God goes against his idea of life and the genius of his race, fights against that "religion". Further, when Hauer asserts that race and religion cannot be separated, he does not mean that religion is altogether different in the different races. Religion, according to Hauer, is one the world over, in that it springs from certain universal human needs and experiences. These "elemental phenomena" in religion (*religiöse ur-Phenomene*) are five:

1. Communion with Ultimate Reality.
2. Way to this communion.
3. Consciousness of human guilt.
4. Deliverance from this guilt.
5. Indestructibility of existence.

There is genuine faith, Hauer maintains, in every race. (Faith for Hauer means "the being seized with the idea of a way of salvation".) If we follow a way of salvation which does not agree with the spirit of our race, we shall become spiritually bankrupt. Hauer gives an illustration in the universally felt distinction between flesh and spirit. This is felt, for example, by both Paul and Plato, but the means of overcoming the tension which results from this distinction is vastly different in each case, due to difference of race. According to this view, there should be as many "ways of salvation" as there are races, but Hauer, in common with all National Socialist teachers of racial science, is concerned ultimately only with two races—Aryan and Semitic.

Hauer does recognize, however, that there is a limit to which the idea of race or blood can be pressed. In one of his lectures on Indo-German religion he admitted that "Indo-German" is a linguistic and cultural, rather than a racial, conception. Indeed, archæological research has led him to believe in a pre-historic time when Aryan and Semitic belonged to one race, a conclusion which, he told me on one occasion, had brought him into disfavour with the Nordic Society in Berlin. He is coming to the belief that race is more than a matter of blood and that the Aryan race evolved after the original stock had divided into sub-classes. Culture, then, plays its part along with blood in determining race, and religious ideas must be in harmony with the general culture of the race. All Hauer is able to prove on the subject of race and religion is that, as a matter of history, the Aryans and Semites have evolved, in the main, different cultural systems and accordingly different "ways of salvation". He has not proved that spiritual bankruptcy is the result of a faith which is not racially determined. His error seems akin to that of Hegel, namely in holding that the actual result of history is the best result for the individual, State, or race concerned.

To support his view that Christianity is not *rassengemäss* for the Aryan, Hauer adduces many arguments of varying degrees of cogency.

The idea of God's relation to the world is different in Aryan and in "Israelitic-Jewish-Christian" thought. (The phrase in inverted commas is a favourite expression of Hauer's.) According to the Biblical view, says Hauer, God is *totaliter aliter* from the world. He holds His creation "in the hand", as it were, as something not essential to His own nature. The world, further, is at enmity with God until reconciled to Him by His act. Against this, the Aryan view (as exemplified in such writings as the Vedas, the Edda and the works of Eckhart) holds that man and God have the same spirit. The world is the body of God and is thus necessary to God. Aryan thought is not pantheistic, says Hauer, since it asserts that the world is not God, but a part of God. In one of the Vedic hymns, often quoted by Hauer in this connexion, it is said, "All creatures are one fourth of Him—three fourths eternal life in Heaven". Because of this

close relation between God and man the distinction between God's word and man's word, says Hauer, is purely a difference of style. (This is against critics who assert that the Christian religion stands by God's word while the "German Religion" stands by man's word.) In the *Edda* and with Eckhart and Goethe, it is held that what man sings from his highest spirit is a breaking through of the eternal in the life of man. This leads to a greater self-striving (*Selbststrebung*) in man.

It is a commonplace of Nazi propaganda to describe the Aryan view of life as self-affirming and the Semitic as self-negating. *Kampf* (combat) is Hitler's watchword. Hauer, too, affirms that the Aryan loves combat for its own sake, as is seen in "feats of endurance", for instance. In combat the Aryan spirit finds its true and full expression. To bow down in subjection before an almighty God who commands man simply to do His will, is thus not consonant with the nature of the Aryan. It might be argued that a purely slave-like mentality is equally not consonant with the teaching of Christ (though we must admit that it is a very familiar element in German theology at the present time). If it be argued that the attitude of subjection to God is the necessary complement of active fellowship with Him, Hauer, who recognizes the place of inner peace alongside of combat, would reply that subjection was not necessary for such peace. "Nowhere" he once said, "are strife and combat so clearly pictured as in the *Edda*—yet in spite of this, man in his innermost nature develops like a tree, unshaken, unworried, calm, and steady". The *"ur-Phenomen"* is the same in each case—namely that man's nature needs both activity and passivity. Whereas in the "Israelitic-Jewish-Christian" view, however, passivity is gained by slave-like subjection to God, in Aryan thought it comes from the recognition of one-ness with Ultimate Reality.

The consciousness that man is not the chance product of an arbitrary Creator, but an essential part of Reality, says Hauer, colours the Aryan's whole view of life. The meaning of life is to be found in life itself. Hauer quotes Eckhart (whom he claims to be more Aryan than Christian) as saying, "Why do I live? I know not. I like living!". As life is to be lived for its own sake, so death is to be accepted as one's fate. Death is not a punishment, as St. Paul believes. It is just one's normal fate, says Hauer, and belongs to the same "stream" as life itself. Hauer believes that the fear of death came through Christianity, with its ideas of hell and everlasting punishment.

The idea of a future life of rewards or punishments Hauer holds to be most unacceptable to the Aryan mind. The separation of the sheep from the goats, he maintains, is not only impracticable (since men cannot be classed as "good" or "bad"), it is also based on a non-Aryan view of sin. The Aryan conception of sin, says Hauer, is not that of something destroying the unity of life. It has a definite and necessary place in life. We cannot live without sinning. Our life is possible only at the expense of other life and often we find that a higher duty can only be performed at the expense of several minor duties. In saying that sin has a necessary place in life, Hauer is not *advocating* sin. He is simply pointing out that even when the total consequences of an act justify our calling the act "good", some of the consequences may be evil. In the last resort, he maintains, no act is entirely good or entirely evil. The Aryan conception of morality, found pre-eminently in the *Bhagavadgita* and in the works of Kant, is that sin has no meaning in so far as it is applied to particular acts in themselves. The moral imperative cannot be formulated as, for example, in the Decalogue or the lists of "sins" mentioned by St. Paul. It is purely "formal" and states simply that man should do his duty.

This brief summary of Hauer's teaching should be sufficient to demonstrate that the German Faith Movement is no mere race-idolatry, nor is it a futile attempt to resuscitate the old Nordic Gods. According to Hauer, at any rate, it is a serious attempt to find a religion which shall meet the needs of the Aryan spirit. The chief difficulty, of course, lies in attempting to define just what is peculiarly the "Aryan spirit". It must be admitted that the distinction between Aryan and Semitic *Weltanschauungen* is often purely arbitrary and cannot be scientifically justified. Those of Hauer's friends who believe the distinction to be quite untenable grieve, like Dr. Selbie, to think of a man of his intellectual attainments spending so much of his time in this propaganda. On a trunk in Hauer's study there lies a pile of unfinished MSS. Many think it a tragic pile. One of Tübingen's leading theologians once said to me:

> Whenever I meet Hauer, I ask him three things: "When are we going to hear some more about Yoga?" "When are we to have the remaining volumes of *Die Religionen*?"; "When are we to have volume II of *Der Vratya*?".

Hauer explained his position to me in the following terms:

> I can write these scientific books and nobody but a few students will ever read them. Through the Faith Movement, though, I can reach a far wider public.

Certainly he has succeeded in doing this as far as his University lectures are concerned—his lectures on Indo-German religion last year were attended by 600 to 700 students. Perhaps it is not without significance that on the wall above the pile of unfinished MSS. there hangs a map of Germany, studded with little flags, each representing a branch of the *Deutsche Glaubensbewegung*. There are few German towns where a branch has not been established. I shall be interested to see how many flags there are on the map when I visit Hauer six years hence.

It seems to me that the German Faith Movement, despite many good and interesting points in its doctrine, as preached by Hauer, is bound to fail where Vedic Hinduism failed. It is too intellectual for the average man. If the movement has any lasting numerical success I feel it will be at the expense of the ideals of its founder. Outside the Movement itself, most people I met in Germany thought the *Glaubensbewegung* was a form of race idolatry, and I felt that this view was shared by some of Hauer's own disciples. Certainly it was the "patriotic" appeal that reached the masses. Hauer strongly denies that the Movement is either intellectualist or that it implies race idolatry, and this is no doubt correct, as far as he is concerned. But it is a fact that the great majority of his followers are either intellectualists or extreme nationalists. A prophet's worst enemy is his disciple.

HENRY LEFEVER.

Spirit and Truth. By KARL HEIM. Translated by E. P. DICKIE, M.A., B.D. Lutterworth Press. 6s.

Vom Werk des Heiligen Geistes. von EMIL BRUNNER. J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen. 4s.

Reviewing Karl Heim's latest work last quarter, we deplored the fact that only one small book of his had appeared in English. We, therefore, warmly welcome the translation of another of his books. We read this book when it appeared in its German form some ten years ago, and have often had occasion to refer to it in lectures. We are glad that it is now available to all. Short and popular as it is, it is yet a significant contribution to the

controversy between the Roman and the Evangelical conceptions of Christianity.

The translation is admirably done in clear and vigorous English. The only criticism we have to make is of its title. We should have preferred the German title, *The Essentials of Protestantism* (*Das Wesen des evangelischen Christentums*), which indicates the distinctive nature of this book; the English title, *Spirit and Truth,* is too vague to have much meaning.

The book deals first with "The Spell of the Roman Church". Those "made prematurely old by the relativism of our time" "fall back wearily into the arms of the Mother Church". They seek an authority, and Rome provides it. And young people as yet "strong and unbroken by the sorrows of life" feel Rome's fascination because of "their desire for mystical experience". And ecstasy, mystical experience, is the soul of Roman Catholicism. Its secret is the "overpowering experience of the *unio mystica,* God-intoxication".

> This is the *mysterium fascinosum,* the glowing centre-point round which is ranged all the ritual of the Church and all the renunciation and the good works of the various orders.

Then, too,

> the ritual of the Roman Church meets the profound longing of our generation, which had found an outlet in expressionism and inspires our whole youth-movement, the longing for form, for incarnation of the soul's desires, for æsthetic embodiment.
>
> It is only when we have fully realized this spell of Roman Catholicism that we can understand the significance of men like Luther, who came under the full influence of this Church, and with profound sorrow broke free. How strong must have been the motives which drove them out into exile from a native land so rich in the things of the spirit!

Heim proceeds to speak of "The Cause of the Schism", and shows that it was Rome's fault, not Luther's, that his just protest against the shameful traffic in indulgences led to the division of Western Christendom. There follow chapters on "Thou art Peter", and on "The Roman and Protestant Interpretation of Christ". Of special value to those unfamiliar with Heim's writings is his chapter on "Two Contrasted Ways of Approaching God". For both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism,

> world-history, regarded from within, is a history of the dying and resurrected Christ, a drama which, in the end, is concerned with Him. The point at which the two diverge is the question, Where are we to look for the unravelling of the plot, the disentangling of the threads, the undoing of the knot? The tension of the drama lies in this, that the ambassador of God, in Whom all destinies are determined, before Whom "every knee shall bow", passed through the world as one who was despised, powerless, deprived of His rightful place and of His throne, rejected of men. When will this grievous tension be ended? When will the great change come? According to the Roman Catholic interpretation of Christ it has come already in the Resurrection of Jesus. With that event we entered on the period of Christ's power on earth. According to Protestant doctrine, the tension will end only with the end of this world.

The Roman view leads to the belief that since Christ, after His resurrection, has held an earthly power, then this

> must have an organ through which it is expressed. The representative of Christ is the ruler of the world.

And the compulsion of heretics becomes a duty. But the Protestant view preserves our Lord's contrast between His power over men and the power exercised by earthly kings.

> The nature of Evangelical Christianity is summed up in a single sentence, We find God, not in any impression of power, but only through an experience of conscience.

The first principle of Evangelical Christianity is "the worship of God in spirit and in truth". For the Catholic mystic, "at the peak of ecstatic experience, all thoughts of the person of Jesus are lost, and the soul sinks into the ocean of Divine Unutterable". To the Protestant, "the Word of God plays the decisive part in the search after God". Protestantism is "the religion of conscience", and because of that it knows that if there is any help to be had, "it is to be found in forgiveness which is offered without any conditions".

Of special interest are the chapters on "The End of the Priesthood" and on "Evangelical Morality", and the book concludes with an account of the Evangelical Church and its contribution to the life of Germany.

It has to be remembered that this book was written eleven years ago, and in these times, especially in Germany, eleven years is a long period. Had Heim been writing to-day on this subject, he would have written as one who had in mind the help which Rome has given in the fight against the attempt to subordinate Christianity in Germany to a half-pagan nationalism. But this book is full of interest and value. We are all tired of the kind of polemic against Rome which deals only with its abuses. The issue between Catholicism and Protestantism concerns the centre, not the circumference, of Christian faith. And some of those who dislike Catholicism most themselves teach a form of Christianity which by its sterility makes men seek in Catholicism what a debased Protestantism cannot supply. The only adequate answer to Catholicism is a full Evangelical faith, and that this book helps to provide.

Brunner's *On the Work of the Holy Spirit* contains three lectures given by him last year at Copenhagen. They show still further how unjust it is to asign to Brunner or Barth the extravagances of earlier Barthianism, and Brunner here makes clear how completely he has emancipated himself from that dread of speaking of Christian experience which was typical of earlier Barthianism, though he rightly emphasizes that our faith is God-created. In these lectures he deals with the Work of the Spirit under the three dimensions of the past, present, and future, and so with faith and love and hope. His little book is described as a first attempt to render the New Testament witness of the Work of the Spirit into the language of the present. Much of what he has written is already familiar to students of Calvin or of Brunner, but we welcome this little work of experimental theology. It has a sanity and power which books on the Work of the Spirit often lack.

SYDNEY CAVE.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

"Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider."—FRANCIS BACON.

"A good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life."—JOHN MILTON.

(*The place of publication is London and the date* 1935 *unless otherwise stated.*)

History and Interpretation in the Gospels. By R. H. LIGHTFOOT. Hodder. 10s. 6d.

Not all Bampton Lectures have been so easy to read as these, which students of the Synoptic problem will find full of stimulus. Prof. Lightfoot sets out to expound and examine the contentions of *Formgeschichte*. Dealing especially with *Mark*, he also considers the other Synoptics and *John*, especially the Passion narratives and the rejection by "His own". The earlier part of the argument will be familiar to those who are acquainted with the writings of Martin Dibelius and Bultmann on the Continent, Dr. Vincent Taylor in this country, and Dr. B. S. Easton in America. *Mark* is based upon earlier, disconnected stories, each embodying a tradition about Jesus; these stories either give the setting for an important saying of Jesus (*Paradigms*) or describe a mighty work (*Novellen*). Although the compiler of *Mark* was the first we know to attempt to give a connected chronological and topographical account of the public life of Jesus, his purpose was *not* to write a biography, but to interpret the history and expound a doctrine—his Gospel is "the book of the revelation of the (secret) Messiahship of Jesus". The story of the Passion is an exception in that it forms a connected whole which existed before it was embodied in *Mark*.

It will be realized that this summary involves a study of discrepancies in the Passion narratives, a comparison between the structure of the other Synoptics and *Mark* (*Luke* especially is the work of an accomplished writer), and the discovery that in many ways *John's* doctrinal position is more like that of *Mark* than that of *Luke*.

One or two remarks may be offered in commenting on these most useful, if provocative, lectures.

1. In his detailed exposition Prof. Lightfoot often finds words or phrases "difficult" which happily are straightforward to the unlearned Christian—straightforward and helpful. Sometimes we have felt in reading that it may still be true that things are hidden from the wise and prudent and revealed unto babes. Especially does the attempt to classify all the "stories of Jesus" in rigid and mechanical fashion seem mistaken. That some of them are "paradigms" and some "novellen" we do not doubt, but when a man with full heart wanted to tell other men what the Lord had done for him, out it bubbled. To make all the good news fit specified forms is to stretch the Gospel on a bed altogether too short: it is as bad as limiting God's grace to sacramental channels!

2. Prof. Lightfoot does not convince us that it was the story of the Passion which would first take literary form. It seems to us that while men were alive who had been with Jesus they would be full of the Passion and of the deeds of Jesus. These they would talk about *ad lib.*, and the inevitable inquiry would come, "What did He say? What was His

teaching?" His sayings, we think, would first be committed to writing, making collections of the nature of "Q". Only when those who had been with Jesus began to "die off" would the necessity of writing down the story of His life be recognized, and by that time interpretation, and no doubt, an accretion of legend, would have been added to history.

EDITOR.

The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel. By M. B. FOSTER. Oxford Press. 7s. 6d.

The Defence of Freedom. By M. ALDERTON PINK. Macmillan. 6s.

In Defence of Democracy. By J. S. FULTON and C. R. MORRIS. Methuen. 5s.

Religion and the Modern State. By CHRISTOPHER DAWSON. Sheed & Ward. 6s.

Communism: Christian and Marxist. By H. G. WOOD. Epworth Press. 2s. 6d. and 1s. 6d.

The State in Theory and Practice. By H. J. LASKI. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

The Communist Answer to the World's Needs. By JULIUS F. HECKER. Chapman & Hall. 8s. 6d.

Religion and a Changing Civilization. By JULIUS F. HECKER. Lane. 3s. 6d.

The Passing of the Gods. By V. F. CALVERTON. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

Here are a few of the books which have just poured forth on the main question of the day—that of the State. It has many ramifications, constitutional, philosophical, and religious. The future of civil and religious liberty, of democracy and dictatorship, of economic and political evolution, are all bound up with it. Mr. Foster's book will serve the student as an admirable introduction. Though confining himself to the *Republic* and the *Philosophy of Right* he puts the modern problem in correct perspective.

Mr. M. Alderton Pink resumes his examination of democracy in a well-written analysis of the present situation. After pointing out that the European dictatorships are "emotionally-charged principles providing an overmastering motive for thought and service", he goes on to show that the only defence of freedom is attack. He urges that the common man is incapable of taking an intelligent part in public affairs, and that the defence of freedom must recognize this fact, even though it means some restriction of the franchise. After outlining the constitutional changes and practice necessary he asks whether a "Party" can be created to support free institutions. Turning to economics, he points out that a planned economy must mean some loss of freedom, and that increased leisure will present its own problems, for most people have neither the will nor the desire to employ leisure aright. Mr. Pink concludes that we should work out the best possibilities of the existing system before staking everything on revolution. An interesting study, but Mr. Pink should quote lectures from their book form, and not from newspaper reports.

In Defence of Democracy, which covers much the same ground as Mr. Pink's book, is specially welcome, for it comes from two Fellows of Balliol. They find in *political* freedom the essential thing, while by no means undervaluing economics. A democrat is one who believes in representative government with free election, and democratic institutions should safeguard the personal freedom of the individual, unregimented by the State, over as wide a sphere of action as possible. The great problem of to-day is

> how far, and in what way, the political authority is to seek to secure and maintain an effective supremacy over powers whose basis is economic.

Prof. H. J. Laski's theory that a capitalist democracy is one in which there

is inevitable internal conflict, so that the Parliamentary system, with two Parties looking to entirely opposite ends, has broken down, is rejected by the two Balliol Fellows, who go on to show how democracy must provide the drive which all Governments need to-day. Especially noticeable are the pages outlining the function of religion in a democratic State.

It is remarkable how far the Quaker, H. G. Wood, and the Roman Catholic, Christopher Dawson, march together. Both their books are good, but we think that Mr. Dawson's is the better, except in those parts where he is definitely sectarian. Mr. Dawson goes to the root of things when he ranks himself not with those who believe that all that is needed is the overhauling of a social mechanism that has become antiquated and defective, but with those who believe that, unless the spirit of our civilization is changed, no improvement in social or economic machinery will help. He refuses to accept as an ideal the entire subordination of life to economic ends. [See also the quotation under *Worth Noting.*]

His description of the new political forces is well done, and the distinction between spiritual freedom and political and economic liberty emphasized. Especially valuable is the insistence on the universality of the totalitārian State conception: in our own country, *e.g.,* the State is controlling more and more of life, often in the name of humanitarianism.

On Communism Mr. Dawson thinks the ultimate verdict

> will be that the house it is building for humanity is not a palace but a prison, since it has no windows.

Mr. Wood's Beckly Lecture is a vigorous reply to Prof. H. J. Laski, Prof. John Macmurray, Mr. Middleton Murry, and all other supporters of Communism. He first shows that Christian Communism, apostolic and monastic, is in "direct and immediate" opposition to Marxism. Nevertheless,

> If the Christian refuses to identify the Christian ideal with collectivism, he is not thereby committing himself to the defence of the existing social order.

To Mr. Wood the real issues in Britain to-day are not between classes, but within Parties and within classes. The Conservative Party is torn between those who wish for isolation and those loyal to the new international order, the wage-earners between those who want a monopoly of political and economic power for their class, and those who want to be faithful to real democratic ideals, which rest on respect for personality.

Prof. Laski himself, in *The State in Theory and Practice,* reiterates and expands the argument of his *Democracy in Crisis.* After discussing "The Philosophical Conception of the State" (here he is indebted to Bosanquet) he turns to "State and Government in the Real World", urging that—and here he is directly opposed to Mr. Dawson and Mr. Wood—

> the main index to the nature of any actual state is the system of economic class-relations which characterize it.

The essence of the State is its power to employ coercion to enforce the will of the government, which is to protect the system of class-relations; in a capitalist civilization, therefore, the State is a barrier against the movement to abolish classes and a weapon against the common ownership of the means of production.

If the League of Nations is to prevent war, the erosion (Prof. Laski's pet word) of the idea of sovereignty is essential. But such sovereignty will never be abandoned so long as the power is in capitalist hands. An effective international order is therefore incompatible with the capitalist system.

How is such a system to be changed? Prof. Laski, it is encouraging to see, argues for constitutional methods at present, though they may be doomed to failure:

> The tactic of the revolutionist, in British conditions, ought to be a united front with the reformist as the surest way of proving the futility of reform.

A lucid, searching, and generally fair book which deserves attention.

Dr. Julius F. Hecker, the author of the next two books, has made a place for himself as an able exponent of Russian Communism. In the first he continues the method adopted in *Moscow Dialogues*. A group of British visitors to Russia— an Anglican Canon, a Nationalist with Fascist sympathies, a Labour M.P. of the old school, a Revolutionary Socialist, a Social Credit enthusiast, an Economist, and a Quaker—joined for a time by an American—discuss with Socratov, the Communist apologist, the chief political and social problems of the day. If the scales are weighted in favour of Russia, Dr. Hecker nevertheless presents the different types of opinion very fairly, and it is only at times that our admiration of his skill is interrupted by a desire to cross-question, though it is interrupted by many misprints. Dr. Hecker repeats the not infrequent nonsense about "British Puritans were all exceedingly successful in amassing wealth", but on his own ground he is not easily attacked. Once again we have the view expressed that "A League of capitalist Nations cannot disarm", war being inevitable because of uneven development of capitalism in different countries. We have also the belief that "genuine social democracy has never yet existed and cannot exist in a class stratified society", the Russian dictatorship being defended as a temporary measure leading to genuine democracy.

The other book, a contribution to the XXth Century Library, is also full of misprints: Dr. Hecker must really get somebody to read his proofs. And the book is disappointing, giving the impression of being written to order on a subject which is not the writer's own. The outline is good: What religion is to those who believe in it and practise it, and to those who reflect upon it and study it, how it functions to-day, what is challenging it and what aiding it, and what is its future. But the filling in! If preachers do not accept Dr. Hecker's view of the class struggle it is because of lack of understanding on their part! He knows all about the foes of religion: the spirit of secularization, the mechanization of life, the spirit of social revolt, the atheistic propaganda of communism, but how little about the life that sustains the Christian and by which the Church has survived the persecution of its enemies and the disloyalty of its friends.

Mr. V. F. Calverton says that religion has survived despite its "contractions, fallacies, distortions, absurdities and imbecilities" because it has succeeded in making man read "his material *interests* into the scheme of the universe." Man's development has been conditioned ultimately by the economic factor—in Mr. H. G. Wells's words, "The brain of a man, like the nose of a pig, is a food-getting instrument". Religion arose out of the simple, economic need for food and protection from disease and elemental forces, from the desire for economic and psychological security.

We have found it very difficult to get to the end of this book. A hysterical Preface is followed by a dogmatic and verbose Introduction, and the style is trying indeed. Often Mr. Calvert "sure sez a mouthful":

> Distorted through the lens of this cultural compulsive, reality was divorced from its physical roots and buried in the obfuscations and obscurities which resulted.

or :

> The early success of the Christian religion can be traced to a definite combination of economic and cultural factors which were conducive to the creation of a state of mind immediately receptive to the rise of such a religion.

Often, too, we have such statements as :

> The communism that Jesus taught was militant and merciless. And so the phallus became for Paul a thorn in the flesh.

Origins are confused with values, prejudices influence the selection of facts, and a blind eye is turned to much that is pertinent to the argument. If Mr. Calverton had kept to the admirable quotations which head his chapters his book would have been more effective; we should have been saved from many "obfuscations and obscurities".

EDITOR.

Darius the Mede and the Four World Empires in the Book of Daniel. By H. H. ROWLEY. Cardiff : University of Wales Press. 12s. 6d.

The first part of this thorough and well-documented work seeks to prove that "Darius the Mede" is not Cambyses, Gobryas, Astyages, or Cyaxares, but a wholly unhistorical figure, due to the confusion of Cyrus with Darius Hystaspis and of the fall of Babylon in 538 with that in 520. The second part discusses the four empires symbolized in *Dan.* 2 and 7, and concludes that they are the Neo-Babylonian, the Median, the Persian, and the Greek. It is further urged that the unhistoric assumption of a Median king and empire when they could not have existed supports the unity of *Daniel,* since the error is found in what some claim to be an earlier part as well as in the admittedly Maccabean apocalypse.

No one can read the book without admiring the scholarship and patience of the author, who has compiled in fact a cyclopædia of Danielic exegesis without losing his own way in the maze. His work should be a labour-saving one for other students of *Daniel,* who may be grateful that they need not themselves make any such comprehensive examination of the enormous literature. The author's conclusions as to the unhistorical character of the Median king and kingdom are shared by the great majority of critical scholars at the present time, but they also will be grateful for so able an answer to some recent attempts to meet the critical arguments. As to the unity of *Dan.* here alleged, there is a great deal more to be said, as the author himself fully recognizes. He is not convincing when he says :

> The spontaneous outburst in which the Maccabean revolt began might fittingly be indicated under the figure of a stone cut without hands.

The depreciating reference to the Maccabean Revolt in 11^{34} suggests that the author of *Dan.,* a true apocalyptist, contrasts the supernatural with the natural, and expects a catastrophic and divine deliverance. The geographical explanation of the survival of the three kingdoms after the destruction of the fourth ($7^{11, 12}$) is attractive. Altogether, the book will amply confirm the author's reputation as a sound scholar, already established by his previous work, *The Aramaic of the Old Testament.*

H. WHEELER ROBINSON.

The Text of Acts in Codex 614 and its Allies. Edited by A. V. VALENTINE-RICHARDS. Cambridge Press. 6s.

The study of Textual Criticism is "caviare to the general" but most of us have at least heard of the "Western" Text and its interesting readings, especially in *Acts.* Our chief authority for this type is the Codex Bezae (D), but it happens that D is defective here and there in *Acts.* Fortunately

there is a group of minuscule MSS that repair this defect and of them Codex 614 is the best. Scholars—and through them the world at large—are therefore indebted to the late Dean of Christ's College, Cambridge, for this edition of the MS, and to Professor Creed for the Introduction, and for seeing the book through the press. Not the least interesting part of the Introduction is that which deals with the affinity between Codex 614 and the "Harclean" Syriac.

ALEX. J. GRIEVE.

The Ethical Teaching of Paul: a Study in Origin. By MARY EDITH ANDREWS. Oxford and N. Carolina University Presses. 9s.

The authoress of this book, the Assistant Professor of Religion at Goucher College, has here given us, not a systematic treatise on Paul's ethics, but a series of studies on certain aspects of it. The general thesis for which she pleads is that Paul's ethical teaching was that neither of Stoicism nor of Judaism in any thoroughgoing way, but that it was the simple application, to various practical situations, of Paul's spiritistic religion, *i.e.*, a religion consisting largely of beliefs concerning the spirit-world (in particular concerning Christ, the Christ-possessed or Spirit-possessed Christian, and the demons). With this basic idea in mind, she discusses Paul's attitude to the problem of the status of Gentile converts, his personal characteristics as evinced in his dealings with the Corinthian Christians, the solutions he offered to the problems of conduct they raised, and the questions whether he was an intellectual and how far he was affected by Stoic and orthodox Jewish teaching.

Although religious "spiritism" (in Miss Andrews's sense of that word) is presented throughout as the "motivation" of Paul's original ethical judgments, the theory is not unduly obtruded; and in the course of the discussion a great many acute observations are made regarding Paul himself. She says quite rightly, for instance, that the word "Spirit" had for Paul a meaning by no means identical with that given to it by the modern Christian. She points out kindly but clearly certain defects in Paul's temperament which Christian scholars have usually been somewhat loth to recognize and allow for. Paul was, she concludes, neither a theologian nor even an intellectual. She observes that his constant and strong conviction of being completely in the right as against all who might differ from him was itself largely responsible for the trials in which he found himself involved. He was clearly a difficult man to work with ("people sure of God's favour often are", she drily explains). He was clearly very temperamental: "he is on the heights or in the depths most of the time". In discussing Paul's regulations concerning women she makes the sensible suggestion that his injunction of silence in church was probably due to the contentious behaviour of the women themselves.

I cannot help doubting the accuracy of some of her particular conclusions. Surely Paul's account of his second visit to Jerusalem in *Gal.* 2^{1-10} cannot rightly be called "a very pleasing one". Her translations of *Phil.* 2^{13} and 3^{10} (pp. 27f, 120) are very free, and her interpretations of *1 Cor.* $7^{15 \text{ and } 21}$ (pp. 85f) questionable. She doubts, without (it seems to me) sufficient ground, the statement in *Acts* that Paul studied Rabbinism under Gamaliel. Yet she has a right appreciation of the grandeur of the best side of Paul's character and of the best things he wrote: and no one could read her book without receiving a rich addition to his means of understanding both the man and his work.

A few slips, *etc.*, need correction, *e.g.*, p. 101n. ("orasis" for "horasis", "vision"). On p. 157 "father" should be "Father", and

on p. 167 "protested" must be understood as "protested against" or else the true meaning will be reversed. Commas are frequently absent where they are wanted, and there are other slips in punctuation. And why must we have *sarks* and not *sarx* every time as the equivalent of σάρξ?

C. J. Cadoux.

The Background of the Epistles. By Wm. Fairweather. Clark. 12s. net.

Dr. Fairweather's name is already familiar to a large number of Bible-students as that of the author of several useful works. He has now placed us further in his debt by producing a companion-volume to his recent *The Background of the Gospels*. This substantial work of nearly 400 pages is divided into four main parts, dealing respectively with the historical, literary, religious, and doctrinal backgrounds. Readers of the *N.T.* epistles (the Apocalypse is wholly excluded) are here provided with a comprehensive and readable account of the world in the midst of which they were written; and the excellent arrangement of the matter and the full table of contents make it easy for one to find quickly what one wants. Naturally, much of the information given is such as is obtainable elsewhere, in books like the recently re-edited *Helps to the Study of the Bible* and G. W. Wade's *New Testament History*, not to mention less popular works like the English translation of Schürer and the Bible-Dictionaries. But that does not mean that there is no purpose to be served by a new and up-to-date survey such as Dr. Fairweather here provides.

It was, of course, inevitable that, in covering so wide a field, the author should commit himself to a number of specific judgments with which all of his readers will not agree. Thus I cannot consider the explanation offered (pp. 30, 103) for the absence from the *N.T.* of any explicit condemnation of slavery at all satisfactory. Doings felt to be wrong (like adultery and idolatry) were frankly condemned as such by the early Church, without regard to the immediate social consequences of the condemnation. If slavery was not similarly condemned, is it not the simplest and truest explanation that it was not as yet felt to be wrong? Again, I think Dr. Fairweather is needlessly hard on the Pharisees (though here he has a big majority on his side). Is it true to say that "The Pharisees had no national feeling" (p. 50), that "No question of motive could enter into such a scheme of life" as theirs (p. 122), that their loyalty to the law "was entirely contrary to the spirit and teaching of the prophets", and that the prophets "valued morality only as the verdict of the conscience" (p. 297), or to imply that the Jewish Law consisted only of "ceremonial enactments" (p. 338)? I observe, too, that Dr. Fairweather treats the Jewish phrases in the greetings of *1 Pet.* and *Jas.* as indicating that these epistles were addressed to *Jewish* Christians (pp. 153f, 352, 359). But is it not in every way more probable that these phrases simply illustrate the Christian assumption that the Christian Church is now the true Israel, and therefore designate ordinary Gentile converts?

The object of the book is not only to impart information; it aims also to present an apologetic. Part Four, "The Doctrinal Background", is a section not quite co-ordinate with the three that precede it, for it deals, not with the historical, literary, or religious conditions of the contemporary world, but presents what Dr. Fairweather himself regards as the great essential beliefs of the early Church itself. These are "the Fact of Sin", "the Fact of Christ" (His pre-existence, His historical reality, and His risen presence and power), and "the Fact of the Spirit". One feels that much of this part is rather remote from the general purpose served by the

book. It necessarily covers only a portion of what the Epistles teach; it is questionable whether the selection of the points discussed is the best possible; and very ample materials exist elsewhere for the study of the doctrines taught in the *N.T.* Controversial topics (like the pre-existence of Christ) are raised—only to be settled with the unsatisfying demonstration that thus and thus did Paul and his contemporaries believe. The impression left is that either much more ought to have been said, or much less.

Dr. Fairweather allows himself the use of some rare words—"declinature" (p. 93), "remanent" (p. 127), "outwith" (pp. 320, 379). Misprints, *etc.*, occur on pp. 34 (n.1: "Rostootzeff"), 44f. (Archilaus), 47 ("Helenistically"), 77 (1.19), 101 (n.4), 113 (1.22), 117 (1.26, "mimimum"), 124 (1.13 "Mesusah" for "Mezuzah"), 159n. (Kurzgefusstes" and "Handbuck"), 184 (1.24, "conformally" for "conformably"), 221n.3 ("Griechisen"), 252 (1.5: "numinae" for "numina"), 260 (1.10: "Hermatic" for "Hermetic"), 265n.5 ("Theologiae" for "Theologie"), 276 (1.5 from foot: ? read "Ormazd" for "Zoroaster"), 293 (1.16: comma omitted after Amos-reference), 336 (1.11 from foot: read "love" for "live"), 346 (1.10: superfluous bracket), 351 (1.9: ? read "glows" for "grows"). There is also surely something wrong with the top four lines of p. 74, with the self-contradictory chronology at the bottom of p. 82, and with the translation from Josephus *Ant.* XVII ii. 4 on p. 113; while footnote 2 on p. 327 looks as if it ought to begin with "Not". And finally—on a small point of style—I cannot but deprecate the omission of the customary full-stop after abbreviated titles of books: is not the practice bound to mislead those not already familiar with the field?

In conclusion, however, I ought to say that, despite its liability to criticism on the grounds I have indicated, the book provides an exceedingly useful introduction to the study of a group of *N.T.* writings, which modern readers frequently find mystifying for lack of the sort of information which is here given in so handy and readable a form.

C. J. Cadoux.

The Primordial Ocean. By W. J. Perry. Macmillan. 15s.

Dr. Perry is Reader in Cultural Anthropology in the University of London and his aim in the present book is to study the general principles underlying the development of human society in its various phases. He calls it *The Primordial Ocean* because he regards this term as "an expression of the essential unity of culture throughout the ages". It may be said at once that his book is a very real and useful introduction to primitive anthropology.

Dr. Perry divides mankind into two classes—food-gatherers and food-producers. The former are "natural" men. They have little or no social organization and no acquaintance with arts and crafts. They spend their lives getting food and living in groups of relatives. The food-producers, on the other hand, have social institutions and various forms of organized behaviour out of which civilization in the end emerges. Both alike, however, show that man is an essentially social being and cannot therefore be studied or understood in isolation, but only as he lives his life in social surroundings. In the first few chapters Dr. Perry deals mainly with the food-gatherers and shows how closely they are akin in their habits and ideas in different parts of the world. He then passes on to the food-producers and to the development of such social institutions as religion, kinship and magic, arts and crafts. In the course of his survey he gathers together an immense mass of information about man in the earlier stages of his development: if his book has one defect it is that he does not always

successfully coordinate the material he has amassed, and that it is sometimes not very possible for the reader to see the wood for the trees. His main thesis, as to the way in which human nature works out under certain conditions to similar ends, is very clear, and the book provides some interesting illustrations of the widespread nature and similarity in origin of some very familiar features of our modern life. It is probably not generally known that stories of the Brer Rabbit type are to be found among peoples very widely separated from the American negro, and that the dances of the modern ball-room had their origin in religious and other ceremonies in the far distant past. Every kind of ritual, generally speaking, is a recapitulation of primordial events, and the more clearly we can trace the evidence for this the better can we understand the history and meaning of many modern practices that would be otherwise obscure, and it is always well to remember, as Dr. Perry points out,

> a savage is neither a baby nor a pathological specimen. He is a normal member of a community whose customs differ, superficially perhaps, from those of the Westerners who write about him, but he is a man no less.

W. B. Selbie.

Head, Heart, and Hands in Human Evolution. By R. R. Marett. Hutchinson. 10s. 6d.

Dr. Marett has followed up his two recent books on Primitive Religion and Sacraments by this somewhat more detailed and comprehensive volume, in which he surveys the whole field of primitive anthropology from the intellectual, spiritual, and practical standpoints. Readers of Dr. Marett know that he is anything but a dry-as-dust; he always keeps an open mind and has an eye for everything that bears even remotely on his subject. He has a real respect for primitive man and his doings, and seems to understand him as few scientists are able to do. He believes in evolution but regards it from the sociological point of view as

> a useful servant but a bad master, being the inferior category as compared with Progress, that distinctively human attribute which history proves to be a real thing when its spiritual nature is duly taken into account.

It is on this spiritual nature of mankind that Dr. Marett lays unusual stress. The material side of things has its place and must not be ignored, but it is only one side, and "a cocksure materialism", he says,

> is in fact a disease of thought that has attained to epidemic proportions only in quite recent times; though religion is partly to blame for having driven commonsense into opposition and for seeking for the spiritual in the wrong direction, namely, without instead of within.

This gives added interest to Dr. Marett's treatment of primitive religion in this book. He calls it pre-theological religion and deals with it at the stage for which he coins the word Polydynamism, which seems to cover the stages which he has previously distinguished as animism and animatism. In the first part of his discussion he deals with Religious Feeling, Thinking, and Acting, and then gives a number of illustrations of his theme such as Ritualism as a disease of Religion, Food Sacraments, Charms, Medicine Men, Taboos, and Totems. No one can read these fascinating pages without realizing how closely religion is bound up with man's whole outlook, intellectual, moral, and social. As Dr. Marett says,

> religion finds him since his fairway is beset with many hazards, and once in them he must perforce play out bravely or else quit the game.

We have perhaps said enough to show that this book contains a vast amount of very rich material for the student of human nature. He could have

no better guide than Dr. Marett, whose outlook is so sane, humorous, and comprehensive: he so evidently enjoys himself all the time that the reader is easily carried on to the belief that there is nothing so important or so interesting as the study of anthropology.

W. B. Selbie.

The Historical Element in Religion. By Clement C. J. Webb, F.B.A. Allen & Unwin. 4s. 6d.

In the spring of the present year Prof. Webb delivered a short course of lectures in the University of Bristol: these are now published in book-form with an additional chapter. The problem discussed is the place of history in religion, and especially in Christianity; and it is considered particularly with regard to the very trenchant statements in Mr. Oakeshott's recent book *Experience and its Modes*, where it is denied most emphatically that history and religion can have anything to do with one another. According to Mr. Oakeshott, history proper is the synthesis of experience *sub specie præteritorum*: it has nothing to do with history in its relation to the present and future as a source of lessons and examples: these things and this way of considering the past belong to the sphere of practice, to which sphere also religion belongs. Practice considers the world *sub specie voluntatis*, and religion is simply practice at its fullest.

What Mr. Oakeshott has in mind is the distinction between history as a completely unprejudiced and disinterested science and history practically studied and valued as a source of inspiration and guidance. Within the Christian Church the former manifests itself as historical criticism, the latter appears in the common use we make of the Bible in preaching and teaching. The question then rises: if criticism shows that the Biblical narratives are unhistorical, what is to become of the practical use of them that we make in religion?

One very radical solution is to say that it does not matter what historical science makes of the Biblical narratives. Whether the things recorded ever happened or not, the lessons drawn from them are equally valid in the sphere of practice. But Prof. Webb will have none of this radicalism; though he thinks that criticism must be admitted to have shown that a good deal in the Bible is unhistorical. Nevertheless he contends for a substantial core of fact in the Bible story; and he considers that the essential character of Christianity, as we know it, is bound up with this irreducible element. How then is the presence of this core of fact in the Bible to be established and made good?

Professor Webb's solution of the problem is that the individual member of a religious community can so share its common life as to have experiences which have evidential value as regards the nature of its past:

> His participation in a life which owes its character, or to a sentiment which owes its intensity to a tradition about the past of the society whose life he shares, gives him a legitimate ground for the conviction that the past was at least so far what tradition affirms it to have been, as to have been able to inspire the sentiment and to form the character, the reality of which he knows as it were, from the inside.

This is substantially the position on which Schleiermacher's famous work, *The Christian Faith*, is based; by accepting it Prof. Webb places himself in the great modern development of theology that comes down from that master. The writer, who is an ardent admirer of Schleiermacher, is glad to observe in *The Historical Element of Religion* an evidence of his continued influence at the present time.

Robert S. Franks.

Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance. By Nesca A. Robb, M.A., D.Phil. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.

We have here a patient and sympathetic study of an important period of transition in European life and thought. All students of history know how with the coming of the Renaissance the spell cast by Aristotle over the medieval mind was broken, and there was a return to Plato. But what Dr. Robb very thoroughly and very interestingly shows is that it was not Plato pure and simple who came to dominate men's minds. In the first place, Plato was interpreted through the Neoplatonist tradition : next, even that tradition was not revived in its old Alexandrian form, but was synthesized with the vivid humanism of an age which in every direction was waking to a consciousness of man's power over the world. Thus there arose a type of philosophy foreshadowed in Petrarch and brought to completion in the work of Marsilio Ficino and Pico of Mirandola. It was a philosophy which saw the whole world as a manifestation of God, but which also recognized this same world as an opportunity for man to enter into communion with God and raise himself to divinity by the spontaneous exercise of his powers. In her study Dr. Robb not only describes this philosophy with abundant textual illustration from the contemporary documents, but also shows how its influence spread over the whole life of the time and particularly how it affected the Arts, including especially the art of poetry. The whole constitutes a very valuable and readable account of a formative period in European culture. An interesting "Conclusion" is added which draws a comparison between the Neoplatonism of the Renaissance and the Romanticism of the early nineteenth century. Both viewed the world as spiritual and believed in the dignity of man, and especially of the artist, as its interpreter. But the men of the Renaissance were only conscious of man's power and spontaniety : the Romantics were also keenly aware of the way in which his power and freedom were everywhere thwarted.

Altogether, the book is a finely reflective piece of historical study, and will fully repay the attention given to it.

Robert S. Franks.

The Idea of Salvation in the World's Religions. By J. W. Parker, M.A., B.D. Macmillan. 6s.

It was an excellent notion to illustrate the Christian doctrine of the Atonement by comparing it with related elements from the religions of the world, so as to show how Christianity satisfies the various needs that are expressed in them. The particular necessities that are mentioned are Relief from Material Wants, the Dread of Evil Powers, Release from Life, Freedom from Sin, and the Way of Life in Moral Codes. In each case both the primitive religion of the savage and the great universal religions are drawn upon for any appropriate matter they may offer : and there follows a sketch of the way in which the Christian Atonement meets the need that has been brought out by the comparative study.

If Mr. Parker had spent as much care and effort on thinking out the Christian doctrine of the Atonement as he has upon collecting material from the various non-Christian religions, he would have written a much better book. So far as I can judge, who am not a specialist in the comparative study of religion, Mr. Parker has done his work in this sphere soundly and well, within the limitations imposed by the size of his book. But he has not meditated enough upon the Christian Atonement itself to present any unified theory of it. What we get is piecemeal and frag-

mentary. This is partly occasioned, of course, by the method of the book, which sets out to compare the Christian Atonement first with this and then with that aspect of non-Christian religion. Nevertheless, that is not the whole explanation of the defect: the real trouble is a lack of concentrated and consistent thinking on what after all is the main subject of the book.

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

SHORTER NOTICES AND DESCRIPTIVE LIST.

*(Books marked * are recommended for ministerial reading).*

In *Fragments of An Unknown Gospel* (British Museum, 4s.) Dr. H. I. Bell and Mr. T. C. Skeat, of the British Museum, have edited the papyri recently purchased. We have facsimiles, text and notes, and translation, and the whole handling of the papyri is marked by a skill and efficiency for which scholars will be grateful. It is regrettable that the unknown gospel (date probably the early second century) is so fragmentary, but we must be thankful for what we have. When the Oxford Press and the British Museum have been responsible for publication it is surprising that there is no publication date.

Despite its imposing bibliography, Miss Margaret Goldsmith's *John the Baptist* (Barker, 7s. 6d.) is not the work of a biblical scholar. The Synoptics and *John,* Josephus and H. R. Reynolds, are drawn on at will to make this modern interpretation. Indeed, Miss Goldsmith admits that she has made an arbitrary selection from her sources, a fact that must never be forgotten by readers. If they are prepared to read the book as an impression, written in the light of current psychological thought, they will find it often illuminates the familiar story. And Miss Goldsmith writes well.

It must be confessed that Dr. S. D. Gordon's *Quiet Talks with Eager Youth* (Oliphants, 5s.) would "cut no ice" with the eager youth known to us. They would neither accept Dr. Gordon's premises nor care for his methods and, despite his earnestness, most of his words would, we fear, simply pass them by. A technique successful with devout Christians forty years ago is possibly not the one to appeal to inquiring youth of to-day.

Though there is a chapter on communism, there is a pre-war atmosphere about the Rev. F. C. Spurr's *The Man who holds the Keys* (Lutterworth Press, 2s.), alike in its content and its method. That does not mean, however, that it is not worth study; indeed, we can imagine no more salutary discipline for a young men's class than to work through the book on Sunday afternoons. Mr. Spurr has a great gift of putting his points concisely, and confronting the reader with a challenging case.

There is so much that is sensible and timely about A London Journalist's *Britain Without God* (Lutterworth Press, 2s. 6d. and 1s. 6d.) that its general tone is all the more to be regretted. Scorn is poured on all those who do not accept the writer's view of the Bible or use ways of church work of which he does not approve. A sketch of this kind probably does as much harm as good.

America possesses no more cultured scholar that Dr. G. Glenn Atkins, who contributes to our pages next quarter. His ripe and mellow wisdom is enshrined in **Preaching and the Mind of To-day* (Clark, 6s.) which we commend without reserve to all who have to preach. Dr. Atkins has something to say, and he knows how to say it, and preachers will not only

learn much from his lectures, but they will pick up many sermons by the way. Let them ponder the fundamental forms which, Dr. Atkins says, preaching has always taken—the defence of its gospel, the interpretation of its faith, and the call to Christian discipleship—and they will find themselves engaged in fruitful meditation. Dr. Atkins has read widely in literature as well as in theology and philosophy, and frequently clinches his argument by apt quotations. He has given us a very useful and timely book.

Sequels are rarely successful, and we can imagine that some who found Canon F. R. Barry's *The Relevance of Christianity* very helpful will think *The Relevance of the Church* (Nisbet, 7s. 6d.) rather thin. The book covers a lot of ground—"The New Christian Morality" as well as the theology, worship, and ministry of the Church—and it has a fine spirit about it, as has all Canon Barry writes, but it is strangely unsatisfactory. Canon Barry seems open-minded *up to a point*, but beyond that to be bound by conventional ideas. His discussion of "voluntary clergy" is an example of this, but it applies all the way through. We do not demur when a man is loyal to his denomination; rather the reverse; but to say that "the Anglican interpretation of the faith . . . . appears to be uniquely adapted to meet the religious needs of the present age" or that "Anglicanism has all the cards in its hand" is to make claims that need substantiation—and certainly do not err on the side of modesty! And what are we to make of this:

> Episcopal ordination means that wherever you have a congregation led in worship and sacrament by the curate, there you have, not Brown, Smith, and Robinson, but the Holy Church Universal.

Would it make any difference to read "blacksmith" or "charwoman" for "curate"? Or "three poor people praying behind a dyke", or "two or three gathered together in my name"?—without curate?

We wonder, too, how it is possible to argue, on the one hand, that the new United Church of South India is to be something entirely *sui generis*, while boasting that the Church of England, wherever it is,

> is thorough-bred and breeds true . . . . it persists, in its own specific identity and the fundamental unity of its witness, liberal, catholic and evangelical.

Canon Barry ought to be warned that the Rev. E. R. Micklem's book *Our Approach to God* is scarcely typical of Nonconformity (the Index does not give a reference to Mr. Micklem's book on p. 136, and confuses him with his brother on p. 118).

Turning to the other side, it is encouraging to find Canon Barry so happy about the young men and women he has known in Oxford, and in general so optimistic about the future.

On the whole, the volume is more superficial than its predecessor. It has, nevertheless, much that is suggestive, and now and then a phrase that is pregnant with meaning, as, *e.g.*,

> Therefore a true philosophy of the Church will be teleological rather than archæological.

Canon C. E. Hudson is a "live wire", and his *Preface to a Christian Sociology* (Allen & Unwin, 4s. 6d.) makes the reader think, and sometimes violently disagree. With his emphasis on the present need for a prophetic Church and for spiritual values we are in cordial agreement; his exposition of the meaning of Christian worship (pp. 64 ff.) we find admirable; but his sacramentarianism repels us as being something less than catholic:

> When an individual is baptized he becomes that which before baptism he was not: a member of Christ; he is now "in" Christ, one of the vast com-

> pany which constitutes the New Humanity. By his baptism "there is a new creation", a new thing.

This almost drives us to become Baptists right away; surely it is when a person deliberately accepts Christ as his Saviour and Lord that he is a new creature—quite irrespective of baptism.

About the Eucharist, "the sublimest corporate activity of the Church", Canon Hudson is even more reactionary:

> Any Eucharist, at any altar, with three worshippers or three thousand, is one with all other Eucharists everywhere and always.

Again, we prefer "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I", even without Eucharist.

We had not suspected Canon Hudson of narrowness of this kind. And he is decidedly poor on initials.

Faith that Illuminates (Centenary Press, 3s. 6d.), which is edited by the Rev. V. A. Demant, contains half a dozen Anglo-Catholic addresses, in which Mr. T. S. Eliot, the Revs. P. E. T. Widdrington and W. G. Peck, Mr. M. B. Reckitt, Sir Henry Slesser, and Mr. R. Ellis Roberts, deal with the relation of religion to literature, leisure, economics, politics, philosophy, and morality respectively. Mr. Roberts's is the outstanding contribution, but the whole volume is worth reading. For a quotation from Mr. Eliot's essay see "Worth Noting".

There is no more difficult task than that of preaching to boys, but the Rev. A. J. Costain's *Rydal School Sermons* (Epworth Press, 2s. 6d.) shows that it can be tackled successfully. Mr. Costain is evidently in contact with his boys and with the life of the world, and he has a touch of humour which they will greatly appreciate.

Mrs. A. W. Harrison showed something of her mettle in her chapter in her husband's *Liberal Puritanism* and in the memoir of her father (Dr. J. S. Simon) prefixed to the last volume of his great work on Wesley. The chapter is reprinted in the present volume, *Methodist Good Companions* (Epworth Press, 3s. 6d.), which contains half a dozen admirable papers, with "Jabez Bunting" easily the best, though some readers will prefer "Reactions in Haworth Parsonage". Other volumes in the same series are Dr. F. W. Boreham's *The Heavenly Octave* and the Rev. N. H. Snaith's *Have Faith in God*. The former is an exposition of the Beatitudes, and is manifestly the work of a preacher; the latter, expositions of *O.T.* passages on the line of the writer's *Studies in the Psalter,* the work of a scholar. Dr. Boreham must be like Trollope, and turn out a required number of words each day. Year after year books come from his pen of unvarying texture and uniform merit; now, in addition to the one just mentioned, we have *Ships of Pearl* (Epworth Press, 5s.)

Perhaps the most notable thing about the Bishop of London's *Nine Christian Virtues* (Unicorn Press, 2s. 6d.) is the fact that it is dedicated to the King and Queen. It contains nine addresses, the last one delivered on the occasion of the Jubilee.

Fr. Vincent McNabb's *The Craft of Prayer* (Burns, Oates, 2s. 6d.) contains sixteen addresses delivered in recent years. Their form, we fear, will prevent them from appealing to any but Roman Catholics. A more practical little book is the Rev. A. F. Thornhill's *Method in Your Prayers* (Blackwell, 2s. 6d.).

The Rev. Carey Bonner and Dr. W. T. Whitley have prepared *A Handbook to the Baptist Church Hymnal (Revised)* (Psalms & Hymns Trust, 2s. 6d.). Mr. Bonner has also edited *Marches for Young People's*

Organizations (N.S.S.U., 2s. 6d.), and written the tunes for the Rev. Pitt Bonarjee's thirty-three *New Hymns for Public Worship* (Carey Press, 2s. 6d.).

Mr. Walter B. Sloan's *These Sixty Years* (Pickering, 2s. 6d.) is an illustrated history of the Keswick Convention.

Protestants have almost invariably fought shy of moral theology : to them the word casuistry always has a sinister sound. It would be deplorable if the suspicion which has come to be attached to the work of the casuist should hinder all who have to deal with souls from profiting by the knowledge which the Roman Catholic Church has gained through long experience in the confessional and elsewhere. The Jesuits have won for themselves a foremost place as moral theologians, and Fr. T. Slater's *Manual* has long been a standard work. Now it is superseded by the work of another Jesuit, Fr. Henry Davis's **Moral and Pastoral Theology* (Sheed & Ward, 30s.; vols. may be had separately, 7s. 6d. each), which surveys the whole field in four volumes. While Protestants will be often irritated, and sometimes amused, at the dogmatism of the treatment, they would do well to study this great work, especially those who are ministers. It is impossible even to outline here the ramifications of a big subject : a list of the contents of the four volumes will suffice, not merely to indicate their scope, but to show that the Roman Church is not unaware of modern developments :

Vol. I. Principles. Scope of Moral Theology ; human acts ; probabilism ; law ; sin ; virtue ; faith ; hope ; charity.

Vol. II. Precepts. The Decalogue; problems connected with sterilization, medico-moral matters (as abortion, feticide, ectopics, placenta prævia, hydramnios, hyperemesis gravidarum, eclampsia, twilight sleep, curetting. irradiation by X-rays, embalming, *etc.*) ; forbidden books; precepts of the Church.

Vol. III. The Sacraments (I). The Sacraments in general ; baptism ; Confirmation ; Holy Eucharist ; penance ; indulgences ; censures.

Vol. IV. The Sacraments (II). Extreme Unction ; Holy Orders ; Marriage ; the Clerical State ; the Religious State ; the duties of certain lay people, namely, judge, juryman, witness, advocate, doctor, surgeon ; ecclesiastical burial ; list of canons referred to ; index to the four volumes.

Some of the sections are draped in decent Latin.

In *A Catholic Memorial of Lord Halifax and Cardinal Mercier* (Williams & Norgate, 3s. 6d.) the Rev. Anselm Bolton narrates the events which led up to the Malines conversations, including—and this is the most valuable part of the book—the negotiations on Anglican orders which led up to the letter *Ad Anglos* and the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ*. It is a revealing story, not least so in the picture of Duchesne and Portal which it presents.

With a convert's eagerness Mr. Arnold Lunn rushed in to engage Dr. Coulton, an enterprise which more wary Roman Catholics have deliberately shirked. *A Critic and A Convert* (Taunton : Wessex Press, 2s. 6d.) reprints their wordy warfare, which, despite its violence, becomes as tedious to the reader as it must have been to the participants. Mr. Lunn no doubt relied on the "dogged persistence" of which he boasts, but in this, as in the controversy in general, he is no match for Dr. Coulton. Indeed, there is only one point at which he wins—he has a pleasing sense of humour not evident in his adversary—Dr. Coulton is too much in earnest for humour. The Cambridge Scholar's wide knowledge, his tenacity, his refusal to be browbeaten, have made him the *malleus Romanorum, par excellence*. We

imagine that when the sad, and we hope far-distant, day comes for him to depart this life, the Roman Church will strike a medal, as on a previous occasion it would now like to forget.

It is not easy to discover for whom Mr. Paul Elmer More and the Rev. F. L. Cross have compiled the hefty volume *Anglicanism* (S.P.C.K., 21s.), which illustrates "the thought and practice of the Church of England from the religious literature of the seventeenth century". The book is too big to be an anthology, while scholars will need far more than the extracts here given; and although we have Richard Hooker, Jeremy Taylor, and Thomas Browne, the compilation can scarcely have been made from the angle of literature. The selections are classified under "The Anglican Faith", "The Church", "Separated Churches", "The Bible", "Standards of Faith", "Natural Theology", "Revealed Theology", "Soteriology", "Eschatology", "The Christian Ministry", "The Sacraments", "Other Religious Practices", "Prayer", "Ethics", "King and State", "Visitations", and "Caroline Piety". There are biographies of the writers at the end. Perhaps the best thing in the book is Mr. More's essay, "The Spirit of Anglicanism". It is succeeded by Mr. F. R. Arnott's "Anglicanism in the Seventeenth Century".

Ever since reading the Rev. W. J. Platt's account of the life and work of Prophet Harris we have looked forward to something else from his pen. Now we have *From Fetish to Faith* (Livingstone Press, 2s.) in which he describes the growth of the Church in West Africa. It is an inspiring story of missionary enterprise in vast areas controlled by Britain, France, Portugal, and Belgium. Mr. Platt makes us realize the complexity of the problem as he tells us of districts once Christian now Moslem, of Christians who desire to remain polygamous, of Governments which support Roman Catholic Missions only. A book to read and study.

Miss Margaret Wrong's *The Land and Life of Africa* (Livingstone Press, 2s.) covers an even larger area, for it surveys the whole of the dark continent, past and present! Miss Wrong has made a brave attempt at a quite impossible task.

In *India's Womanhood* (Lutterworth Press, 2s. 6d. and 1s. 6d.) Miss C. I. Tinling tells of the forty years' work of Dame Edith Brown at the Women's Christian Medical College in the Punjab. The College, started by Dr. Brown with only £50, has grown into a great institution which does splendid service, which Miss Tinling describes with insight and sympathy.

Mother St. Austin's *Fifty-Six Years a Missionary in China* (Burns, Oates, 5s.) has for its running title "A Missionary Nun in China." It is the life-story of Mother St. Dominic, Eugénie de Maurepas, who was born in 1842 and entered the Society of the Helpers of the Holy Souls in 1869. In 1871 she arrived in Shanghai, and there she laboured for fifty-six years until her death in 1927, building up a large Mission which, under Mother St. Dominic, educated 2,258 pupils as part of its manysided work.

More Pilgrim Ways (Burns, Oates, 3s. 6d.), the work of a Roman Catholic, Mr. F. I. Cowles, describes cathedrals, abbeys, and shrines—mostly in the North of England.

Mr. Nevil Truman's *The Care of Churches* (Allan, 3s. 6d.) is "A Manual of Self-Help for all who are Interested in our Churches." Many non-Anglican churches would be no worse if they were cared for on the lines here laid down, their vestries most of all. Archives, bookstalls, churchyards, damp, drainage, glass—the mention of these topics will show how eminently practical the book is.

Mr. H. M. Gillett's *St. Bede the Venerable* (Burns, Oates, 2s. 6d.) is an interesting, if somewhat uncritical, account of one of the most attractive figures in English history.

There are many admirable essays among the forty which make up *The Great Tudors* (Nicholson & Watson, 10s. 6d.) but we scarcely think the volume is as successful as most of its predecessors. After all, some research is required in writing about the sixteenth century, and when a writer lacks either the knowledge or the care to give an Archbishop of the period his correct Christian name, the reader's confidence is swiftly undermined. Not only so, but nothing but incompatibility could be expected from the union of some of these writers and subjects, though both Mr. Hilaire Belloc on Cecil and the Rev. C. L. Warr on Knox are much better than we anticipated. Dr. G. B. Harrison on Elizabeth is as good as anything in the volume, and other essays which deserve mention are Prof. A. W. Reed's Tindale, and Prof. Conyers Read's Walsingham.

While perhaps it is true that Mr. Stephen Graham's forte is not biography, he has nevertheless so written his *Life of Alexander II, Tsar of Russia* (Nicholson & Watson, 21s.) as to win sympathy for the Emperor. From 1855 to his assassination in 1881 Alexander was in the difficult position of an autocrat who believes in reform. His steadfast support led to the emancipation of the serfs; his love of peace limited warfare in duration and extent; he was blown to bits with the draft of a constitution in his pocket. Mr. Graham says that he was "as monarchs go, above the average in kindness, goodness, and wisdom." He was above the average in courage, too, for he went in and out among his people after many attempts on his life. Mr. Graham's book is a good starting point for one of the most important periods of Russian history. There are slips on pp. xiv, 94, 183, 259.

There was room for a biography of Brougham, and it has been satisfactorily filled by Mr. G. T. Garratt, whose *Lord Brougham* (Macmillan, 15s.) is both competent and readable (misprints on pp. 22 and 100). Brougham was a man of great gifts, but he was a "card", whose "restless and exuberant vitality" prevented him from rendering the service to politics and letters which he might have done. His achievements were considerable: it was largely due to his zeal that a breach was made in the citadels of privilege and corruption, that reform and education began to light up the landscape, and that the shameful Augean legal stables were cleansed. At critical moments, however, he blundered, as when he accepted the Chancellorship in 1830 and went abroad in 1834. His enemies—and he made many—did not fail to seize the openings he gave them, with the result that the last 34 years of his life were spent in activities which served to occupy his mind rather than to aid the State.

Mr. J. Travis Mills's *John Bright and the Quakers* (Methuen, 2 vols., 25s.) is in the manner of the Victorians, and those who want their biography "potted" and spiced will scarcely appreciate its merits. Those who are willing to go wherever Mr. Mills leads them—to the ancestors of John Bright and his wives, to the early history of the Quakers, to Bright's friends in politics and business, to his relatives and their relatives, to the political and social questions which occupied the decades of his long life, to William Penn, the *Alabama,* James Nayler, the Factory Laws, and a hundred and one other things—will learn and enjoy. Especially valuable are the records of early Friends' Meetings which Mr. Mills prints; and not without their application to to-day the discussion of Bright's attitude to

that difficult and, for the pacifist, almost insoluble problem—When, if ever, can a Christian resort to armed force by way of police, or for the purpose of restoring, or preserving order ?

The book is packed with information, and is far more than an appendix to Prof. Trevelyan's masterly biography. Mr. Mills's intimate knowledge of Rochdale and of the Friends, and of Bright himself, in whom he found a worthy hero, has enabled him to make a contribution to our knowledge of Quaker history impossible to anybody else.

All philosophers will be grateful to Prof. J. H. Muirhead for *Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends* (Allen & Unwin, 12s. 6d.). Mrs. Bosanquet's *Short Account* of her husband's life and work had already provided the framework for these letters, which Prof. Muirhead describes as "illustrating the sources and the development of his philosophical opinions". While some of them are written to relatives, most are to philosophers, beginning with F. H. Peters, his colleague at University College, Oxford, and ending with Vivante and Carlini—the section entitled "Italian Idealism at Close Quarters" will be found very useful by those engaged in philosophical studies, especially of Gentile and Croce. Green and Nettleship, Bradley and Alexander, Haldane and Pringle-Pattison, Stout and C. C. J. Webb, indeed, all the familiar names in the world of philosophy of the period, appear in these pages. Prof. Muirhead's work has been done skilfully and unobtrusively.

It is usual to remark on Abbé Dimnet's achievement in being able to write with such skill in a language not his own. In *My Old World* (Cape, 7s. 6d.) there is perhaps only one sentence which betrays that the Abbé is a Frenchman, though a phrase like "donated to the community" would indicate his familiarity with the United States—he tells us later in the book that he crosses the Atlantic every year. This account of the writer's youth—at home at Trélon, at school at Cambrai, teaching at Saint-Jean School, Douai, as theological student in the Cambrai Seminary and as instructor at Lille University after *agrégation,* brings the Abbé to Paris in 1902 at the age of 35, and leaves the reader looking forward to the continuation of the life story of a liberal cleric who has never been a parish priest, but has combined the career of teacher, journalist, and man of letters in a remarkable way. Already at 35 we see that his love for the English has made him the master of the English tongue and the correspondent of some of its leading journals. His comments on affairs of Church and State, his sketches of individuals and peoples, lend spice to a very unusual story.

Some years ago we crossed the Atlantic with the group of scholars, publicists, and preachers which Dr. Sherwood Eddy brings to Europe every summer, and had the privilege of preaching to them on the *Majestic*. We were then greatly impressed by the personality of Dr. Eddy, in which an intense sincerity is combined with wide knowledge. It was, therefore, with special interest that we opened his autobiography *A Pilgrimage of Ideas* (Allen & Unwin, 10s. 6d.) which has as its sub-title "The Re-Education of Sherwood Eddy". During the 63 years of his life Sherwood Eddy has played many parts. Student life at Yale and Union Seminary were followed by missionary experience in India, and by long service for the Y.M.C.A., in which six months of every year were spent in the Far East and six in the United States. Subsequently Dr. Eddy has been a traveller, visiting China eight times and Russia eleven, learning all the time, and spending himself in service. Gandhi he thinks the greatest person he has known, and after him he places Miss Amy Carmichael, C. F. Andrews, Kagawa, and

Bishop Azariah. In the course of the years he has moved from fundamentalism to a broad conception of Christianity, from nationalism to socialism. His book, like his previous works, bears many marks of haste, but it is simply packed with interest. The sections in which he describes his personal dealing with men in regard to their religion or soliciting their gifts, present their challenge to all Christians. The letters received from Russian students under the old régime make clear what a tremendous release the Communist ideal must have meant to those without hope or purpose in life. The pictures of the War, of "dynamic personalities", and of the revolution in morals, give much food for thought, while the writer's study of himself and the account of his philosophy of life help us to understand an attractive and forceful personality.

Fifty Years of International Socialism (Allen & Unwin, 6s.) is the autobiography of the historian of Socialism, Mr. M. Beer, and its jacket does not err in calling it "an instructive footnote to the history of the last fifty years". The author was born in the ghetto in Galicia nearly 70 years ago (a few more dates would have been welcome). He gives a vivid account of his early life and education in a Christian School, and of the growth of anti-Semitism which resulted in his departure for Berlin in 1887. There he became a journalist and a Socialist, and after sundry adventures reached London in 1894. The narrative of his struggles for a livelihood are rivalled in interest by the interwoven story of the early days of the British Labour Movement, with its pictures of English and foreign Socialist politicians, including Lenin, Engels, and Jaurès. Mr. Beer's writings won him the respect of scholars and subsequently the attention of the Nazis, who recently cancelled the German naturalization he had obtained in 1921 (he and his family had been ejected from England in 1915). Mr. Beer compares the effect of the Nazi movement on the Jews with that of the Babylonian exile. He says:

> My wife went Germanic, one of my daughters joined Zionism and settled in Palestine, the other children dispersed, some returning to their land of birth—England—some remaining Germanic. It was as in the old times, when the Jews returned from the Babylonian exile, but with the *rôles* reversed. Ezra and Nehemia, in reorganizing the Jewish nation, enforced the dissolution of mixed Jewish marriages in order to safeguard "the holy seed" from being contaminated by the foreign demotic elements. The Nazis, the imitators of the Italians and Russians, are also imitating the non-Aryan leader Ezra, the creator of post-exilic Judaism.

Altogether a moving and informing narrative, with one or two unfortunate misprints like "W. T. Steed; *Nehemia* is Mr. Beer's spelling.

The remarkable success of the film "Little Women" has drawn the attention of a new generation to the author of the book on which it was based. Miss Cornelia Meigs's *The Story of Louisa Alcott* (Harrap, 8s. 6d.) faithfully portrays the Alcott family—its eccentric head, Bronson, his heroic wife, and their children. Louisa's youth, her experiences as nurse during the Civil War, and the fame that came to her, bringing an income sufficient to maintain the family in comfort—are simply but vividly described in a book which rather scamps the last years.

Miss Muriel Harris's *Pulpits and Preachers* (Methuen, 5s.) contains sketches reprinted from *Truth*. The recipe is the same in every case—a description of the church, and of the preacher's appearance, and a summary of the discourse. Some of the fifty-two subjects will not be known outside their own denominations.

We are not sure that Dr. T. R. Glover's *The Ancient World* (Cambridge Press, 7s. 6d.) is not his "best yet". In it the gifts that have

marked his previous writings are conspicuous, but the skill with which he surrounds the pill with jam is extraordinary: we learn in spite of ourselves, and come to the end of the book with a much clearer idea of the ancient world than had previously been ours. Especially does Dr. Glover make *geography* interesting, so that we see the Persians and the Greeks, the Carthaginians and the Romans, walking and talking, warring and trading, in a real world: they seem to step forth from the tapestries of history and become living men and women. The modern allusions are not less useful than the table of dates as means by which the Public Orator achieves his purpose.

The first volume of the translation of Dr. G. Constant's great work on the Reformation in England was published last year under the title *The English Schism: Henry VIII (1509-1547)* (Sheed & Ward, 16s.) and speedily went to a second impression. What a pity Dr. Constant or his publishers asked Mr. Hilaire Belloc to write a Preface. Mr. Belloc's stock as historian is so low that a Preface lauding a work by a man "wholly French, wholly Catholic" will probably damage rather than help it. Dr. Constant's work shows immense industry; students of the period will benefit merely by reading his bibliographies, and they will not be harmed by the writer's prepossessions: they are too obvious to mislead.

Mr. F. J. Varley has collected so much useful information in his *Cambridge during the Civil War, 1642-1646* (Heffer, 6s.) a companion volume to his *The Siege of Oxford*—that it is to be regretted that he does not make it more accessible. A student not *au fait* with the authorities will find Mr. Varley far less helpful than he should; *e.g.*, he will note a reference to Laud's Annual Accounts without being told where they are to be found and so on. Mr. Varley also confuses two very different Samuel Wards, and his Elizabethan chapter does not inspire confidence. On the other hand, the chapters on the University, the Colleges, the College Plate, and the Military Occupation are extremely good. He has no hesitation in deciding against the value of *Querela Cantabrigiensis,* and comes down strongly on the side of the Puritans in regard to charges of iconoclasm: at the end of the Civil War

> the condition of the Colleges at Cambridge was much better than that of the Colleges at Oxford.

Dr. E. D. Bebb's thesis, *Nonconformity and Social and Economic Life, 1660-1800* (Epworth Press, 7s. 6d.), gathers together an interesting collection of facts which students of Nonconformity will find useful. While not getting beyond the usual sources, Dr. Bebb has so analysed them as to give in easily accessible form the number of Nonconformists in his period, an estimate of their wealth and social position, an account of their church discipline, their attitude to the State, and to social problems such as slavery, smuggling, and poverty. It would have been well, perhaps, if the book had been limited to the old Dissenters or to Methodism, and had gone a little deeper; but it is nevertheless a conspectus for which we should be grateful.

With Dr. Bebb's book should be read the Rev. E. R. Taylor's essay, *Methodism and Politics* (Cambridge Press, 7s. 6d.), which shows the transference from a united Methodism, loyal to Wesley, to a Methodism, sundered and divided, agitated and bewildered. Jabez Bunting, the Methodist pope, who led his Church to disaster, was true to the general type of Methodist of the earlier part of the period, holding that "Methodism hates democracy as it hates sin". With the years liberalism (both ecclesiastical and political) developed, preparing the way for the alignment

of most Methodists with other Nonconformists on the side of Cobden, Bright, and Gladstone, and finally for Hugh Price Hughes.

Mr. Taylor ably describes this process, in which not least important is the breakdown of the notion of pastoral supremacy : Bunting's reference to "the Dissenting principle, that not the *pastor,* but the *Church* collectively, should have the power of the keys" is enlightening. Indeed, Mr. Taylor sees in Congregationalism one of the disrupting influences in Methodism—James Everett, one of the leaders of the United Methodists, had been much influenced by the meetings of the Congregational Union at York in 1847—and he considers that the struggle between the Congregationalist and Methodist elements went on until the defeat of the former in the Union of 1932.

Prof. D. E. Walker's *Adventuring for Christian Unity* (Berean Press, 1s.) is "A Survey of the History of Churches of Christ. (Disciples)".

We are told by Mr. Morse Adams Cartwright, the author of *Ten Years of Adult Education* (Macmillan, 8s. 6d.) that before 1924 the term "adult education" was not in use in the United States. In that year a conference was called to consider a volume of essays, *The Way Out,* published by Lord Haldane, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, Mr. Albert Mansbridge, and others, and as a result an American Association for Adult Education was formed. In this book Mr. Cartwright surveys what has been done with the aid of grants from the Carnegie Corporation amounting to $3,000,000. Of this $2,000,000 have been spent in experiments of various kinds. The volume shows that America has yet a good deal from which we might learn, although there are various fields about which we must perforce say, as does Mr. Cartwright, "Somebody ought to do something about it".

For a long time we believed that Commander Stephen King-Hall was not an individual but a syndicate. How could one person write plays, discuss economics, broadcast most effectively to children, direct an Insurance Company, and 101 other things. In course of time we discovered that he was really one single human being, and the appearance of *Our Own Times 1913-1934* (Nicholson & Watson, 2 vols., 10s. 6d. each) increased our sense of wonder, not merely at the range of Commander King-Hall's activities, but at the remarkable success which he has achieved in them all. The clearness and simplicity of this survey are no surprise to those who have listened to the *liaison* officer between young and old expounding international affairs to juveniles. To these gifts are added a sureness of touch, wide knowledge, and an enthusiasm for peace and justice rarely found together. The Selected Chronology (116 pp.), the Bibliography (20 pp.), and the exhaustive and careful Index (54 pp.) together testify to the thoroughness of Commander King-Hall's researches, and we know of no book we would recommend as soon to the student of "our own times". A special word of praise, too, must be given for the mottoes at the head of each chapter.

Of course, Commander King-Hall's picturesque style has its dangers, but the rare occasions on which it leads him astray (II. 98 is an example) only emphasize its usual success. He overlooks little, though we think the attitude of the Roman Catholics, led by Cardinal Faulhaber, in Germany deserves mention. It is impossible to discuss the conclusions to which Commander King-Hall comes. He believes a "planned Socialist economy" is an inevitable development, holding that

> the system of relying upon the motive of private profit as the main incentive to wealth production, a system which includes the private ownership of the means of production, breaks down upon the consumption side when human

labour becomes suddenly no longer an important factor in the process of production.

This is a contribution to the history of our own times which no student of affairs can afford to miss.

Mr. Lewis Browne is indebted for his title *How Odd of God* (Lane, 6s.) to Mr. W. N. Ewer's

How odd
Of God
To choose
The Jews.

This "Introduction to the Jews" is marked by the rationalism of outlook and the clarity of style which marked Mr. Browne's previous books reviewed in these pages. The writer, himself a Jew, shows how Judaism is in the same boat as other organized religions, having lost multitudes of its professors to the ranks of the indifferent. In Russia, in America, on the Continent, in England, the same story is to be told: the War, economic pressure, bolshevism, civilization have broken down the old adherence to the Torah; even in Tel Aviv "Jews will be found clad in overalls and covered with grease and sweat even on the Day of Atonement". The exclusion which has been the lot of the Jews continues, from the social and industrial boycott in America to the Nazi deprivation of civil and political rights. There is no saying where it will end, for any nation may turn on "a minority unobtrusively energetic and irritatingly able"—the Dreyfus case shows how easily the cry against the Jews can be aroused. Mr. Browne's most suggestive analysis goes on to discuss the future of the Jews; he finds hope for his race in the Zionist movement, with "the promise it gives of encouraging the physical de-urbanization of world Jewry".

Men are still one-third animal, and one-third savage, and at times there is a reversion to savagery and the belief in magic. It expresses itself both in the world of affairs and in the world of the intellect, and its exponents Mr. Leonard Woolf calls quacks. His *Quack, Quack!* (Hogarth Press, 7s. 6d.) is fierce and bitter, and sometimes unfair as it looks at Mussolini and Hitler in politics, and Carlyle, Nietzsche, Spengler, Keyserling, Bergson, and Radhakrishnan among the intellectuals. Mr. Woolf is a rationalist, and his book is a strange mixture of argument and special pleading. Its message is summarized in the words:

> To think freely must have much the same result in A.D. 1582 as in 400 B.C. or in A.D. 1935. It must end in putting the thinker on the side of civilization against savagery, of reason against quackery, of freedom against despotism, of tolerance against persecution, of knowledge against ignorance, of scepticism against dogmatism, of equality against privilege, of peace against war.

Over against this freedom is the appeal

> to primitive tribal instincts, fear, hatred, the desire to smell out witches or scapegoats, the joy of the human pack in hunting down some miserable, defenceless victim. The other is based on freedom, intelligence, and co-operation; its appeal is to reason and scepticism, tolerance, and humanity.

The object of Mr. Philip Henderson's *Literature in a Changing Civilization* (Lane, 3s. 6d.) in the "XXth Century Library" is

> to demonstrate that it is only by understanding the economic, and therefore the class structure of society, that any genuine understanding of the literature and thought of an age can be arrived at.

Mr. Henderson writes from the communist point of view, "capitalism, in

its last degenerate phase of fascism" being the enemy, although religion receives short shrift. The case against capitalism is so strong that Mr. Henderson's hysterics do harm to his cause, which he does not help by absurd laudation of Lawrence and Joyce. The survey gives evidence that Mr. Henderson could have performed his task much more skilfully: he is polemical throughout, and his sketch lacks proportion, but it has promise.

The ninth series of lectures on "Problems of Peace" delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations is entitled *Pacifism is not Enough* (Allen & Unwin, 8s. 6d.), the subject of Sir Norman Angell's lecture. The other lectures are "The Growth of Nationalism" (Dr. G. P. Gooch), "Small States in the League" (Dr. W. E. Rappard), "Great Powers in the League" (Prof. A. E. Zimmern), "French Foreign Policy" (Prof. Etienne Dennery), "The Socialist View of Peace" (Major Attlee), "The Chaco War" (Señor del Vayo), "Social Justice and World Peace" (Mr. E. J. Phelan), "Trends of Recovery" (Dr. J. B. Condliffe), "Natural Economic Planning and International Organization" (Prof. R. MacIver), and "Financial Aspects of the 'New Deal' in some of their International Implications" (Dr. L. R. Robinson).

Europe, assailed by a general industrial offensive on all sides, is caught between two fires, Asia and America, the low wage level of one and the high wage level of the other: she is

> burdened with an excessive industrial superstructure, too dense a population, and a social standard which is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

Asia can underlive Europe, which has neither the economic youth nor the vast territory, making mass consumption possible, of the United States. Europe, nevertheless, is superior in "the quality, individuality, and difficulty" of its work, and we cannot conclude her day is over. Such is the situation skilfully diagnosed by M. André Siegfried in *Europe's Crisis* (Cape, 5s.). It seems to turn a blind eye to Russia, surely a not unimportant factor in the case.

The Rev. Norman S. Hough's *Letters on Marriage* (Skeffington, 2s.) comes from an Anglican Rector, a member of the Christian Marriage Group. In this correspondence between a clergyman and niece, who is about to be married, he deals sensibly and frankly with the marriage service of the Prayer Book, divorce, birth control, sex education, *etc.*

Mr. E. S. P. Haynes and Mr. Derek Walker-Smith have collaborated in *Divorce and its Problems* (Methuen, 6s.), though they divide company on the subject of divorce by consent, Mr. Haynes writing "for" and Mr. Walker-Smith "against". The book as a whole is a cogent plea for reform of the divorce law. On p. 26 Dr. Worsley-Boden becomes Dr. Boden-Worsley.

The value of Mr. Claud Mullins's admirable little book *Wife v. Husband in the Courts* (Allen & Unwin, 3s. 6d.) is not only in the description of his procedure in matrimonial cases in and out of the Courts; it lies even more in the picture it presents of a magistrate who adds sympathy to skill and insight in carrying out his difficult job. We wish all who have to deal with "domestic difficulties" could be made acquainted with this study by a magistrate of wide experience.

The frank discussion of sexual morals is common to-day, and it may be very useful, but it all depends on the spirit in which it is conducted. The tone employed by some of the writers in the American book, *The Sex Life of the Unmarried Adult* (Allen & Unwin, 7s. 6d.)—"An Inquiry into and an Interpretation of Current Sex Practices"—is disturbing; their

minds are made up, and their method is to provide details which will be enjoyed by the prurient rather than the objective examination of facts. It is hoped that Dr. Ira S. Wile, the Editor, is a better physician than he is a stylist; it is perhaps indicative of much that the medical men who contribute are far more dogmatic than their fellow-contributors. The subject is examined from the points of view of anthropology, biology, psychology, sociology, economics, medicine, law, morals, and literature, while the concluding essay, by a consulting psychologist, describes—luridly—"Conditions To-day".

Sterilization (Allen & Unwin, 5s.), by the Rev. J. P. Hinton and Miss Josephine E. Calcutt, is a handy book of reference based largely on the Reports of the Brock and Wood Committees. It comes down in favour of the legalization of voluntary sterilization, largely with mental deficiency in mind. It recognizes, however, that sterilization of the mental defective does not rule out, but rather demands, the development of both segregation and supervision. The methods of sterilization advocated are vasectomy and salpingectomy.

The St. Dominic's Press, Ditchling, has reprinted St. John Fisher's *Sermon Against Luther* in an edition of 300 copies (2s. 6d.). From the same publishers comes Father Vincent McNabb's *Geoffrey Chaucer* (5s.) which is "Stones from the Brook, No. 1". It is printed by hand in Caslon Old Face type on Head's hand-made paper and is mainly of interest in that it prints Chaucer's *A.B.C.*

Shakespeare has been held to be a pagan, a good Anglican, a Papist recusant, and a Puritan: it is amazing what can be proved from internal evidence! Now Mr. Richmond Noble has given us a fascinating book, *Shakespeare's Biblical Knowledge and use of the Book of Common Prayer* (S.P.C.K., 10s. 6d.). Using the first folio, Mr. Noble examines the plays with care, extracting scriptural quotations and allusions, and attempting to discern the versions of the Scriptures from which they come. He is not, as Shakespearean scholars so often seem to be, a man with a bee in his bonnet; he has read those who have preceded him, and uses their findings, but he has the courage to go his own way; and he is mindful of the fact that it is easy to argue that Shakespeare read the Bible and the Prayer Book when he is merely using phrases which had already come into common speech. It is impossible to follow Mr. Noble through his detailed analysis. Suffice it to say that he shows quite clearly that Shakespeare had access to the Geneva-Tomson quarto (Geneva *O.T.* 1560 with Tomson Revised Geneva *N.T.* 1576, issued bound together 1587) which could be carried about; to the Bishops' Bible (1568 and later, last quarto 1584), and to the *Book of Common Prayer*.

We have enjoyed reading Mr. J. Lewis May's translation, *The Memoirs of Ernest Renan* (Bles, 7s. 6d.), in which he succeeds in rendering the limpid French into an English not unworthy of it. "Wended our way" is perhaps the only unworthy phrase.

Though irritated by many slips, for the proofs have been very badly read, we have greatly enjoyed Mrs. Amy Cruse's *The Victorians and their Books* (Allen & Unwin, 12s. 6d.), a successor to her *The Englishman and His Books in the Early 19th Century*. Mrs. Cruse has steeped herself in the literature of the period, and she gives us an excellent idea of what people read. Some of her chapter headings will indicate the range of her survey: "The World of Miss Charlotte M. Yonge", "The Chapel Folks", "Science and Religion", "Preachers and Their Hearers", "The Two Nations", "Dickens", "The Philistines", "A Young Victorian's

Library", "Books from Mudie's", "The New Woman", "The Aesthetes", *"Punch"*. It can be safely assumed that Mrs. Cruse is not *au fait* with "chapel folks"; her references to Binney and Mark Rutherford show that, but she also discovers a "President of the Congregational Union" unknown to the records (it may only be *Barnet* for *Burnet*) and a "stirring Methodist sermon at the Tabernacle". On the whole, however, the book is fascinating reading, with many illustrations from the world of letters. Thus, we have Lord Rosebery, at the age of 11, reading Macaulay's *Essays* and afterwards writing,

> To that book I owe all the ambitions and aspirations I have ever indulged in.

A delightful book for autumn evenings.

To some forty novels Miss Isabel C. Clarke has now added *Six Portraits* (Hutchinson, 18s.), the women writers whom she describes being Madame de Staël, Jane Austen, George Eliot, Mrs. Oliphant, John Oliver Hobbes, and Katherine Mansfield. Madame de Staël gets most attention, but the sketch of George Eliot is the most successful. Miss Clarke's style and method are not convincing, nor does she write with detachment—her Roman Catholicism several times obtrudes itself. Nevertheless, her zest and animation give life to her studies.

We must resist the temptation to engage in the controversy on the importance of Geraldine Jewsbury to which the Preface of Miss Susanne Howe's *Geraldine Jewsbury: Her Life and Errors* (Allen & Unwin, 12s. 6d.) invites us. Suffice it to say that while we confess to ignorance of Miss Jewsbury's writings, references to her in the literary personalia of the 19th century made us open Miss Howe's book with interest. The writer is evidently an American and not altogether familiar with some of the persons and places of which she writes—we have "Ilkely (three times so spelt) then as now a well-known hydropathic institution on the Yorkshire moors"—but she makes us see Geraldine as one born out of due time—the 18th or the 20th centuries would have suited her better than the 19th—and as one whose restless temperament prevented her from reaching that place in letters which concentration would have won for her. This book would follow excellently on the two just noticed.

Jakob Wasserman had such insight into human personality that anything that throws light on his own life and character is welcome. His posthumous *My Life as German and Jew* was revealing, and it is now supplemented by *Letters of Jakob Wasserman to Frau Julie Wasserman* (Allen & Unwin, 7s. 6d.). The letters, which cover the years from before their engagement in 1900 to the divorce in 1926, make sad reading. In the early days of his married life Wasserman owed much to his wife's inspiration, but while she reared a family he constantly spent long periods away from her, in Italy and elsewhere, nominally on the ground of securing quiet for his work. The inevitable happened with a man of his background and temperament: there were other women, and finally divorce. This volume might have been called "Letters of an Egotist". Thus, about one of his affairs, he writes:

> Let me have my own way, I must be allowed my own way; no obstacles must be put in my path, and then everything will straighten itself out as it should.

Wasserman himself realized his egotism, but it is to be regretted that he descended as low as this:

> Ah, my whole existence is work, nothing but work; the shaking off of a burden that God has laid upon me, the fulfilment of the commands of a

Supreme Will. I know I often tremble in my dreams lest something terrible should happen to you before you have realized that you have done me wrong.

It is with great pleasure that we have read Lady Robertson Nicoll's *Under the Bay Tree,* printed for private circulation. The world of journalism still echoes with stories of Nicoll's genius—his immense industry, his *flair* for men, his encyclopædic knowledge, his gift of making the best of both worlds—and anything that can be gleaned about him is welcome indeed. Lady Nicoll's "Record" tells of the years from 1897, when she and Nicoll were married, to his death in 1923. Extracts from his diary, letters to and from her husband, accounts of holidays on the Riviera and at Lumsden (we still think *My Father* is one of the best things Nicoll wrote), and descriptions of life and of Nicoll's methods of work at Bay Tree Lodge, all combine to win for the book its place on our shelves next to Darlow's biography and to the two volumes of selections from Nicoll's writings—*People and Books* and *The Seen and the Unseen*—to which we often turn. Barrie and Joseph Parker, Annie S. Swan and Beatrice Harraden, S. R. Crockett and John Watson, Maarten Maartens and David Masson—these are but a few of the figures which flit through these charming pages. Nicoll's politics, once the War came, did not appeal to us, but as book-lover and critic he remains an exemplar.

Mr. T. S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral* (Faber, 5s.), a play on the martyrdom of Thomas Becket which was performed at Canterbury in June, has the same characteristics as *The Rock*. We do not find in it the elements of true poetry, nor can we think it would succeed as a play, though it is hard to tell from merely reading it. The Second Act, separated from the first by a sermon in which Becket glorifies martyrdom, is much more effective than the first. If only Mr. Eliot could eschew such lines as

> But violence, duplicity, and frequent malversation,

and

> You are right to express a certain incredulity,

and instead give us more of the simplicity of

> No life here is sought for but mine,
> And I am not in danger, only near to death,

his plays would be more effective.

A delightful addition to the "English Heritage" series (Longmans, 3s. 6d.) is Mr. Iolo A. Williams's *English Folk-Song and Dance*. As we read we are reminded once again how much we owe to Cecil Sharp in this field.

Two new volumes in Messrs. Burns, Oates's "Nature and Science Series for Young People" are Mr. J. Fairfax-Blakeborough's *English Wild Animals* (3s. 6d.) and Mr. G. H. Browning's *Magic in the Woods,* the latter of which is splendidly illustrated by photographs taken by Capt. St. Barbe Baker.

Mr. Hugh Walpole's *The Inquisitor* (Macmillan, 8s. 6d.) concerns Polchester, its cathedral and its "town", its clergy and its unemployed, and it will be a help to the reader if he is already acquainted with previous volumes in the series. Can the inhabitants of Precincts really be so unpleasant as Mr. Walpole makes them? The attractive ones are quite a small minority. Mr. Walpole has always been drawn to the eerie, even the *macabre,* and *The Inquisitor* is overshadowed by this strain, even as Polchester is overshadowed by the Cathedral and the miser Furze. While interesting enough, the book must be ranked below Mr. Walpole's best.

Dr. Lloyd Douglas, one time Congregational minister in Los Angeles, is certainly succeeding in his new calling, that of novelist. There are weak spots in *Green Light* (Dickson, 7s. 6d.) but it holds the reader from start to finish. Not the least attractive character in the book is Sylvia, the dog, but the two doctors, Endicott and Paige, and the two women, Phyllis and Sonia, are very well drawn, and the minor characters are good. There is verisimilitude about the scene in the operating theatre and about Dean Harcourt. The latter, a difficult personality to get into print, is the pivot of the book; it should be the endeavour of all ministers of religion to do for people in trouble what Harcourt was able to do—perhaps in virtue of his own suffering. There are more misprints than one usually finds in a novel.

Reluctantly and in spite of ourselves we have to recognize the merit of Mr. Paul Horgan's *No Quarter Given* (Constable, 8s. 6d.) Reluctantly, because we dislike a book in which all the characters fall so easily a prey to sex and, second, because the method of interspersing the narrative with episodes from the earlier life of the hero is unconvincing, and the fanciful "Death song" inartistic. The story of a consumptive genius is told with insight and power, with two outstanding passages—the account of the operation in a mountain cabin by a doctor with an arm already poisoned, and the section describing Edmund's last days. In themselves these are sufficient to put Mr. Horgan in a class far above the ordinary.

Mr. Robert Francis's *The Wolf at the Door* (Allen & Unwin, 8s. 6d.) is the translation of a much-talked-about French novel. It is the work of a young man and it is said to have affinity with Flaubert, Dickens, and Hans Andersen, though Mr. Francis himself would add as influences Alain Fournier and Katherine Mansfield. Mr. Havelock Ellis introduces the book, which is difficult indeed to understand. It has something of the realism of Maupassant and the horror of *The House with the Green Shutters,* and is not to be recommended to delicate stomachs.

Mrs. E. Thornton Cook's *They Lived* (Murray, 7s. 6d.) is called "A Brontë Novel". It tells the familiar story well enough, only occasionally leaving the documents to let the writer's imagination have play. When there can be no surprises the novelist is at a disadvantage, but the story of the Haworth Rectory can be retailed many times and yet hold the attention.

We find the Rev. W. H. Lax's *Mrs. Benger Carries On* (Epworth Press, 3s. 6d. and 2s. 6d.) both moving and disturbing—moving in that it tells vividly the story of a Poplar flower-woman whose faith and service put many Christians to shame; disturbing in that in what purports to be a biography there are many chestnuts: we really cannot think that Mrs. Benger was the original who, having had her diet, proceeded to her dinner.

EDITOR.

Dr. J. W. Jack's *The Ras Shamra Tablets* (Clark, 3s.) is the first number of a new series of "Old Testament Studies" promoted by the Society for Old Testament Study. No subject could have been better chosen. The importance of the new discoveries in N. Syria can fitly be compared with that of the famous Amarna tablets. The new documents throw much needed light on the mythology, ritual and, to some extent, the history of the Caananite and Phœnician peoples before their contact with the Israelites, *i.e.,* from the fifteenth to the thirteenth centuries B.C. They show us the origins of not a few features of the Hebrew religion and elucidate some of the Hebrew terms. By their very contrast with the oracles

of Hebrew prophecy they bring out the true characteristics of Israel's religion, which justify us in calling it a unique revelation. To the linguistic scholar they are full of interest, and not least because they show us the beginnings of an alphabetic script.

Dr. Jack has handled this material, some of which is naturally still *sub judice,* with the competence and lucidity which he has taught us to expect from him. He has kept in close personal touch with the French discoverers and interpreters of the text and his book is thoroughly up to date; at the same time he exercises independent judgment on a number of disputed points, whilst giving us fairly the evidence on which his conclusions are based. No serious student of the Hebrew text of the *O.T.* can afford to be without this study, which brings together information nowhere else to be obtained in such handy compass.

H. Wheeler Robinson.

The Rev. Jewett C. Townsend's *The Modern Approach to the Old Testament* (Allen & Unwin, 5s.) is a rather unscholarly treatment of a theme dealt with far more adequately in works of which the author is evidently unaware. He seems to have little first-hand knowledge of his subject, for his statements are often vague, obscure, and even incorrect:

> Moses could not have written the Pentateuch because writing was not known to the Hebrews before the entry into Canaan.
> The restoration under Cyrus 458.
> Antiochus was a Persian king.

Perhaps these latter are slips, but spelling such as "Baalam" and "Nazarite" do not inspire confidence.

The main part of the volume consists of simple undiscriminating summaries of the several books of the *O.T.* The book is ill-arranged and the treatment is very disproportionate: the "Five Rolls" receive as much space as the whole of the Hexateuch. No serious attempt is made to state and expound the documentary theory of the Pentateuch, which surely is critical for the approach to the whole subject.

As if the *O.T.* were not enough, a chapter is added on the "Apocrypha of the Old Testament", which summarizes the books of the Apocrypha proper, and also of the Pseudepigrapha.

Some wise and true things are said, but the above defects rob the volume of the right to its title.

The Rev. Henry Cook's *The Prophets of the Bible* (S.C.M., 5s.) should prove helpful to ministers and laymen alike. It is an eminently clear, sympathetic, and competent account of the personalities and messages of the Canonical Prophets.

W. A. Davies.

There is little that needs to be said about *Sons of God: a devotional Commentary on the Fourth Gospel* (S.P.C.K., 5s.), by Dr. W. E. Lutyens, Canon Emeritus of Rochester, except that it *is* a devotional commentary on the Fourth Gospel. The author sits loose to all the historical problems connected both with the Gospel and its contents. He does indeed recognize that the *Perikope Adulterae* did not originally form part of it; and he allows here and there for the Evangelist's "footnotes": but for the rest he treats the contents of the Gospel as a series of fully reliable records in their correct order, and the reports of discourses generally as verbatim reports. There is, of course, something to be said for not deferring the exposition of the book until all critical problems connected with it can be regarded as solved; and the series of meditations or sermonettes which Dr.

Lutyens has here given us will undoubtedly be found devotionally helpful. On the other hand, one wonders whether there is not a rather serious danger in so completely ignoring the well-known conditions of attaining historical truth, when fostering devotional thought concerning our Saviour.

The Rev. F. Warburton Lewis's *The Christian Religion* (N.S.S.U., 3s. 6d.) contains a series of meditations on the significance of Jesus Christ and the inward character of Christian discipleship. The tone throughout is lofty, the insight frequently striking, the presentation always stimulating. The short chapters would serve admirably as readings with which to begin the devotional periods of the day. Mr. Lewis writes with the enthusiasm of a prophet, the vision of a mystic, and the eloquence of a poet.

It must, however, be added that the ability to appreciate (as also to produce) an account of Christianity in this style is to a large extent a matter of temperament. While, no doubt, the book faithfully and beautifully represents the experience that Christians of a certain type have had of Christ, there will be others who will find it hard to follow the story with full consent. They will sense in the style a certain straining after effect—for example, in the frequent use of the verbal termination "-eth". More seriously, they will feel that where the book deals with history it is somewhat misty and uncritical. The Fourth Gospel is quoted as if it gave us the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus. The exegesis is here and there distinctly forced: Mr. Lewis, for instance, impugns the translators' *"yet"* in *John* 20^{29}, and wants to interpret the χάρις of *Lk.* 6^{32f} (which clearly means simply "thanks") as "the grace of Christ". The old mistake about Herod Antipas's centurion being a "Roman captain" turns up again. Furthermore, Mr. Lewis seems to misunderstand the argument that Paul knows nothing of an empty tomb. He argues that Paul must certainly have believed that Jesus' tomb was empty. No one doubts that. The point is that Paul's evidence consists exclusively of "appearances", from which he and others doubtless *inferred* the emptiness of the tomb. But he summons no witnesses to prove that the tomb was actually found to be empty. And lastly, I feel that Mr. Lewis overdoes the oft-used plea that Christianity is not, essentially, moral effort. He recognizes in one place that "It is well for us to remember that there is sin to be fought": but he is clearly not hearty about it; and he greatly undervalues, I feel, the element of moral struggle and development which is as real a feature of the Christian life as is the accession of new inward power through the indwelling Spirit. The moral aspects of Christianity are in fact wellnigh obliterated by the mystical and imaginative.

C. J. Cadoux.

In *Mirage and Truth* (Centenary Press, 6s.), Father D'Arcy, the Master of Campion Hall, has given us a worthy successor to his volume, *The Nature of Belief*. He writes with engaging frankness and lucidity in stating the case for Christian Theism against modern pagan substitutes for Christianity which seek invulnerability without any sound analysis of the facts of human nature. The only alternatives to Theism are pessimism and sheer romanticism. Father D'Arcy hold that what he calls "the Minimum idea of God" is guaranteed by the cosmological and ontological arguments. On this basis the Christian ideal is seen to be true, satisfying, and beautiful, rising to its splendour in the Atonement which unites man and God in the way of self-sacrifice. Throughout the book many good things are well said, and are worth remembering and quoting. It is a very serviceable piece of Christian apologetic.

Mr. H. J. Swift's *Life and Destiny* (Daniel, 6s.) is a very unequal bag. It contains much that is good and some that is not so good. The early part of the Book is on the lines of Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*. The main contentions in what follows are: (1) The Churches must cease to be dogmatic and obscurantist; (2) All religions teach the same thing, their principal doctrine being that of love (p. 219); (3) The Universal Church of the future will be based upon a synthesis of all religions; (4) Christianity, being both international and a social dynamic, is the only permanent solution of social and economic ills. Some of these contentions are more than questionable, and as presented by the writer they seen to be mutually inconsistent. While he objects to dogmatism in religion, he can be dogmatic enough in his psychology, which has a queer background in the occult. There is more than a dash of Theosophy appearing from time to time: the soul has substance and weight; thought sends out lines of force or waves which vibrate in space. Sentences like "Telepathy is to-day accepted by men of science as being true beyond question" occur rather too frequently. One would prefer a little more caution in respect of matters on which men of science are by no means agreed.

In spite of these drawbacks the writer has much that is worth saying upon the task of Christianity in the modern world. We note a misprint on p. 85 and a grammatical slip on p. 125.

E. J. Price.

In *The Foundation of the Christian Faith* (Heffer, 3s. 6d.) Dr. Lukyn Williams has written what he calls "a book for honest thinkers whether Jews or Christians". Evidently it is Jews he has mainly in mind in this careful and candid attempt at Christian apologetic, but it should also be useful for intelligent young people generally. The trouble is, of course, to get such people to read a book like this: they mostly take their ideas of Christianity from what they see of the churches and from the conventional teaching they find there. Many of them seem hardly to realize that there is a good case to be put up for the Christian position.

Very much the same may be said of *What did Jesus Think?* by Messrs. Brown-Serman, and Prichard (Macmillan, 10s. 6d.). This is an attempt by two American writers to answer the question "What think ye of Christ?" by trying to set out what He thought about Himself. They write from the strictly historical standpoint and they take account of modern *N.T.* criticism, but where these fail they do not hesitate to fill in the gaps with their imagination. For example, in a full account of the losing and finding of Jesus in the temple they say,

> A hurried search through the morgue, the police station, the doctors' offices —and then with a sigh of relief the sudden appearance of the boy amongst the temple staff.

There are not many lapses like this, however, and on the whole the book gives an interesting and readable presentation of the Christian position.

W. B. Selbie.

Canon H. F. B. Mackay's *Some Studies in the Old Testament* (Centenary Press, 6s.) is a very welcome selection of sermons preached mostly at All Saints, Margaret Street, during the War years. These are not the mythical recruiting sermons of which one hears so much. Several of the sermons collected here are on the *O.T.* figures of the Pentateuch and later times; the rest are from the Prophets, especially from *Zechariah*. In the character studies of Abraham, Moses, Jacob, Balaam, and in the

sermon on "The Threshing Floor of Araunah," one of the best in the book, Canon Mackay gives us examples of preaching of great freshness and power: it is just the treatment of *O.T.* subjects which is needed if the *O.T.* is to be saved to the modern pulpit. The volume is alive all through, and one catches again and again those spiritual overtones which are the soul of true preaching. It is interesting to compare the interpretation of Balaam as "a mystic" with Bishop Butler's famous sermon. I wonder if Canon Mackay knows Mark Rutherford's singular essay on "Saul," which gives a very different estimate of Saul from the one in this book. Perhaps the real Saul was in a middle place between the two.

The Rev. A. Day's *The Best World "Possible"* (Allen & Unwin, 4s. 6d.) discusses the old riddle why world-evil and imperfection are to be found in the creation of an all-wise and loving God. Mr. Day's argument is that on the whole this is the best world *possible* under the conditions of time and space and the finitude and freedom of man. In chapters written with much scientific discernment he points out the difficulties to be overcome; the difficulty of progress and of life itself, and in the highest realm the difficulty of character and spirit; and he shows how evolution is no guarantee of easy progress, and that what has been achieved has been done at a great price, and through many miscarriages and escapes. God might have made a better world perhaps, but not a better one under the limitations of this one. The latter part of the book is a brief modern statement of the Christian position of faith in a God who is love.

This book is in effect an argument aimed at diminishing the difficulties of faith, and in that way it is very helpful. But the actual riddle remains unanswered, as it always will: perhaps the course of Mr. Day's argument rather makes one ask why other conditions in which a better world should have been possible were not chosen, instead of conditions leading to this imperfect result. It is a vain and useless question, like squaring the circle; and Mr. Day's own final recourse is the only possible one—to fall back on faith in God. This is a more than ordinarily interesting book. It is written after much thought, and it is well written. It is a book that makes for faith.

Mr. Charles Copeman's *You and I and Chaos* (Allen & Unwin, 6s.) would be a more persuasive study of the social question if it had a little more light and shade. He calls it an ultimatum; and his point seems to be that unless the world adopts the socialism outlined there is an end to our modern civilization. Mr. Copeman speaks of the one need of adopting the teachings of Jesus, and there is much with which one can but sympathize in what he says. He is very hard on the Churches, but he is not quite fair in making them the root and reason of every social offence. Is Mr. Copeman quite sure that his chapter on marriage is anywhere near the teaching of Jesus? In the same way, there seems to be a great deal of unrestrained assertiveness about other opinions in this book. And yet one can enter into the passionate plea of the book for a more Christian form of society: to be shaken up will do us good. I hold no special brief for the Group Movement: but when Mr. Copeman says,

> Buchmanism is merely a re-gilding of the old slave-morality, calculated to tempt us back in a spirit of self-sacrifice to that tottering, ill-constituted society from which we are trying to escape,

I feel he has lost all sense of proportion and truth.

The Rev. H. S. Box's *Miracles and Critics* (Faith Press, 3s.) will be found a very useful handbook for the study of miracles, and of the general controversy about them, both in the past and now. This defence of

traditional views is based on a wide knowledge of the subject, and it is well annotated. The book has a foreword by the Bishop of Gloucester.

Mr. G. P. Bailey's *Scientific Progress in Recent Times* (Nicholson & Watson, 4s. 6d.) is a volume of the "University Extension Library." It has much to say about some of the practical applications of science, *e.g.*, in radio-telegraphy, and coal and its products, as well as about theoretical work. Others besides University Extension students will be glad to have it for reference, and as an exceedingly good outline of recent discovery.

Sir Arthur Eddington's *New Pathways in Science* (Cambridge Press, 10s. 6d.) is not a book for the impatient, but the careful reader who has a fair knowledge of recent science, without being in any sense an expert, will find in it a clear and very able discussion of current physics and astronomy. It deals with such questions as the principle of indeterminacy, the law of entropy, probabilities, and the simpler interpretations of wave mechanics; and on all these it throws light for those who will see. Sir Arthur has the gift of making difficult things seem easier, though not too easy. The middle chapters are on the new astronomy—The Constitution of the Stars, Sub-atomic Energy, Cosmic Clouds and Nebulæ, and The Expanding Universe. To many this will be the most interesting part of the book. These chapters contain in a very delightful form an outline of researches in which the author is easily one of the first of living masters. In a final chapter Sir Arthur discusses some of the more important criticisms of his opinions, especially those of Prof. W. T. Stace and Mr. C. E. M. Joad; and in an Epilogue, and a very good one, he repeats his own philosophical position, and his general outlook. One impression the book will leave is that the new science is still moving about in "worlds unrealized," and that many of its interpretations must be construed with caution, and within a considerable margin of error. This point is frequently emphasized. The book is a worthy successor to the author's *The Nature of the Physical World,* and should be read as in many ways a sequel to that work.

Mr. O. de Selincourt has attempted in his *Art and Morality* (Methuen, 10s. 6d.) an unbiased discussion of the relation between art and morality, and one that leans neither to the side of the æsthetes nor to that of the moralists: the discussion is certainly unimpassioned enough to suit the most rigorous philosopher. The question of what art is and what it can do is analysed at length; and in the later chapters there is a minute consideration of the nature of morality, and of some points now much in dispute among students of ethics. The conclusion is that art and morality are neither of them independent of the other, nor of other forms of human experience:

> Art, therefore, though in some sense an independent thing with its own standards and containing its value in itself, is doubly related to morality: directly in virtue of its impact on the practical lives of persons . . . . . and indirectly through its relations to other things . . . . . and in both respects it is susceptible of moral justification.

I am not sure that Mr. de Selincourt would greatly approve of Ruskin, but in the end he seems to be not far from Ruskin's teaching, that "the love of beauty is an essential part of all healthy human nature . . . and is itself wholly good."

This book would be easier to follow if the writing were a little less abstract, and had colour. Phrases like "it is not difficult to see that" occur far too often, and they are apt to be irritating when, do what you will, it is not easy to see. But the discussion gathers force as it goes on; and

apart from the main problem of the book, it touches incidentally on many points on which the plainest man has his own views.

A. T. S. James.

The Religion of the Hebrews (*to A.D. 70*), by Dr. C. Ryder Smith (Epworth Press, 2s. 6d.), appears in that very useful series "Great Religions of the East", and, like its other six volumes, admirably combines competency and simplicity. In little more than a hundred pages Dr. Ryder Smith succeeds in giving a clear outline of the whole development of Hebrew religion. His book should be of the greatest use, not only to theological students beginning their work on the *O.T.*, but to all who require a short history of Hebrew religion written with adequate knowledge, religious insight, and literary skill.

Mr. C. R. North's *An Outline of Islam* (Epworth Press, 2s. 6d.) is a very useful addition to the same series, which is edited by Dr. Waterhouse. Mr. North has been fortunate in his subject, for the life and work of Muhammad and the later developments of Islam have an intrinsic interest lacking in some of the other religions treated in the series. Mr. North writes with obvious competency and with such admirable clarity that not only students of theological colleges but all who desire a short and simple introduction to the study of Islam will find here the book they need.

Sydney Cave.

Dr. Ralph W. Church's *Hume's Theory of the Understanding* (Allen & Unwin, 7s. 6d.) is a detailed and careful exposition of Hume's philosophy especially as we have it in the Treatise. The writer presupposes in the reader a fairly extensive acquaintance with the development of the Cartesian philosophy from Descartes to Hume's immediate predecessors. Whilst the author gives us a highly condensed account of Hume's Theory of Knowledge his main interest is to emphasize the constructive aspects of Hume's teaching, and in this respect he has done a much-needed piece of work. There is, as Prof. Norman Kemp Smith has elsewhere pointed out, a decidedly pragmatic element in Hume's writings. This has too often been overlooked. In addition to his sceptical analysis Hume teaches that Reason justifies itself by its practical uses even though it offers no standard to which objective reality must conform. In this book the syntheses of association are expounded as a corrective to the overemphasis that has been put on Hume's atomism. It is a good piece of work, but the book will be of advantage mostly to the advanced student of Hume.

Value and Existence (Allen & Unwin, 7s. 6d.), by Prof. N. O. Lossky and Mr. John S. Marshall, is a very suggestive and important book. Within its comparatively brief compass there is much food for thought and many a germinative argument. Prof. Lossky writes from the general standpoint of Neoplatonism and the Fourth Gospel. His views are coloured by the teaching of the Greek Orthodox Church but that by no means affects adversely the trend of his general position. He maintains strongly that Values are objective and absolute, that they are constitutive and unifying realities in the universe and in human personality, that to possess them, or rather to be possessed by them, is to enjoy real, as against unreal, existence. That is to say, there is a strong trend of mysticism in this book, but it is a sane mysticism. "The achievement of value is only possible by co-operation with God Himself through the Life of the Trinity." This is "fullness of life." It is quite impossible to do justice to the many sidedness of this book and its well-worked-out arguments in a short review. One can only advise that it should be read and re-read again and again.

John Short.

In 1800 there were not more than a thousand Catholics in Wales, with only ten churches; to-day they number over 100,000, with 178 churches. *The Catholic Church in Modern Wales,* by Mr. Donald Attwater (Burns, Oates, 8s. 6d.), is the story of this increase, which is an increase strictly in Wales rather than among the Welsh. The author practically admits that Romanism is exotic in Wales; if a few aristocratic families, such as the Vaughans and the Mostyns, be excepted, the faithful are predominantly English and Irish, and "the religion of the Welsh is Nonconformity". Devotion to the vernacular is recognized as the chief difficulty; in Anglesey, where almost a quarter of the population still speak no English, there are apparently but three churches. The book lacks the imaginativeness, at once creative and historical, of Fr. Mathew's recent study of Elizabethan Catholicism in Wales and sometimes resembles a catalogue, but it is an instructive description of Catholic method, its core being the development of diocesan organization, in which the Holy See combined practical elasticity with theoretic everlastingness. There are a few misprints, *polygot* (for *bilingual*) appearing twice (pp. 213, 215).

GEOFFREY F. NUTTALL.

The Thorndike Century Junior Dictionary (Scott, Foresman and Company, $1.32) is one of the most fascinating books into which we have looked for years. There have been children's dictionaries before now, but this is the first to be constructed upon a thoroughly scientific basis and with an art that amounts to genius. The author, Professor Edward Lee Thorndike is the well-known educational psychologist of Teachers' College, Columbia University. The making of the dictionary has absorbed what time he could give it for twenty years. Under each word is given the pronunciation, the definition, and illustration where possible or necessary, and the frequency of its use. The definition is omitted for the simple words when it is implicit in the illustration. The peculiar value of the book lies, however, in the fact that every definition is given in terms of utmost simplicity. To choose a word at random: "bondage", in the dictionary we find on our desk, is "restraint of personal liberty by compulsion"; in the *Junior Dictionary* it is "being held against one's own wish under the control or influence of some person or thing". Already the book has created a revolution in the publication of children's dictionaries, for each major competitor is now working to produce a similar volume.

DOUGLAS HORTON.

NEW EDITIONS, REPRINTS, ETC.

Dr. James Moffatt and Dr. Millar Patrick have prepared a revised edition of their *Handbook to the Church Hymnary* (Oxford Press, 6s.). After the death of T. E. Lawrence Messrs. Cape published *T. E. Lawrence in Arabia and After* in the "Academy Books" (7s. 6d.), and it has been reprinted several times. Three new volumes in the "Everyman Library" (Dent, 2s.) are Arnold Bennett *The Old Wives' Tale,* Hugh Walpole *Mr. Perrin and Mr. Traill,* and Pierre Loti *Iceland Fisherman.* Constance Holme's *Beautiful End,* first published in 1918, is a new issue in the "World's Classics" (Oxford Press, 2s.).

LECTURES, PAMPHLETS, ETC.

Father Clement's *Catholic Reunion* (Blackwell, 2s. 6d.) is a plea to the Pope to give uniate status to Anglo-Catholics. Prof. Gilbert Murray's Romanes Lecture *Then and Now* (Oxford Press, 2s.) is a very fine summary

of the changes of the last fifty years. The Archbishop of York's *The Wage-Less: A Social Asset* (3d.) is published by Dr. Temple's Committee on Unemployment. Mr. W. R. Lester's *Poverty and Plenty* (Hogarth Press, 1s.), which is No. 26 in the "Day to Day Pamphlets", is a discussion of Social Credit. *The Burden of Plenty* (Allen & Unwin, 4s. 6d.) is edited by Mr. Graham Hutton, and contains talks broadcast by R. H. Brand, Hugh Dalton, H. D. Henderson, J. A. Hobson, A. R. Orage, Lionel Robbins, Mrs. Wootton, Sir Arthur Salter, and (in summary) Mr. J. M. Keynes. The *B.B.C. Annual* (2s. 6d.) is issued for the first time this year. It covers the period 1st November, 1933 to 31st December, 1934, but really contains a history of British broadcasting since 1930. It is packed with information. Sir Arthur Keith's *Darwinism and its Critics* (Watts, 1s.) is an extended form of an essay which appeared in the *Literary Guide*. The Livingstone Press has published four more "Tracts for the Times" (4d.) —the Rev. D. W. Langridge's *Seeing we Perceive Not,* a very fresh approach to the subject, the Rev. Cecil Northcott's *What God is Doing About It,* the Rev. Howard Partington's *What Right Have We To Go?* and Prin. E. J. Price's *Can a Man Save Himself?* From the S.C.M. there comes a series of *Daily Readings,* on *The Eighth Century Prophets* (6d.)— notes by the Rev. E. W. Hamond, *St. John* (4d.)—the Rev. Winboult Harding, and *Acts* (4d.)—the Rev. Conrad Skinner. In the "Lutterworth Papers" we have *Church Unity* (3d.) by Dr. A. J. MacDonald, *The Edict of Nantes and Afterwards* (3d.) by Mr. H. J. Cowell, and *Man and His Need of God* (6d.), a reprint of talks broadcast by the Rev. J. S. Whale. Nos. 4 and 5 of the "Heroes of the Free Churches" series (Epworth Press, 4d.) contain broadcast addresses, *William Booth* (Dr. G. Campbell Morgan) and *Two Great Quakers* (George Fox by Prof. H. G. Wood, and Dr. Thomas Hodgkin by Mr. Ernest E. Taylor). *Shall I Bet?* (Ludgate Circus House, 6d.) by Mr. Cecil Rose is No. 1 of "Youth Manuals". The Rev. Herbert J. Rossington's *The Essentials of Christianity* is published by the Lindsey Press (1s.). Dr. John Stevens has written *The Chronicles of Claylands Congregational Church: 1835-1935* (6d.).

ALSO RECEIVED.

HERBERT LOCKYER. *The Sins of Saints.* Pickering. 1s.
ARCHIE and W. FRASER NAISMITH. *God's Christ and God's Book.* Pickering. 2s. & 1s. 6d.
HENRY PICKERING. 100 *World-Known Witnesses to the Second Coming of the Lord.* Pickering. 6d.
A STUDENT OF PROPHECY. *Prophecy Fulfilled.* Damer. 4s. 6d. Largely occupied with *Daniel* and *Revelation,* and admittedly owing much to H. Grattan Guinness.
OSWALD J. SMITH. *World Problems in the Light of Prophecy.* Marshall, Morgan & Scott. 2s. 6d.
KATHERINE KENT. *The Words of the Master.* Rider. 3s. 6d. The Chief Sayings of Jesus the Christ.
FRED G. WARNE. *George Muller. The Man of Faith.* Pickering. 2s.
JAMES JOHNSTON. *Robert Laws of Livingstonia.* Pickering. 1s. 6d.
I. O. EVANS. *Sensible Sun-bathing.* Laurie. 1s. A sensible booklet.
VERA BARCLAY. *Joc and Colette on the Seashore.* Burns, Oates. 3s. 6d. "Nature and Science" Series.
FRANCES C. BAYLOR. *Juan and Juanita.* Burns, Oates. 5s. An English edition of a popular American child's book about two Mexican children captured by Red Indians.
FLORA E. BERRY. *Monica's Choice.* Pickering. 2s. 6d.
GRACE PETTMAN. *The Face in the Crowd.* Pickering. 1s. 6d.
T. H. PASSMORE. *The Way of the Cross in Christian Life.* Faith Press. 2s. 6d. & 1s. 6d.
E. WERGE-ORAM. *The Coronation of Christ.* Allen & Unwin. 1s. An Easter Mystery Play.
KENNETH INGRAM. *The Adventure of Passiontide.* Allan. 1s. 6d.
WILFRID NORTHFIELD. *What Life Has Taught Me.* Fenland Press. 3s. & 2s. By the author of *Conquest of Nerves* and *Secrets of Happiness.*
CICELY HOOPER. *New Patches.* Livingstone Press. 1s.
M. I. BAUMANN. *Golden Pavements.* Mary Entwistle. *The Seeker.* Livingstone Press. 6d. each.
C. A. NEWDIGATE AND E. A. DIGNAM. *The Story of the Catholic Church under Henry VIII as told by a Protestant contemporary, John Stow.* Burns, Oates. 1s. 6d.
GRACE L. HILL. *The Christmas Bride.* Lippincott. 7s. 6d. A story of simple faith and love, reminiscent of the 19th century, all the more refreshing in these days.
M. ARNCLIFFE SENNETT. *The New Inquisition.* Daniel. 1s. An attack on vivisection.
REGINALD WALLIS. *The New Home.* Pickering. 1s.
MARY WARBURTON BOOTH. *"They That Sow."* Pickering. 3s. 6d.
J. T. MAWSON. *"Waiting for the Coming."* Pickering. 2s.
W. J. MADDOX. *"The Morning! The Night Also."* Pickering. 6d.
W. GRAHAM SCROGGIE. *Eight Things That Matter.* Pickering. 6d.

PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS.

The London Quarterly and Holborn Review (July). The most striking contribution this quarter is that in which Dr. Newton Flew deals faithfully with the Rev. T. S. Gregory's *The Unfinished Universe.* Dr. Scott Lidgett on Bede, and Dr. George Jackson on Wesley as Bookman, are interesting. Theology and biblical scholarship are more evident in the useful "Notes and Discussions" than in the article section, though here Dr. C. J. Cadoux on "Dr. Klausner's Estimate of Jesus" should not be overlooked. The new editor is wisely extending his list of reviewers.

The Hibbert Journal (July). Prof. J. L. Stocks's "Leisure" is followed by Prof. V. D. Scudder's "Work". Mr. Claude G. Montefiore's "What a Jew thinks about Jesus" will be widely read, as will the Rev. R. A. Edwards's "The 'Peasant' Theory of Jesus". It is pleasant to find Prof. J. Wright Buckham ("Everyman a Philosopher") here once again, and also Dr. W. M. Childs, who writes on his childhood days in Lincolnshire. Dr. James Moffatt's "Survey of Recent Theological Literature" is very useful.

The Baptist Quarterly (July). Special mention is made of the retirement of Dr. W. T. Whitley from the Secretaryship of the Baptist Historical Society. The most important articles are the Rev. B. G. Collins's "Some Causes of Accidie in the Ministry" and Dr. L. G. Champion's "Worship and Life in the New Testament".

The Baptist Layman (July). This live little magazine has some articles of interest to more than Baptists and more than laymen. The Rev. E. A. Payne has some useful contributions and Mr. J. B. Gotts writes on "Rationalization in Stewardship".

The Modern Churchman (June-July). The Editorial is as alive as ever in discussing Gospel criticism, the Anglican Church and Marriage, and modernism generally. Canon Sheppard writes on "Towards a Vital and Comprehensive Church", Mr. J. W. Poynter on "Infallibilism and Freedom", and a Congregational contributor, the Rev. T. Wigley, on "The New Background of Christian Thought" (rather overweighted by authorities). A lighter article is Dr. J. M. Macfie's "The Travels of Pietro della Valle in India, 300 Years Ago". The Rev. G. H. D. Grimes's "Religious Conditions in Austria" ought to be read.

The Expository Times (July-Sept.). The outstanding *N.T.* problems dealt with are "Further Thoughts on the M-Hypothesis" by Dr. F. C. Grant, "The Johannine Sayings of Jesus" by Dr. W. F. Howard, and "The Trustworthiness of the Marcan Outline" by the Rev. F. B. Clogg. Among other contributions are Sir Charles Marston's "The Lachish Letters", and Dr. Garvie's "Criticism and History".

The Christian Quarterly (July). Several papers are connected with the World Convention of Churches of Christ held in August. The Rev. J. T. Hornsby's "The Movement towards Christian Union in relation to the Churches of the Congregational Order" deserves consideration.

Social Service Review (June-August). Miss Hilda Jennings continues her study of the transfer of men from South Wales to employment elsewhere.

The Common Room (June). Mr. A. C. Cameron's "The Film in National Life" is the most important article. Mr. F. R. Barlow's "Birds: A Fascinating Hobby" will be enjoyed by nature lovers.

Bulletin of the John Rylands Library (July). An admirable number with the Editor's "Miles Coverdale and the English Bible" as the *pièce de resistance.* Among other important contributions are Prof C.. H. Dodd's "The Background of the Fourth Gospel", Prof. Barker Fairley's "Nietzsche and the Poetic Impulse", and Dr. T. Fish's "A Rylands Cuneiform Tablet Concerning the Conquest of Kish under Agga". The addition of some interesting MSS. is recorded.

Religion in Education (July). Dr. T. H. Robinson gives an account of recent books on the *O.T.,* Dr. K. J. Saunders writes on "Teaching the History of Religion in Schools", Mr. Colin Sharpe, the Head Master of Abbotsholme, on

"Corporate Religion", and Dr. James Kelly on "Evangelical Christianity in Central Europe".

The International Review of Missions (July). Dr. J. H. Oldham surveys the 25 years since the Edinburgh conference, Dr. F. Rawlinson writes on "The Present Status of the China Christian Movement", and the Rev. G. W. Briggs on "Yoga". There are articles by the Rev. G. E. Hickman Johnson ("Christian Work in Jamaica"), Dr. Van Andel ("The Devolution of the Work of Missions on to the Indigenous Christians"), Herr Otto F. Raum ("Magic and Christian Policy"), Herr Hans Kosmala ("The Religious Development of Judaism"), the Rev. J. K. Macgregor ("Christian Missions and Marriage Usage in Africa") and Prof. Lootfy Levonian ("Islam and the Evangelical Churches in the Near East").

World Dominion (July). Two Congregational contributors, the Rev. A. M. Chirgwin and the late W. Kendall Gale, open this number. Mr. Kendall Gale's "Church Planting in Madagascar" is a vivid picture of his own pioneering work there. Another striking article is the translation of Mr. D. O. Shabert's "Soviet Russia and the Word of God", which describes Anti-God Propaganda in Russia. Mr. Kenneth G. Grubb's "Mexican Misunderstanding" is also informing, and among other contributors are Prebendary W. Wilson Cash, Dr. S. M. Zwemer, Dr. Adolf Keller, and the Rev. J. J. Cooksey.

The Evangelical Quarterly (July). The outstanding articles of the present number are Dr. G. H. Clark's "Kant and Old Testament Ethics", Prof. John Macleod's "The Place of Natural Religion", Dr. J. C. Coetzee's "Religious Education", and Dr. G. H. Hospers's "Groen Van Printerer and His Book". Dr. Leon Wencelius's "*L'Idée de Moderation dans la Pensée de Calvin*" is continued.

Religion in Life (Summer). This number is packed with interesting articles. English contributors include Dr. Oman on "The Book of Proverbs" and Dr. Garvie on "Paul as Christian Apostle and Jewish Rabbi". Among useful American contributions are Dr. Buttrick's "The Ladder of Faith", Dr. F. C. Grant's "Some Ideals of Education in Religion", the Rev. George Stewart's "Happy Marriage", and Dr. J. S. Zelie's "A Night in a Russian Monastery".

The Yale Review (Summer). Mr. Walter Lippmann writes on "The Permanent New Deal", Mr. Julian Huxley on "Scientific Pitfalls of Racialism". There are two stories, by Mr. William Saroyan ("Five Ripe Pears"), and Mr. Paul Green ("Love and a Fiddle") and verse by Conrad Aitken, R. P. T. Coffin, and Josephine Pinckney. Sir Richard Livingstone's "Greek Ideals in Modern Civilization" is worth reading, as are Mr. J. T. Adams's "A Letter from England" and Mr. Oscar Jaszi's "Czecho-slovakia's First Years".

The Review and Expositor (July). It is good to see Dr. Nicol Macnicol appearing in this *Review*: he writes on "The Influence of Oriental Religion in the West". Other articles are the Rev. R. H. Miller's "The Christian Philosophy of Peace", Dr. H. W. Tribbe's "The Convicting Work of the Holy Spirit", and Prof. E. M. Cook's "Making Psychology Practical".

The Harvard Theological Review (April). This number is strictly for students only. It is confined to two articles, "Mr. H. A. Wolfson's "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts", and Mr. L. W. Jones's "The Text of the Bible and the Script and Art of Tours".

Anglican Theological Review (July). The Rev. N. B. Nash writes on "The Christian Experience of Grace". In "The Religion of Heavenly Reason", Dr. H. H. Gowen describes the Japanese sect called *Tenrikyo,* now a branch of the Shinto religion, founded in 1838 by a woman named Miki Nakayama. It is said now to have ten thousand churches and over five million adherents.

THE NINTH THEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE OF CONGREGATIONALISTS.

WESTMINSTER COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

JULY 8th—11th, 1935.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF MAN.

Monday, July 8th. Evening. *God, Man, and Natural Law.* Prof. H. F. Lovell Cocks, M.A., B.D.

Tuesday, July 9th. Morning. *God, Man, and Moral Experience.* The Rev. John Marsh, M.A.
Evening. *Man and His Religious Experiences.* Dr. W. A. Painter, M.A., B.D.

Wednesday, July 10th. Morning. *The Faith of Jesus concerning Man.* The Rev. G. Currie Martin, M.A., B.D.
Evening. *Sin and Forgiveness.* The Rev. Prin. J. S. Whale, M.A.

Thursday, July 11th. Morning. *The Shape of the Kingdom.* The Rev. Malcolm Spencer, M.A.

AN IMPRESSION.

By Albert Peel.

The Conference this year was held at Cambridge, and once again Westminster College proved an admirable place of meeting. Some familiar faces were absent, but continuity was maintained by the presence of many who had attended all the previous Conferences. It was pleasant to see Mrs. Horton, especially as this year the number of ladies was unusually small. The officers were Mr. E. Cunningham, M.A., who presided, the Rev. B. C. Plowright, B.A., B.D., Secretary, and Mr. A. B. Russell, J.P., whose quiet efficiency has won the respect of all members of the Conference: Mr. Russell has been Treasurer from the inauguration of the Conference and a small token of appreciation was handed to him before the sessions ended. Once more it was a joy to notice the presence of visitors from a distance: these included the Rev. L. C. Parkin, of Australia; a minister of the United Church of Canada; and a visitor from Madagascar. Cambridge residents were also in evidence: Dr. Oman's participation in one of the talks in the evening was exceptionally valuable.

The general impression was that the Conference was workmanlike, and the discussions were generally much to the point. There were some very promising "youngsters", but more of them would be welcome, and we hope they will not in future years be so chary of speaking. There is always danger in a Conference of this kind that the same people should do most of the talking, and new blood is always welcome. Perhaps the most effective newcomer was Prof. H. F. Lovell Cocks, who not only read the opening paper, but took an active part in debate. Dr. Garvie re-appeared after some years, and what he had to say was invariably useful: there was

a charming exchange of bouquets between him and Mr. Whale. Dr. C. J. Cadoux, the Rev. J. C. Harris, and Mr. Plowright often intervened, and were helpful not merely in the formal discussion of the papers but in the give and take of the informal talk, which, as usual, lasted far into the night.

It might be worth while for the Committee to talk over the best use of the after-dinner time. The personnel of the Conference is so varied that it is obvious that the desires of its members are not always the same. The keen theologians would like the informal conversation to be limited to the papers read during the day : this has the advantage of not anticipating (or of attempting not to anticipate !) papers still to come. Others—ministers who look on the Conference as a sort of "refresher-course", and laymen who wish to be *au fait* with contemporary theological thought—often feel that the best is secured from the informal sessions, not by keeping strictly to the papers read, but by "drawing" readers on subjects specially dear to them—Calvinism or what not. Sometimes it is not possible to get the best of both worlds.

The subject of the Conference next year will be "The Christian Doctrine of Community", and the Chairman will be the Rev. Norman Goodall, M.A. The Conference, it is hoped, will again be held at Westminster College, Cambridge. Any inquiries should be addressed to the Rev. B. C. Plowright, B.A., B.D., 41 Wrottesley Road, N.W.10.

GOD, MAN, AND NATURAL LAW.

By H. F. Lovell Cocks.

If I had not been afraid of raising expectations I am bound to disappoint I should have headed this paper with a question, "What is Nature?" For that is the question we are trying to answer; only our approach to it is dictated by the necessities of our general subject and of the papers that are to follow. I am to attempt three things : (1) to outline the Biblical view of Nature and to contrast it with the scientific conception; (2) to inquire how far Naturalism can make its case good against the acceptance of any teleological view of the world; and (3) to indicate the lines along which we may arrive at a new and richer teleology.

I.

In a way, to look for a Biblical view of Nature is like looking for snakes in Ireland; for of Nature as the Greek philosophers knew it and as modern science studies it the Biblical writers know nothing. Although for them the heavens declare the glory of God, Nature is but the background of history wherein the normative revelation of God is to be found. Unless traces exist in the Wisdom literature, which in other ways also shows the influence of Greek thought, the conception of Nature as a quasi-independent system of events, a *tertium quid* between God and man, is virtually absent. All "natural" events are direct acts of God. It is God Who created the world and upholds it by the word of His power. It is God Who gives the early and latter rains and clothes the fields with plenteousness. All Nature's beneficent regularities are not only of His ultimate appointment; they are His acts, revealing in this sphere also—what is earlier and more clearly shown in national crises and deliverances—that Yahweh is a God Who keeps covenant, Whose character is righteousness, trustworthiness, moral reliability. What manner of deity Yahweh was before He became Israel's God is a question of purely antiquarian interest. No doubt survivals of pre-covenant religious ideas remain, but they are

inconsiderable eddies in the majestic flood-tide of the prophetic movement wherein Yahweh is carried from His lowly station as the deity of a few nomadic tribes to the throne of the Creator of the world. From first to last He is a God of righteousness, and though the conception is deepened and enriched as prophet after prophet sees new facets of the Divine glory, its heart remains at the end what it was at the beginning—reliability, faithfulness to a covenant. And so irresistible is the sweep of this mighty current that at length even the idea of the holiness of Yahweh is cleansed of those non-moral animistic elements which found their last refuge there. Righteousness becomes the very fabric of the universe. Outside Israel we find only faint analogies to this remarkable development. Heraclitus of Ephesus traces in the ceaseless flux of things the rhythm and harmony of a righteous Reason, and the doctrine of Karma teaches that a universal distributive justice rules the destinies of men. But from the operation of an impersonal justice in things and the natural rhythm of opposites to the Holy One of Israel is a very far cry. Yahweh is a personal God.

Now the world that confronted the Hebrew showed him, as it shows us, not only regularities but variations. To the modern scientific mind, an apparent exception to "natural law" is a challenge to modify an hypothesis. To the Hebrew it was a miracle, an event whose very unexpectedness and marvellous character fitted it to be a special revelation of the Divine purpose. The Bible knows nothing of the later conception of miracle as a breach of natural law; for it knows nothing of any law to be broken. "Nature" does not exist; there is only the Divine activity. Miracle is but the occasional departure of God from His normal ways of working. And it goes without saying that the watered-down idea of miracle as an event which, though in accordance with law, is inexplicable in terms of laws known as yet, is for the same reason outside the ambit of Biblical notions. Miracle is a Divine act, but it is not an arbitrary interference. It is the way in which the unswerving gracious purposes of God meet the changing circumstances of the historical situation and the faith or unbelief, the obedience or sin, of men. For God is not the only agent. Man also plays his part on the stage of history. No doubt this raises the philosophical problem of reconciling Divine omnipotence with human freedom, but that problem never became acute for the Hebrew mind within Bible times.

It would be interesting to inquire how far the enthronement of the Law in post-exilic Judaism conspired with Greek ideas to pave the way for the conception of Nature as an impersonal system. Whitehead maintains that the idea of Divine Law as the revelation of a dependable God became the foundation of modern science. But to trace historical affiliations is not our task. It is enough to recognize that the religious teleology of the Bible, combined with elements drawn from Aristotle, holds the field until the temper of Hellas reappears at the Renaissance and Christianity begins to undergo the salutary purge of scientific criticism.

Belief in a Divine purpose in things, though quite indispensable to religious faith, is prone to illuminate isolated events at the cost of leaving universal processes in deeper obscurity. Where impartiality in face of facts is absent, there is no realization of the necessity to sift evidence, and no incentive to improve the technique of observation. Not that the religious spirit is entirely lacking in critical capacity. We need only think of that process whereby the Gospels and Epistles were saved from the welter of pseudo-apostolic writings to understand that a genuine piety is not without resources as it tries to discriminate between truth and error. Yet that same piety will too readily accept evidence at its face value, since

its interest is always more in the Divine provenance and edifying character of events than in their details as actual processes and their relations to non-miraculous happenings. Where everything that happens must at once be brought under the category of direct personal agency, there is no urge to inquire into correlations. Even in face of the dysteleological features of the world, the believer may not depart from his pious waiting upon God. Famine and pestilence may be interpreted as acts of an inscrutable Divine wisdom, visitations to be patiently endured as precious trials of faith. We moderns would say that faith is not really tested until reason has been challenged, and that if we are to trace in pestilence and famine any over-ruling purpose of Divine love, part of that purpose must assuredly be to sting us into concern with better sanitation and improved methods of food-supply. But before faith can come in sight of this wider teleology, it must undergo the stern schooling which science provides. And *disinterestedness* is the first lesson. We must abandon our teleology in order to possess it, and even turn our backs on God that our faith in Him may be invincible.

Science is born when men begin to be interested in things in a disinterested way. It has its own natural piety, which, like every piety, is at once loyalty and renunciation. Its central dogma, belief in the universality of ordered process, is both world-affirmation and world-abnegation. The world affirmed is the all-embracing system of causal nexus, while the world science renounces is the world where history never repeats itself and where the individual is unique. And what does this mean but that man himself is renounced? Thus science becomes the asceticism of the modern age. Man is no longer at the centre of the universe, but is merely a link in a chain, a term in a series. Perhaps the renunciation cannot be complete. Perhaps the rigid causal nexus will prove too rigid even for science, and the unique and inexplicable come stealing back again. Perhaps even now we see science beginning to demand of philosophy a profounder teleology to replace that which science helped to destroy. This would confirm us in our belief that the world is not explained until we have traced a Divine purpose in it, but does not alter the fact that science must begin with renunciation. The scientist may be a religious believer, but he must leave God out of his scientific calculations. For science must be autonomous. It dare brook no interference from religious or philosophical dogmatists. Though the scientist may believe in God, yet his science must be godless—and that for God's sake and man's. Only so can science reinforce our faith.

It is useful to remember that science was not the only rebel against the effete rationalistic teleology of the later Middle Ages. At the Renaissance Art also achieved autonomy. Art led men down another avenue of escape from a philosophy that had become too narrow for life. Both science and art return to the facts, but they handle them differently. Whereas science abstracts from the concrete individual to secure and correlate its own interchangeable molecular objects, art enhances the individual by making it the bearer and evocative symbol of a unique subjective mood. Accordingly, while in science the individual is ignored except as a congeries of universals correlated in an abstract system, in art it becomes the gateway into a world of inner experience. Both science and art thus achieve autonomy by setting up absolutes—the one intellectual, the other æsthetic; the one a closed system of events and processes, the other a realm of feeling, evoked, it is true, by objects, but needing no justification beyond its own intrinsic worth. Both these absolutes are standing protests against a religious teleology too narrowly anthropocentric, and it is

precisely because both are abstractions that they can bring their contributions to life. But experience is not an affair of departments; it is, or ought to be, a unity. There is no closed world of feeling any more than there is a closed system of natural law. And it follows that we must expect to reap evil as well as good when these abstractions are taken as real. Art ceases to be a liberator when the artist no longer keeps his eye on the object; for then the subjective world engulfs Nature, and art is visited by strange maladies of which the "pathetic fallacy" is typical. And when the scientific absolute—"Nature closed to mind"—is taken as being the real Nature, we have identified with the real world a sightless, soundless, mindless realm of abstractions. "Nature closed to mind" is obviously not the real world at all, but merely an aspect of it—an abstraction useful for certain purposes. So long as science is content to accept the limitations imposed by its own methods and abstractions, it remains beneficent. But once the attempt is made to turn physics into metaphysics, and naïve scientific Naturalism into a synoptic philosophy, science is exploited by errors capable of deceiving the very elect.

II.

Unfortunately the thing happened. That closed system of Nature, by reason of the growing prestige of scientific method, became the very framework of European philosophy. Science does not say that the universe *is* a closed system of mechanistic process; but only that for its own purposes it must investigate things *as if* mechanism were everywhere regnant. If in our day science inclines more and more away from mechanistic and towards organic categories, that is not due to a belated conversion to teleology, but merely to the pressure of facts. Science is as justified in its initial mechanistic assumptions as it is in its growing recognition that they are becoming inadequate. It is not the scientists who have created the modern scandal, but the philosophers who incautiously struck out the "as if" of science and substituted an "is." Nature then became an entity standing between God and man. That God transcended Nature as the artificer transcends the thing he has made was obvious. What was not so obvious, but nevertheless true, was that man transcended it also. Man as free was outside Nature, just as God was, and not only Divine acts but also human choices were *interferences* with the machine—miracles.

These assumptions really underlie the Teleological Argument as expounded by Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises. In this form the teleological argument is a curious hybrid, a strange amalgam of a deistic conception of God, a mechanistic view of Nature, and a Pelagian doctrine of man. The "Divine Watchmaker" is no mere analogy. God *is* a mechanic, who has fashioned a delicate and complicated piece of machinery. The *order* of Nature is God's work, and witnesses to His purposes. Wherever we discover Order we may infer *design*. But the order is impressed from without upon an alien or at least neutral material. As Kant showed, the argument gives us no warrant for believing that God is the Creator; on the contrary it definitely implies that He is not. The *stuff* of the world is what God finds to His hand, and the very notion of *contrivance* implies a wresting of matter to the purposes of mind or spirit. This is a quite indefensible surrender to materialism. If Nature is really a closed mechanical system, the inference to God on the one hand, and human freedom on the other, becomes highly precarious. Of course it is true that of all conceivable things a machine shouts most loudly of a contriving mind. But Naturalism is not committed to the mechanical analogy. It is

most formidable when it follows Hume's pregnant hint and views the world as a "vast animal", a self-maintaining, self-explanatory cosmic organism. Modern scientific thought, particularly in the departments of biology and physics, has reduced to vanishing point the gulf between Order and Stuff, Design and Material. There is no Order impressed on things; Order is immanent, and Stuff is one with it in that concrete unity of structure and function we call life. Indeed, Stuff is disappearing—melting into Order, into mathematics. This new view of the world is a double-edged weapon. Naturalism can use it to make more plausible than before the conception of an evolving universe containing within itself all the powers and principles of its own teeming life, and needing for its explanatory ground no God such as religion has conceived. Yet it is available for our use also, and in any case it is a gain to clear thinking that the old dualism between Order and Stuff is now abandoned. Physics, once anchored in materialism, now steers towards an idealistic harbour, and we theologians are in danger of believing that the theistic campaign is as good as over. It is not; in fact, it is now entering its most critical stage. But at least the issue is now the real one. The ground has been cleared. Stuff having been dissolved into Order, there remain in the universe Order and our consciousness of Order. And no philosophy is adequate that does not deal faithfully with both terms.

We said that science must leave God out of account in order to render service to God. It must leave God out because it leaves man out. This is why science as such can never be philosophy. The world of the philosopher must include everything, but from the scientist's world at least one item is missing—the scientist himself. But if the scientist were really outside the universe we could have no confidence in his report about it. We might doubt whether Nature is really mathematical and think that the scientist has read mathematics into it because his mind happens to be built that way. As it is, we need not hesitate to believe him. His mathematical world is not the real world but something less. His "Nature" is "closed to mind" only because for his special purposes he has strained mind out of it. The physicist remains a man standing on two feet within the only universe there is, and if his mind sees things mathematically, that can only be because the universe is in certain aspects mathematical. For his mind is part of it. If there is deception here the universe is in the plot.

But mathematics does not tell the whole truth about the universe. In the world of physics there are no real men, only "observers." And perhaps even they might be replaced with advantage by sensitized plates. Yet the physicist's scheme of the world is not untrue. Its truth is the truth of a diagram. If your diagram of the world only indicates spatio-temporal magnitudes by its scales and co-ordinates, then man is indeed very small, a tiny dot in an unimaginably vast area. His values cannot be shown on the diagram. But there will be other absences. This diagrammatic world shows no qualities—no colours, no sounds—only mathematical relations between terms which are themselves relations. And it does not disparage the great services the physicist has rendered us to say that the attempt to extract the full meaning of reality from such a diagram is like trying to measure the significance of a Shakespeare by the size of his feet. Not that the physicist makes the attempt; he is no such fool. But some philosophers still think it ought to be made.

The crucial question for Naturalism is not how life and consciousness arise out of supposedly dead and mindless stuff, but what difference they make when they have arisen. And the first answer Naturalism gives is that they make no difference at all. True, they *seem* to make a difference. An

animal behaves differently from a block of granite. Yet the difference is only that the mechanisms constituting the animal are more complex than those which constitute the granite. Fundamentally, both animal and granite are resultants of differing collocations of primal "stuff"—that, and nothing more. This is the classical materialism, which, we are often assured, is as dead as a doornail. If it were, it would be waste of time to attack it, but while physicists are moving steadily away from it, certain psychologists—of all people—are still enmeshed in its toils. Behaviourists have given materialism a new lease of life; and for this reason it is worth while to see how materialistic Naturalism deals with the problem raised by our consciousness.

When I am conscious of what I call "the sun," materialism must explain the situation in terms of light-waves and nerve-currents, and trace a mechanical sequence of events whose last term is my *seeing-the-sun*. But there are great difficulties in the way. The last term of the series is not *in pari materia* with the light-waves and neural processes, but is a fact of another order—in short, a fact of consciousness. If it is merely the last term in a mechanical series, how can it be a seeing of the sun? For it is the sun I see—not light-waves or neural processes. The latter are not seen by me, but only inferred. Nor do I see a retinal image. No doubt I see by means of all these, yet when all is said my seeing the sun is an event which differs in important ways from the reception of an image by a sensitized plate. Even in its elementary forms perceiving is an act of judgment, an ascription of meaning. That is why error is possible. Materialism is beaten in the end by its inability to explain our errors and illusions without dragging in that activity of consciousness whereby wrong meanings are read into sense-data. When I see the sun, I take a flying leap back over nerves, lightwaves and sense-data, and land plumb in a *meaning*—"the sun." And then of two things one: either consciousness is an activity which, though possibly capable of being stimulated by purely mechanical means, is not itself the last term in a mechanical series but an event of another order; or every term from sense-data to retinal image is itself in some measure psychical. Either alternative is fatal to the materialistic view of consciousness.

III.

Materialism is therefore impelled to take a further step and to deny the reality of consciousness altogether. This is not quite as absurd as it sounds, and the behaviourists almost succeed in making it plausible. For what is denied is the psychical nature of consciousness. Thinking, for example, is not merely accompanied by incipient movements of the muscles of the mouth and larynx—it *is* these movements. Let us look at behaviourism a little more closely, for here if anywhere we meet the *reductio ad absurdum* of the materialistic view of consciousness.

It is strange that psychology should be afflicted with materialism at a time when science as a whole moves away from it. But psychology is still very young, and perhaps every infant science must take its dose of materialistic measles. And in any case not all psychologists are behaviourists.

The difficulties and limitations of the introspective method have long been recognized by psychologists of all schools, who have supplemented its findings by results gathered in the study of the behaviour of civilized adults, savages, children, and animals. As a psychological method, therefore, behaviourism is not new. But while other psychologists use observations of behaviour as clues to unobservable psychical states, behaviourists use

them only as clues to external stimuli. They think it possible to short-circuit the pattern reaction—*stimulus, psychical state, response*—by cutting out the middle term. Consciousness, they claim, is not a true datum. We observe only external stimuli and the responses of the organism to these, and there is neither need nor justification for the interpolation between stimulus and response of any hypothetical entity called consciousness.

As a psychological method, behaviourism is clearly legitimate. A science has a right to any method which proves useful. And even as a psychological hypothesis behaviourism is not yet within range of our guns, although it may seem odd that a science called psychology should regard the *psyche* as non-existent. Still, those of us who believe that consciousness cannot be ignored even by psychologists may learn much from those who believe it can. But behaviourism used to buttress the ruined castle of materialism is quite another matter. The contention that a science of the *psyche* is impossible may or may not be true—the answer turns in part upon our definition of a science. But if the contention is interpreted as meaning that the *psyche* does not exist, then behaviourism is transformed into a metaphysical theory—one of those which, as C. D. Broad says, are so silly that only very clever men can possibly believe them. Here, once again and in a very instructive way, the inescapable limitations of science obtrude themselves. The differences between Einstein and an Australian Bushman are enormous, yet from the standpoint of half-a-dozen sciences they may be irrelevant. Trouble begins only when differences that are irrelevant in certain restricted contexts are ignored by a synoptic philosophy whose context cannot be less circumscribed than experience in its fullest depth and range.

Yet even from the psychological point of view it is more than doubtful whether behaviourism will have a long reign. It is significant that its most impressive successes have been obtained from experiments on animals and young children. The claim that consciousness makes no difference appears most reasonable where the psychical life is taken at its simpler and less integrated levels. Essential differences between one dog or one baby and another may be negligible, and even undiscoverable by any experiment we can devise. They are not therefore to be ruled out as non-existent. Like every other mechanistic theory, behaviourism is never more than a rough and ready approximation to the truth, even in its simplest applications. That upon every repetition of the stimulus A the response B will follow, is a law which is strictly true only in this hypothetical, abstract form. No two stimuli are exactly alike. As an actual event, A is unique and unrepeatable. What happens, of course, is that different situations arise, each resembling the abstract typical A in certain respects. But the response B occurs *because this likeness is recognized.* Instances of B will differ in ways that can be correlated, at least in theory, with differences in A. But the occurrence of these subtly differing responses cannot be wholly explained in terms of mechanisms, however complex. For between stimulus and response comes *recognition*—an irreducible psychical fact. In his *Analysis of Mind* Bertrand Russell cannot quite persuade himself to accept the behaviourist doctrine—though he would like to accept it—because he finds in the phenomena of memory certain features for which behaviourism cannot account. The residuum happens to be crucial. Long ago, James Ward admitted that presentation covered nine-tenths of the facts of our mental life. Is the remaining tenth destined to be assimilated in due course by a materialistic psychology? Hardly; for the remaining tenth is—*consciousness.*

But see how behaviourism underscores the absurdities of materialist philosophy. If behaviourism is true, there is no such thing as truth—and behaviourism is not true. This is a very slick argument. Is there not a catch in it somewhere? Let us see.

The dogmatic materialist can always be shown to contradict himself, not in the obvious sense of maintaining in argument two contradictory propositions, but in the more devastating way of believing one thing and practising another. He tells me I am a theist because my internal mechanisms happen to work out to that result. But then *his* internal mechanisms make him a materialist. Now the interesting question is not whether materialism is true, but how the materialist *knows* its truth. For if every strutting philosopher is mechanically determined to think as he does, the real truth of this situation is accessible only to a visitant from another sphere who can see human nature from the outside and watch the wheels go round. By his propagandist zeal our materialist makes it plain that he is this dispassionate observer, who, having discovered the truth about human nature, is anxious to set us free from our dreadful superstitions. He knows the truth. But how can he, unless he be more than mortal man? If materialism is true, no *man* can ever know it. The materialist is the victim of the old, old fallacy into which philosophers are always tumbling—the fallacy of believing that you can somehow achieve detachment from the universe and survey all time and all existence from the vantage ground of pure nothingness. The physicist manages to get outside *his* world because it is a much smaller world than the universe. But the philosopher cannot get outside the universe, and his fond delusion that he can may be due to a dim unconscious feeling that he is not as other men. He makes an exception in his own favour—and then forgets he has made it. That in a nut-shell is the error of materialism.

The argument we have been expounding is not valid in the loose form in which it was stated. Behaviourism may be true after all, although it is not for the behaviourist to claim that he *knows* it is. Still, by sheer good luck his private, mechanically determined belief may happen to correspond with the facts. In this more exact form, the argument loses in impressiveness, and is evidently of no force against the materialist who is a genuine agnostic. A blatant "is" it can overwhelm, but against a "maybe" it is mere gossamer. Nor does it help us much against that newer, wiser Naturalism which, refusing to take the desperate step of denying the psychical reality of consciousness, returns on its tracks and, admitting life and mind as "emergents" within the universe, yet disclaims the necessity of postulating God as the Ground of the cosmic process. Theism can encounter this type of Naturalism only by a patient and laborious reconstruction of the teleological argument on new foundations and with better materials. In what follows we do no more than take an inventory of some of the resources at our disposal.

IV.

There is Order in the universe and Consciousness of Order. We cannot merge these two into one by making Order the creation of our finite consciousness any more than by denying the reality of the latter and making Order the only ultimate. Both the scepticism of subjective idealism and the dogmatism of materialism are illegitimate. We discover Order in the universe because it is there to be discovered. And if our minds cannot grapple with forthcoming facts except by shaping them anew within that order we call experience, what is that but the strongest hint of an affinity between minds and things?

This is urged only as a necessary presupposition of all philosophizing and not as a short cut to theism—as though reality, being intelligible, must straightway be inferred to be Intelligence. For we must distinguish. In the universe we find Order, but is the universe an Order? It contains systems, but is it itself a system? Perhaps mathematical order bears sway to the outmost stars and penetrates into the minutest seeds of things. If it does—and science cannot dispense with the postulate—then reality becomes intelligible—for as far as mathematics takes us we *know* it. But this mathematical intelligibility is not of itself the rationality demanded by religious faith. The religious postulate makes far greater claims than the scientific. Is reality which is mathematical in one aspect, and contains systems and orders our minds can trace, itself a system of values unified by a Divine Life? Our faith that it is can never turn into demonstration. All we can hope to do is to descry the trend of things converging to meet beyond our horizon. And our first task—the only one that can be attempted here—is to see how apparently disparate orders of reality reveal unsuspected mutual dependence and how the iron inexorableness of natural necessity may work secretly to give us the freedom of the City of God.

Now that matter is melting into mathematics and Nature is no longer substantiality, the way seems open for a return to idealism of the Berkeleyan type. May not "Nature" be but God's language whereby He communicates with mortal minds? But some of us have misgivings which make us hesitate to tread this open road. We recall that the older teleology was too parochial and anthropocentric. Nature, surely, has its own rank and worth for the God Who made it, and that childlike delight in natural objects, which has inspired not only the artist's creative passion but also the scientist's patient observations, is well-pleasing in the sight of a Creator Who loves beauty and has made all things to speak most plainly of Him when they declare His joy in them. A narrowly didactic teleology belittles God. Divine language Nature may be; yet language is more than intelligible signs, and has its own glories of structure, rhythm, and inevitable word, so that not only what is said but how it is said reveals the grace of the uttering mind. We shall never be proof against the errors of Naturalism until we have absorbed this truth which gives it a relative justification.

On closer scrutiny, the Order of the universe is seen to be multiform. The mathematical physicist not only knows the mathematical order, but is himself part of it. But there are other orders, other patterns of reality. In yielding to the constraint of that unearthly beauty which, we are told, informs the modern view of the physical universe, the physicist becomes aware of an æsthetic order. And in his pursuit of truth he stands under the constraint of something other and higher than logical necessity—the imperative of duty. It makes no difference that he disclaims any lofty moral motive and tells us that he is a scientist because he loves science better than anything else in the world. For it is the utter surrender we call love which transforms necessity into freedom, duty into delight, and what we ought to do into our greatest beatitude. Perhaps this takes us to the heart of the matter; perhaps here and here alone we solve the problem of the heterogeneity of world-orders—in a solution that is no theory but an invincible practical certitude. At any rate, it is certain that through these universal orders we hear the challenge of the real world. Each order is a vast construction of that creative imagination which is the eye of faith. But the orders are no cloud-castles; they are built on the solid earth of experience. We know them through their constraints upon

us. Physical necessity, logical cogency, the urge of instincts and impulses, social traditions, the subduing appeal of the beautiful, the tensions and ecstasies of the "numinous" consciousness—what are these but differing ways in which we experience the inescapable challenge of the real world? It is these varying constraints that are our clues to the world-orders. We are, in very truth, creatures of necessity, of constraint, and our personalities are literally evoked, called forth, as responses to the demands of reality. Election is at the heart of things. Our philosophical task is to trace harmony among orders apparently heterogeneous; yet this is but the pale, intellectual reflection of a need more vital and more urgent. The real philosophical issue is not a supposed clash between fact and value, but a real conflict in the world of our constraints. Our world can be unified only as we are made whole.

Yet even now we may dimly see traces of the hidden harmony. We can see that necessity and freedom are not disparate worlds; that the relation between the mathematical and the moral orders is not one of antagonism but of co-operation, so that man need not be ravaged by their conflict but may live by their conspiracy. Happily we may sidetrack the everlasting debate between Determinists and Indeterminists. If freedom means unmotived choice and necessity rigid mechanism, then doubtless they are irreconcilable foes in a conflict very like the famous battle between the elephant and the whale. But so understood they are mere nonentities. What are the facts as we know them?

Freedom is not omnipotence. My moral sphere is "my station and its duties", so that my first moral task, and perhaps my last also, is to accept my necessities with natural piety and transmute them into freedom. I am hemmed in by circumstance, and the impersonal constraint of the physical world which will not be denied is one of my earliest and most momentous experiences. By the very limits it imposes, the constraint of things makes freedom a real possession. I may push back those limits and in a measure conquer the physical world, but only on condition I first learn the lessons it has to teach. So the secret of my mastery over Nature is a moral secret; I command her by obeying her and overcome her by my humility and teachableness. And physical Nature teaches me to distinguish between her constraint and the claims of the moral order. The pain I feel when I fall foul of her is not the same as the pang of remorse that follows my moral lapses. It is against the background of impersonal, mathematical necessity that I come to know freedom.

And apart from a dependable world where the consequences of acts can be calculated with reasonable probability, there can be no moral freedom, for there can be no rational intentions conceived and carried out. And if no moral freedom, then no selfhood. Nor are the consequences of my acts wholly physical. There is a psychical mechanism which does not merely register my acts but in part determines them and is determined by them. Take it away; let my moral life be a series of isolated choices; and my personality becomes a rope of sand. And with the irrevocableness of the moral act departs the tragic dignity of our human life. Unless my act is really *mine,* proceeding from my self and declaratory of it, has it any more moral significance than a fire or an earthquake? Morality is rooted in necessity.

And, finally, is it not clear that every constructive faculty—whether athletic skill, business initiative, scientific research, artistic creation, or religious worship—is broad based on a foundation of habit and sheer routine? And are not our physiological and mental mechanisms the indispensable allies of our liberties? Must we not put ourselves in bondage

to them in order that we may be free to achieve our moral destinies? And since they thus subserve our highest ends we may be very sure that these mechanisms are not merely mechanical.

It is time to bring this pedestrian inquiry to a close. A fully reasoned modern exposition of theism would have to take account of its most serious contemporary rival, the attractive and difficult metaphysics of A. N. Whitehead. That field the present writer is not competent to enter. But to reconstruct theism has not been in our minds. Our conception of our task has been more modest—to show that there is no essential incompatibility between the religious and the scientific views of the world, and that a teleological interpretation of reality is not only allowed but even demanded by a synoptic philosophy which is faithful to experience as a whole. Such an attempt is not valueless; for although philosophy can never be a substitute for religion, it has its own contribution to make to the virility and reasonableness of our faith in the living God.

GOD, MAN, AND MORAL EXPERIENCE.

By JOHN MARSH.

I.

THE question with which we are concerned is: What does man's moral experience teach us:

(1) about our own nature;
(2) about the world, of which we are a part;
and particularly, (3) what, if anything, about God?

This is an oft-asked and answered question. Many great and wise men have travelled this way, and it would be presumptuous to claim novelty or absoluteness where so many have preceded; though that such a paper as this has been planned for us, means, I take it, that the road will become more familiar to us if we travel it together. We may see new vistas of the old countryside, observe fresh details of the hedgerows, or catch a new wonder in the glimpse of distant hills that would have gone unnoticed had we not journeyed together.

As moralists we study actions as expressive of character. Moral philosophy is not simply a study of behaviour, because though any response is "behaviour", not every one is moral behaviour, *e.g.*, the jump of one's leg when hit below the knee while sitting with legs crossed. Nor are all non-reflex actions within the moralist's sphere, for, as on the boy whose neck was forcibly washed by his schoolfellows, action may be "thrust upon us". Again, as moralists we are not concerned merely to collect facts about behaviour, even moral behaviour: we seek a principle. Nor is our study the writing of a history of "morals" or of "progress", or of "conscience"; for while such disciplines may tell us *how* we come to value things in the way we do, they do not, as a moralist must, pronounce upon the validity of such evaluations. Nor are we committed to the mere discovery of a set of rules: the decalogue is not a moral philosophy, though it express certain fundamental moral requirements.

Two pairs of terms are in use—good and bad, right and wrong. Of these good and bad (or evil) seem to be ultimate, for even Kant, the formalist *par excellence*, had to begin his work with a famous sentence about an unconditional good. Good and bad express our valuation of objective goods, such as pipes, books, walks, poems, sonatas, and sermons, as well as of human characteristics and activities; right and wrong properly apply to human action, and are used in describing the daily tension of

good and evil in our characters. In that tension we want to know not merely a good action—many such may be open to us—but the right one. Thus I prefer to say that activities (truth-speaking, honesty, chastity, *etc.*) are good, and actions right or wrong. A "moral problem" consists in the selection of the proper activity *now,* making concrete the appropriate universal.

The instrument of moral decision is conscience, which is not opposed to reason, for it often arrives at decision by a rational route, even as it sometimes appears as immediately as does feeling. But however it comes, it is in issue the same, *viz.,* the sense that I ought to do a certain action, that I am obliged to do it. But conscience is not *therefore* infallible, and even while we acknowledge its supremacy in the present, we admit its slow development through long ages, its reflection of social content and heritage, of education and of natural endowment: as to all these it is so far relative, though its claim upon action has always been made and acknowledged as absolute. It is, however, the business of a moralist to investigate this claim and to ask whether conscience may or may not be reducible to other terms. I have no wish to defend here a position which I imagine we all accept, *viz.,* that conscience is not reducible to other terms; but I do wish to add that action *from* conscience or *from* a sense of duty is not necessarily the highest type of action. Thus a man's fidelity to his wife must proceed from love, and not merely from a sense of duty, if the fidelity is to be of the finest. And this helps us to see that conscience is not simply a negative warning before action or a final judge after action, but is the functioning of reason as it apprehends and seeks to make its own the moral and ethical goods of its environment. Yet conscience clearly does guide us before action, and this implies that a future which *is not yet* is working upon the self that *is now.* It is not an uncommon moral experience to be guided by the thought of an ideal that is not actual yet, at any rate in me.

This same fact that our conscience can tell us that action from conscience is not always the best action may provide opportunity to observe that our moral experience and our judgments thereupon give us no hard and single conception of obligation. It may be right now to act for the greatest resultant happiness, now from a mere sense of duty, now from a deep-rooted love, and now from the vision of an ideal. Any or all of these can oblige us, do oblige us, to act in certain ways, and they offer us, not conflicting theories as to what obligation is, but data for its fuller understanding.

And here I want to draw what I take to be a very important distinction[1], which may roughly be put as the distinction between moral philosophy and ethics, or between biography and history, or again, as that between "virtues" and "goods". A moral philosopher is primarily concerned with virtue—what quality or qualities make a character good?—even though as a moralist he be unable to avoid reference to goods other than virtues. This is the real significance of Kant's attempted Formalism. Ethics, on the other hand, deals with what, since Moore's *Principia Ethica,* we have come to call "intrinsic goods", though even for ethics, as Moore sees, one such "good" is virtue. This distinction of goods and virtues may be seen in our own experience, for while we might say, should your leg not jump when hit as afore-described, that that was bad *for* you, we should not think of saying, unless the failure were directly traceable to your own evil-doings, that it was bad *of* you. Similarly, many endow-

[1] Not to order a separation. A man is distinct from his wife, though not therefore separated, even as the scent of a rose is distinct from its shape, though not therefore separate from it.

ments of mind and temper—a literary *flair* or a "natural" courage—may be goods, but are not therefore virtues : it is only in cultivation and use that virtue may arise. Again, Mr. Leon has reminded us[1] that *as history* the conversion of Constantine may have been, in the words of *1066 and All That,* a "good thing", but it was not therefore *as biography* a virtuous action of Constantine to adopt Christianity. Indeed, that act can be held, as any act can be theoretically, to be of positive ethical value, and negative moral value, and *vice versa*. The same distinction confronts us when we remember that since the State cannot command virtue, but only sanction action, the State can only exercise an *ethical* function. By detailed legislation, rigid enactment, and large penalties, a State may abolish dishonest practice. That might be—though, since virtue *is* an ethical good, I doubt it—an *ethical* gain ; but it would not necessarily constitute a *moral* advance : indeed, wellnigh the opposite. Honesty as the best *policy* would not provide a *moral* maxim. Love is, indeed, the fulfilling of the law.

Here I interject a political aside. If morals and ethics are both real, the State can never rightly dominate the individual : at most it can but secure certain ethical goods, remove evils, and provide general opportunity for the full life of virtue. I should claim that both ethics and morals are real, for as Alexander puts it[2], "men's natures exist in society, or rather men's natures do not exist outside society". This doctrine may be put in the more extreme form that society is an organism—a social, a political, or a "national" or "racial" organism. It may not be necessary for the eye to know either the part it plays in the body's organism or the meaning of the whole, but it is surely essential in an organism constituted of intelligent beings that they should both know their own function and share the vision of the common purpose. Bees are classified as "workers" and "drones", but they are not intelligents : is it not significant—and evil—that men are classed as "hands" in modern industry, made into "numbers" in the Army, or kept in darkness or intimidation in certain modern States? A true State is what Plato and Aristotle taught us it was—a partnership in virtue, provided we remember, as some do not, that the partnership is given, and not made.

II.

A. I now turn to consider what are the implications of our moral life. The first great implication, I believe, is that God exists, and that not simply as a ground of the world, moral because the world is moral, but as a being possessing personality in some measure akin to ours, or rather to which ours is somewhat akin. To support this I offer you the following considerations :

(i) The fact that ethical values have appeared and are effectual—for they are objects of desire—is at least as significant a fact for our understanding of the world as is any other fact ; or to put it as a moralist, the fact that men have developed and refined "conscience" is as important and natural a fact as the actuality say of a brain or of a banana. The natural order, since *it* bears these values, is so far a "moral" order.

(ii) Further, it is important to urge that it is in the real world that values obtain. "Goods" are objectively there, and are not projected by us. As Archbishop Temple says[3], it is of no avail to tell a man thrilled at the rescue of a little child from drowning that all the goodness of the deed

1 *Mind,* Jan., 1933, 2 and 12.
2 *Space, Time, and Deity,* II. 278.
3 In *Nature, Man, and God.*

has been created by his own admiration! Or, as Prof. A. E. Taylor eloquently writes[1]:

> In life as we all live it, *all* is given, facts and valuations together, in an undivided whole . . . The living moral tradition of our community, the equally living tradition of the scientific, artistic, or religious group into which we have been initiated, are embodied schemes of valuation, but they are also as much facts and parts of the given to which we have to make our response as the pressure of the atmosphere, or the gravitational "pull' of the earth. Our respect for our parents, our love for our friends, our loyalty to our country, our adoration of the divine, all are specific responses to specific features in an actual whole which is, in the first instance, given and not made. We are from the first creatures with a moral as well as a physical "environment", and the values of the moral life are themselves the constituents of the environment, not afterthoughts, or "psychic additions", of our own personal creation.

(iii) But, as Kant reminds us when he says that though there are many goods, there is only one unconditional good, these objective ethical values of our experience cannot of themselves constitute a perfect universe: they need to be used by a good will (a moral agent) in order to become components of an ideal state of affairs. Thus man's advance is seen to be the world's advance. Man, however, advances from the known imperfect past, through the present, to an ideally conceived future, and in that advance it is the future that moves him. Now, unless the whole of morality is delusion, that future must be already in some sense real, for we react to real situations: and yet we cannot say that it is real as the actual world is real, for that, we have seen, is imperfect and not ideal. The ideal, that is, cannot exist, as do goods in the extra-human world, as an ethical good, for that needs use by a moral agent to become ideal. The ideal, the future that moves man, even if only sometimes, must combine in *itself* both the ethical and the moral goods: it must be more than the mere ground of an ethically valuable world. The ideal must have moral as well as ethical value. But only persons, characters, personalities, can possess moral value. Hence the ground of a world which includes moral experience must itself be at least in some sense personal. God must be virtuous, and not simply a "good". Some conception of personality is required by the simple facts of the moral life.

(iv) Further, though values are found and not made by valuation, they always involve a personal reference. As has been said[2]:

> a good must be something that can be possessed and enjoyed by someone or something. In this respect it is with all values as with those of the economist: an article cannot be said to be "worth" so much if there is no one to whom it is worth that price. Ice, for example, is valueless in the solitudes of Antarctica.

But if this is so, and if further it is a significant statement, as I think it is, and not a mere concatenation of vocables to say that it is a good thing that moral agents have appeared in the world, then human beings cannot themselves provide the "personal reference" since it is they who are being valued. The statement could only have meaning if there were some at least personal being to whom the appearance of moral agents would be a value. Such a being in his capacity to appreciate ethical goods would have in his nature all that is the basis of our distinctively "higher" life.

(v) We can further specify the nature of God's relation to man. We have seen how the imperfect world is becoming, through the instrumen-

1 *The Faith of a Moralist.*
2 A. E. Taylor, *Op. cit.*, I. 47.

tality of an as yet imperfect moral agent, by the constraint of the vision of an ideal, gradually transformed and approximated to a perfection. But a history of morals quickly reminds us that the ideal itself changes. This does not necessitate scepticism, but means that, as in science, the farther we go, the more truly we see. And if our experience of conscience is real at all, if conscience is something that *constrains us*, the ideal (ethico-moral, or God) is always increasingly revealing itself to us. For the moral situation is not that our excogitations have constructed a categorical imperative, but rather that from the beginning, and to cause our cogitations, obligations have appeared, however afterward modified, yet in their coming as categorical and absolute. The initiative of our progress lies not with us: it is of God. Such self-revelation is a further specification both of God's nature and of his relation to men.

(vi) Once more, to use the distinction between morals and ethics, and biography and history. The world as ethical or historical often appears intractable to our good intentions (as moral beings) in our life (our biography). A good action does not always achieve the desired good results: the path to hell, it is said, is paved with good intentions. Nor, on the other hand, does a bad action always bear its intended evil fruit. We discover, that is to say, our world of ethical and moral goods to have an objective ethical direction of its own. Our deeds on either hand may be overruled. Now if it can be shown, as I think it can (as in martyrdom, Constantine's conversion, man's answer to the challenge of natural calamity) that this objective ethical direction is towards good, we should be able to speak of a "providence". If further we could show that in any one particular the modification of human intention occurred without the interference of other moral agents, then we should have clear grounds for speaking of God. I venture to suggest that the crucifixion of our Lord is such a particular, for there we see an intention to obliterate a certain movement frustrated, not by any opposition of moral agents as such, but only by such agents as and when some supra-moral assurance had come to them. And from this follows two things. First, since we cannot know the merely unique, that it is at least possible that God has acted and does yet act in this same way; what is revealed is not an act of God, but an act of God has revealed His nature. And secondly, the very existence of evil may be our strongest ground for our belief in God and in His providential working. Again, if we can come thus to speak of a divine providence, we are now entitled to see that only a theistic position is possible to the moralist. God must transcend the world, for the ideal must be real; and He must be immanent in it, for His providence works therein.

(vii) Lastly, in this discussion about God, I wish to appeal to the common judgment that the highest good is that existing between persons. A man's fidelity to his wife must, we claimed, be rooted in love. But again, as Hosea saw, that which works providentially in history can be motivated in no less a manner than that. God is not simply "there"; He is concerned with and for us; He is not simply concerned, He is concerned because He loves us. If this is not so, then He, the perfection which constrains us, is less than we are, and that is strictly unthinkable. If the highest good is personal, then any philosopher must reckon with that fact in an interpretation of the world. And so to do is to see that whatever is "about us" has not simply ethical, but moral, qualities; is not simply a thing, a good, but is in some real, even if analogical[1], sense, a person.

[1] Meaning by analogical what Aristotle meant in speaking of analogical predication. See Taylor, *Op. cit.*, I.

B. I now pass to consider the next implication of the moral life—freedom. We have already seen that the moralist requires responsibility, since reflex or automatic action, as well as enforced conduct, is properly without the moral sphere. I do not here wish to speak of a certain controversy known as that between free will and determinism. A lot of that discussion is abortive, and most of it not ethical but psychological, belonging rather to the preparation for ethics than to ethics itself. It is the reckoning of a moralist with a psychologist, rather than the consideration by a moralist of the implications of our moral experience. I assume, however, that whatever view we take we shall leave our personal responsibility clear; and, as we know, both libertarians and determinists *can* destroy that. What I conceive to be my task is to indicate some of the metaphysical facts implied in our being moral agents.

Much of past discussion has thus been concerned with psychological and not strictly with moral or ethical freedom. But there is moral freedom as such, and we can come to it best perhaps in Paul's classic utterance[1]:

> The good which I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. But if what I would not that I do, it is no more I, but sin which dwelleth in me. I find then in regard to the law that to me who would do good, evil is present. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am. Who shall deliver me?

Moral freedom appears, that is, to the man who so much as wishes for the good life, as a deliverance from a state described as captivity under evil. In a word, to a moralist freedom is freedom from evil—a fact which may help to make intelligible a difficult phrase of the Lord's Prayer. The important fact is not that theoretically I can will a certain thing or not, but that, at any rate at times, some of us are unable in fact to will what we wish. In ethics, as elsewhere, freedom and bondage are the true correlative terms. If I am unable to will my ideals, *then* I am not free; slavery vanishes when I can both will and live for them. True freedom, as was said long ago, is *non posse peccare*.

Life then is a struggle issuing in moral freedom, not freedom issuing in moral struggle. The highest praise of a man is to say that whatever he does, we shall be sure that it is good. Such judgments clearly transcend the limits of ancient controversy. The good man is not free to do evil: he is obliged to do good.

But the good man is obliged to do good precisely because he sees that unless he does the ideal is somehow affected. What makes a moral imperative categorical is that strong sense of urgency, of crisis. I may get my hair cut to-day or to-morrow: it is all one. But to do good or to withhold, to do wrong or to abstain; these are fundamentally different—in act, in significance, and in result. As moral agents we are always implicated, positively or negatively, in the attainment of the moral ideal.

But again, unless we can believe that even though we fail, the ideal is still somehow real, still realizable, morality again becomes illusory. This sounds like stark paradox, but it is not; and simply, again, because ethics is not morals. If our previous argument holds, we can believe in a providence which controls the goods of history—ethical goods. But that providence cannot possess my virtue—that is mine and must be mine and be gained by me. The apparent paradox lies in the failure to see that the two spheres are distinct. Ethically my act may be put right by providence;

1 *Rom.* 7[19-24a].

morally, I may come to repentance, or I may lose my "soul", *i.e.*, my distinctively human ability to distinguish good and bad. In either case the problem ceases. What may produce repentance or cause moral death, I do not now propose to inquire. But I do wish to suggest, as Paul's statement goes on to tell us, that it is just here that morality and religion meet.

There is one familiar "implication" of "freedom" which I wish, if not to challenge, at least to state more correctly. It is often argued that since we are free (or responsible) moral agents, God's power must therefore and thereby be limited. It is granted that this is a self-limitation, and there is much neat, but (I suggest) analogically false, conjecture of God's motive for such limitation. The references to this alleged self-limitation are usually made as if to some defect in an otherwise complete and full nature. Now apart from the very simple consideration that such a nature and the ideal could not be identical, I want to suggest if we can speak of limitation it cannot be derogatively, or that if we can think of the limitation as a defect it is a most trivial one.

May I begin—quite perilously after what I have said—with an analogy. A bachelor, we should admit, has more freedom than a married man, he is less in "bonds": the married man is beset with many limitations to his quondam freedom, limitations self-imposed, or self-accepted, but real limitations. And yet they are trivial, for none of us would argue for a moment that (*as a rule*) the married life was not a fuller, richer life than the celibate. The very limitations of such life are part of the fuller, richer, and, in a real sense, freer life. And so it would be—I do not apply the analogy—with God. If God once had power to do as He liked and then gave that power to us, He would not therefore have become a less God, not really have lost power or freedom even in coming to work through specific limitations. I for one, having to choose between two such Gods, would not hesitate to follow the "limited" Deity.

But, in point of fact, we have no right, from any point of our moral experience, to speak of any self-limitation of God. God is not discovered anywhere without His specific relation to the universe, and that relation shows Him, as we have argued, to be at once a morally and ethically perfect being. It is here, as with the alleged contrast of individual and society—both are in fact given together. We do not know God, and God-in-His-limitations, so that we can speak of a self-limited God: we know only the God revealed in our experience. That God is good and perfect; He is in relation to men, and it is in this same world of God—men—things that in the end God becomes all in all[1]. We may wish to invent what Plato would have called a "myth" to explain what we call the limitation that human freedom puts on God. But that would only be because we had misread the situation, had thought that the one could or did exist without the other, just as the now discredited theory of social contract was invented because we misread another situation and thought that individual and State could exist without one another. God and ourselves are indeed, like ourselves and the State, a partnership in virtue, though again, and emphatically, the partnership is given and not made.

C. Lastly, I turn to the third great implication of the moral life—immortality. To begin with a simple, important, but inconclusive point. I have pleaded that good and evil, not right and wrong, are the ultimate moral terms. If this is so, then we must say that a good man's aim is to become a certain kind of person, not to do a certain kind—or certain kinds of

[1] *Eph.* 1[10], *Phil.* 2[9. 10], *Col.*, 1[16-20].

action : not indeed that persons do not act, but that actions are not persons. But we never do become, in this world, that which we want to be. Must then every moral life end in this small achievement? If so, why do we still persevere and, in a kind of blind and pathetic perversity, continue

> Still nursing the unconquerable hope,
> Still clutching the inviolable shade ?

It may be answered that the ideal is not simply personal; quite, but it must include persons if, as we held, it is all-inclusive. But if persons are to possess the ideal, and if they cannot in this world, are we not driven to postulate immortality? That I take it is the main point of any argument that seeks to establish immortality as a necessary postulate of morality. Can we do more than this? Can we see the temporal nature of things already being transcended in the actual moral life? I think we can. I must here, however, acknowledge my great debt to Prof. A. E. Taylor for both spoken and written word; his wisdom inspires all that I say here. And we may begin our discoveries in quite non-moral spheres. The first transcendence of time by the self comes, of course, with the mere consciousness of time, and there follow such experiences as the enjoyment of a musical phrase heard as a constructed unity, and thereupon that of a symphony similarly understood.

Another feature of our temporal experience is that we cannot, unless we are most unusual people, enjoy a multiplicity of goods at any one time. We cannot be at this Conference and at Lord's. We cannot eat our cake and have it too. We cannot hear a Beethoven Sonata, read a Hardy novel, admire a Giotto painting and watch a Russian film all at the same time. So we arrange for a due succession and arrangement of goods, and the moral can come to be called the "ordered" life. But this ordering of our life is relative to our enjoyment of goods and is an attempt to overcome temporal limitations as far as possible, even while we are yet temporal.

Further, as we have seen, the development of character lies in our becoming a certain sort of person, even though that involve us in certain sorts of actions. But to become that sort of person we call good is to carry about as part of the moral structure of the self certain characteristics or virtues which will come to action in their appointed places and thus enable us to achieve that freedom, from evil and from struggle, which we saw was the end of the moral life. But this again can only be a transcendence of temporality. It would suffice for action, for *ethics,* that we merely performed the right on each and every occasion. But that we become moral beings, good men, that we possess stable characteristics called "virtues", seems to me a clear indication that we do indeed overcome time and enter, even in the temporal world, into an eternal kingdom.

We have, again, all known experiences that in themselves transcended time, even though in their conditions they were through and through temporal. That peak of the mystic experience of each one of us, when perhaps for a moment, in and through things of time and sense, we saw God : that moment should have stayed. That fellowship of great friendship, a fellowship of silence and of speech, that only breaking day and exhausted bodies could dissolve—set as it was in time, conditioned as it was by sensible things, took us into a world in which we longed to stay. If there were no other indication that such a world could be, that such a world *is* real, we must needs dismiss it; but other indications there are. May we not then be justified in claiming these experiences too as valid intimations of a real immortality?

There is one other point, difficult to discuss, but very significant to our purpose. Men hold some goods so valuable that life itself is classed as of

inferior worth and is yielded up. Now

> they that say such things declare plainly that they seek a country. And truly, if they had been mindful of that country from whence they came out, they might have had opportunity to return. But now they desire a better country, that is an heavenly: wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God: for He hath prepared for them a city.[1]

The martyr who receives not in this life the "promise", confesses albeit unconsciously that life must be more than temporal, that it must be rooted in, and be completed by, the eternal.

Thus on every hand our examination of the moral life brings us to great issues; and more, to a great faith. I have tried to argue, as much as possible, not from any particular psychological, ethical, moral, metaphysical point of view, but from those things that are verily believed amongst us all about the moral life. If our inquiry has shown us anything it has discovered to us that our life is set about by God, by God Who cares and Who guides and Who loves: it has discovered to us that we are partners with Him in the perfecting of all things, and that we daily grow into His eternity inasmuch as we grow into His likeness, into His great goodness. It does not seem to me a sudden jump from all this to the words of a great Confession, that "Man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever". That is the essence, as I see it, of the moral, if also of the religious, life.

MAN AND HIS RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES.

By Wm. A. Painter.

At the present time, a note of irrationalism is being sounded, and the general tendency in thought is rather away from reason to a new emphasis on experience. A number of influences are responsible for this. The school of critics, varying greatly among themselves, known as the Humanists, whose ethical attack on Christianity is one of the most dangerour features of modern life, agree only in the fact that they are in revolt against the over-intellectualism of modern life and thought. They are earnestly exploring the whole tract of human experience and are acutely aware of the deep need of the human spirit. They are trying to deflect human inquiry from ideas to essentials, from intellectual wisdom to the "wisdom of the heart". Hence all human experience is being overhauled, with the ideal of fashioning a new organ of experience by which reality may be known. Many are obsessed with the idea that humanity needs salvation more than anything else, but they hew for themselves broken cisterns, for they would find this salvation on purely human levels. The Humanists hold that humanity can save itself. Their earnest purpose is to fashion life to this end, and they are deeply suspicious of mere thought.

Another influence that has drawn attention to experience is the present absorption in psychology. The importance of the sub-conscious in some modern schools is leading to a new distrust of reason. It is fashionable to dwell on the derivative character of rational processes, and to look for the greater part of our motives, purposes, and beliefs, in the unfathomed darkness of the unconscious. The edge is taken from thought, and from our most profound convictions, if they are chiefly produced by unrealized desires, if, in fact, we believe because unconsciously we want to believe. Reason, on the whole, plays the part of accessory after the act. The non-intellectual part of experience becomes then the important field of inquiry.

[1] *Heb.* 11[14-16].

A change of mood in modern science is perhaps not without influence on the inclination to turn from intellectual thought. Research in modern physics seems to have shaken a little the too rigid claim of intellect. The idea of science as a series of "pointer readings", and the clearer notion that the world of physics is definitely an abstraction from the real world, tend to loosen a little the claim of intellect to interpret all life and to assure us from an unexpected source that the more intuitive activities are capable of reaching true aspects of reality.

Within the religious field, influences like the Group Movement are laying stress on experience, and showing great vitality and practical success. They turn from theological religion to the religion of experience, calling men to submit their lives to God, and discover what God is, and His power in human life. They challenge us to define our attitude to the religion of experience.

It is in re-action against these modern tendencies that we are being called upon from several quarters to think—lest thinking become a lost art. We are told that we need above all to-day a thinking ministry. It is a call with which I entirely agree, and would repeat. But it seems to me that we require a sane idea of the true place of experience as an organ of knowledge, neither overlooking experience in intellectual pride, nor becoming irrationalists in our enthusiasm for life.

Let us make clear the meaning of "experience". It does not stand for isolated and unrelated states of consciousness. It is often so interpreted, as signifying mere subjective states, especially by those who do not like it as a basis for construction. But experience already contains a reference to the objective. James Ward's description of the progress of psychology is interesting. The subject matter of this science in Aristotle may best be described as Life. He adopted a biological view, and described mental activities in an objective way. The soul was merely the energy of the body, and there was almost no conception of the subjective. Descartes, making a new beginning, went to the other extreme. He made self-consciousness the beginning of his philosophy, and from it tried to reach an objective world. Consciousness has taken the place of "life" as the main topic. But modern psychology has discovered the concept of Experience, which is more adequate to the facts. Experience is not to be confused with consciousness, it recognizes the necessity of the twofold relationship of subject and object. The standpoint of experience, so familiar to us, has been won by the rejection of other positions. Experience possesses a concrete nature, which Dr. R. S. Franks likens to a stereoscopic view with two eyes, compared with one-eyed vision. But he goes on to point out that experience is not the final form of knowledge, for it is not yet related to the ultimate grounds of thought and being. It is insecure until this relation has taken place.

Now all knowledge springs from experience, for the basis of rational knowledge is the sensible world. This Aristotelian principle was first made a principle for modern philosophy by St. Thomas Aquinas, who brought reason within its true limits, and at the same time gave it its rights, by setting aside those mystical and intuitional short-cuts to knowledge that had confused the philosophical thinking of his predecessors and contemporaries. Sense knowledge, the basis of all thought, is intuitive knowledge. From sensible experience philosophy aims at the knowledge of reality, and by dialectical methods reaches after a First Cause of experience, transcendent to sense. So philosophy approaches God. Religion claims a wider sphere for human experience. It asserts the possibility of knowing that ultimate reality, not by the devious ways of reason, but by

the direct way of intuition. This is a tremendous claim, incredible, unless vouched for by the long religious experience of the race, and, indeed, well known to be true.

Now the world of the senses lends itself easily to verification. We do not often confuse imagination with real experience, except in moments of hallucination or madness, for the sense-world remains for immediate reference. But in religious experience it is not so easy to distinguish between the object of imagination or thought and the objective reality. There is no sensible way of verifying God, hence it is always possible to think He is not a real object of experience. Even thought has its own way of verification, the method of demonstration. Experience often finds itself silent before reason, yet with unbroken certainty. It has no way of demonstration, and comes with no credentials but its own. Hence the theologian often dislikes the mystic, forgetful that he himself is one step further removed than the other from the reality they both believe in.

We may pause to notice that when we discuss experience we have taken, as it were, a step back, and are at a secondary, reflective stage. We are not discussing the sheer material of reality, but reflecting on the manner of its apprehension. The object of religious experience is God. The religious soul is intent upon Him, not upon its own experience. Mr. Dunne, in his *Serial Universe,* describes an artist drawing a picture of the landscape before him, and gives the picture. But this does not represent the whole of the scene, for the artist and his canvas are left out. So he draws another picture showing the original canvas, but including also the figure of the artist painting it. This, of course, leads to an infinite regress; but so far is sufficient for us. We are including the artist in the landscape, and our attention is directed towards him rather than to the scene he is viewing. We have taken a step away from reality.

It is not surprising that there has been an age-long conflict between reason and experience, between dogma and mysticism. The religion of experience is disturbing to the dogmatist, for it suggests new ways of inward certainty which are difficult to verify. Höffding says:

> The dogmatist ever kept watch over the mystic, so often carried away by the tides of inner life beyond the limits of feeling sanctioned by the Church as right and true.

This may stand for most objections to experience as a guide. A present-day view is put by Dr. Leonard Hodgson:

> What is wanted is not a substitution of appeals to religious experience for dogmas and creeds, but reasonable dogmas and creeds to interpret life, and so to produce religious experience.

This statement emphasizes the necessity of thought about religion, which no one will for a moment discredit. It also recognizes the importance of religious experience, since it is something to be produced. But while it suggests the precariousness of experience, it reveals also the insecurity of thought on these matters. For two points should be noticed. First, dogmas and creeds are not invented by a process of pure thought, but dogma, too, is ultimately the fruit of human experience. It is the statement of that objective reality which the Church's whole experience validifies and proclaims. There would be no religion to formulate into creeds unless men had found God. And secondly, we seem to argue here in a circle. Reasonable dogmas and creeds do interpret life and so produce religious experience, but the way we interpret life gives us no security as to the truth of the interpretation. The apostles interpreted a certain experience as the gift of the Holy Spirit. What if they were simply mistaken!

There is in this alone no objective security, and dogma, for all we know, may be a formulation of human delusions, or mis-interpretations of life, and in this case will produce only delusions. To reject dogma for experience may land us in subjectivism, but to reject experience for dogma may do the same. The problem cannot be solved in this way, for must two possible deceivers be taken to speak the truth if they happen to agree? It seems clear that all theology and dogma depend on the validity of religious experience, and that experience is fundamental after all—also that we have come up to the problem of subjectivism.

Now just as a sense experience gives unmistakable certainty, and is incommunicable, so a genuine experience of God will be indubitable, and inexplicable too. Here is the joy and the despair of the mystic. Though he has a certainty beyond all other, since he can never tell what he knows, we may always doubt, if we will, that he knows anything at all. We can only understand if we have ourselves a mystical element, however rarefied, in our make-up. This is not true merely of the higher types of mysticism; all original knowledge of sense or spirit is thus intuitional and direct.

Let us first glance at this problem from the outside. It is not inherently impossible that human experience should be able to know God. Knowledge of God, if it be real, is knowledge of a personality. If there be anywhere Mind in the universe behind all seen reality, He could only be in communion with such other minds as there happen to be, and no other. If somewhere Mind lurks behind its cosmic handiwork, it could only be found by Man. If the universal Mind needs other minds for its own true intercourse, then man, of all things, is nearest God and answers some desire even of the universal Spirit. The fact remains that in all the world, so far as we know, man only is akin to God, most like Himself, at whatever inconceivable distance. Given souls that are capable of seeking Him, we have aflame the impulse that made the worlds, leaping from soul to soul. Free spirits who alone in this empty universe can commune with Him, admire and love and worship, must have their cosmic value. This is the incredible superiority of man over a majestic stellar universe which could destroy in a moment his fragment of a world. In space immeasurable the majestic nebulæ wheel on their way unknowing; man, incomparable in his weakness, gazes across unfathomed space, and measures, and knows—and understands. He only is capable of communion with whatever Mind is behind all things. Now this is true of man whether there is a God or not. If this communion takes place—if God is found responding—this experience brings religion into the picture. To think about the stellar universe and decide that it must have a maker is philosophy. Only if I bring the whole personality into relation with what I have found, and offer worship and service in some degree, as well as thought, do I become religious. And there is, of course, no knowledge of personality except by direct experience. It is not incredible that man should know God.

Yet the spectre of subjectivism lurks near any doctrine of religious experience, and makes the evidence of the individual suspect. But religion is but a mockery and a folly unless it brings us to a real world and a real God. Do religious men worship the imaginations of their own hearts, and is the religious mystic the most deluded of all men? Can we trust experience when it gives us God? We ought to be concerned about the search for truth above all things—even above God—for God will lie in the way of truth, if God be true.

There are those who tell us candidly that all religious experience is delusion and self-deception. Psycho-analysis has found it out! Freud and Jung regard religion as nothing but a process of "rationalization" from inward disharmonies, or believe the idea of God to be but a "projection" of our own unconscious desires or ideals. In fact all life of the mind, art and science, as well as religion, suffers from this colossal blight. The conclusions to which our thought leads us have been pre-determined before we sat down to think. We may never know reality, for our firmest convictions are only evidence of what was in the unconscious. I must not stay to criticize this in a technical way, nor do I deny the valuable help the researches of these psychologists have given to knowledge. But we need not take seriously this orgy of subjectivism in which they indulge. If it were true, all art and civilization would disappear, for all incentive to thinking would go. Progress would be only a tremendous hallucination, a hoax of nature, truth the last thing that reason could reach, our Conference an absurd display of unconscious desires. So our modern psychologists are at great pains to prove, by elaborate arguments, which, we are to assume, are themselves to be regarded as exempt from the general rule that all demonstrations are invalid! The *reductio ad absurdum* of the theory, if that is not already plain, is the fact that Jung's theory, like others, is also the production of unconscious wishes, and so, suddenly, loses its threatening aspect! The nightmare vanishes, and leaves in the pale light of day reality once more, difficult and mysterious, but awaiting our attack, with the promise of knowledge not withdrawn. And if anyone mentions now the behaviourist, who denies soul and spirit because he finds no soul in his laboratory, not even his own, and doubts God because there is no test-tube evidence for Him, we shall not stay to argue so futile a thesis. Let us not be afraid of the psychologist when he pretends to be a metaphysician.

But the problem remains for us. What is the basis of our belief in the objectivity of religious experience? Let us grow a little sceptical and ask some questions ourselves.

Suppose, then, we say to the mystic, or to the religious man who tells us that he has been in touch with God, "You have no evidence to offer beyond your word, and I decline to believe it". He has no answer, he can only re-affirm. The only thing we can do is to try to get down deeper into the nature of human personality; if we can show that it is in some way akin to the divine, that there is some breath of God in it, then mystical experience might not be so unlikely. But this is difficult, because we have no external God to compare it with, but only the God experience itself gives us, and we seem to be in a kind of psychological circle. Our only other refuge may be to estimate on the whole the results of this belief and practice, and to discover that this experience has elevated the race, and brought the recognizably divine into life. But what is the "recognizably divine"? At last we come to the fundamental and inexplicable feeling we have for what I shall call goodness. Our feeling for goodness is prior to our feeling for God. This fact is worthy of some attention. When we call God "good," we are estimating Him by a standard, and a standard we have independently of Him. What is the Good? Ethics flounders in trying to explain it, and we will not here flounder with it. But it is relevant to say that things are not good because they are the will of God, *i.e.*, the moral law is something other than the divine will. God doubtless does will the good, but could He not conceivably have willed hatred as the rule of life? In that case, we should not estimate Him as good, and by a standard external to Himself. But as a matter of fact, we realize God as the Dynamic, the Life, the Power which

makes the good effective and real, the personality in which alone goodness can truly exist, for moral and spiritual goodness are attributes only of a Person. The existence of something like an intuition toward the good is proved by the existence of a problem of evil. Why should evil be a problem at all? Only because it obstructs and is in conflict with something which we know to be fundamentally true, part of the proper shape of things. If our intuitions were other, we should have other problems. May we not imagine that in hell, where their intuitions are different—though I speak with no authority!—one of the outstanding problems of thoughtfulminded devils is the bewildering problem of good? What is this strange influence of goodness in human lives which continually obstructs and harasses and brings to naught the plans of industrious and intelligent evil, this inexplicable factor of goodness in an evil world? It is only the abnormal that needs explanation. Since evil is our problem, we must take it that Good is to us in some way the "normal." And this is to say that we have an intuition to that effect.

Here then we come to a fundamental "surd", an intuition beyond which it seems impossible to reach. But this need not disturb us. For the whole of human knowledge is thus based on "surds": rational knowledge equally has basal intuitions on which the whole edifice is reared, which are hard to justify and impossible to deny. God is the ultimate reality which satisfies and answers the fundamental intuition of the soul. To call a thing good is to justify it beyond all question. God is good because that is what we mean by God. Shall our fundamental intuition lose itself in the void, wave uncertainly from the depths like seaweed on the sea bottom, moving to the tide, but getting nowhere and grasping nothing? If so, all human thought and achievement are but an idle tale, signifying nothing. It cannot be so. No—we are out on a quest for reality that answers to us. The goodness that must be personal is there for us to find. We find Him by lifting up the soul; He comes to us in experience.

We may believe, then, without misgiving, that religious experience is capable of bringing us into relation with an ultimate being who partakes of that nature which we call personality, though we may know Him only according to the capacity of our own. We know Him as one who responds, not with the quiescent objectivity of the natural world, but with true response, living as we live. Faith is the venturing of life as a whole on the belief that God is there, and reaching through growing experience a conviction that nothing can disturb.

Christian experience is inextricably related to Jesus Christ. He was a historical figure who lived on earth in a certain place and a certain generation. His life made such an impression on those who knew Him that presently they settled down to the definite conclusion that in Him God had made an unusual revelation of Himself. It was something unique and epochmaking. God was made flesh, and dwelt among us. In Him the Eternal broke into the world of time. There enters into human thought the new magnificent conception of revelation, and the Church arises with a new message and a splendid certainty. It can claim to teach new truth. He dwelt among us; to the need of Man God came in Jesus. He took this robe of flesh, He divested Himself of the eternal glory. For the pity of love He came to dwell with us, with a shrouded radiance and a bedimmed majesty suited to our state, that men might raise their faces toward the dim glories of that eternal world, and know that for them love has made a home. New depths of experience are open to those who seek it. The "Initiative of the Eternal" has opened the way to fuller truth and life through Christ.

It is within the realm of revealed religion that theology proper arises. Elsewhere we have natural theology or philosophy. But here theology begins, using as it were premises that are put into its hand. Christianity claims a historical revelation of the nature of God on which thought may begin reverently to work. So the Church fashions its message and shapes its dogma, for this truth, historical yet eternal, is to be preserved for the race, and each generation adds its quota of experience of its truth. How, for example, did the Church come to the doctrine of the Trinity? Only because they found this the best way of putting into words and conceptions what they had found Christ to be. In Him they found God; they had no other thought of God but what they saw in Him; in Christ they reached that salvation which only God could give, and they struggled to express what He was to them. In the experience of mankind, when He spoke, God spoke, and they lifted Him to the Godhead, for they felt He was already there. The doctrine of the Trinity is nothing but the formulation, adequate or not, of some knowledge that had come in the long experience of the Church. This He *was* in man's experience. There is no deep conflict between dogma and experience, for dogma only expresses what the corporate experience of the Church has found to be true, and this you must allow, even though you seek better ways of expressing it. This is how I would answer those who prefer to say that the proper basis of theology is not experience, but an objective divine revelation, and maintain that religious experience as a subjective phenomenon is created by knowledge of an objectivity which causes it. For only by experience could men recognize a divine revelation. The claim of revelation is so colossal that its weight could never have been borne unless it was verified in human life. The continued existence of the Church through all the centuries is an impressive witness to the fact that the experience of generations has shown that claim to be valid and real.

Now a religion that is to be universal must fulfil at least two conditions: it must appeal to the common man, or it will never spread; *and* it must be able to satisfy the demands of thought, or it will not be permanent. St. Thomas Aquinas, in the midst of a masterly justification of dogmatic truth in *Summa contra Gentiles,* shows how necessary it is that all should be able to share in divine knowledge; it must be universal. He permits himself an unusual colloquialism when he says that "any old woman" (*modo una vetula*) may know more about the things that belong to faith than all the philosophers. This undoubted truth is vital to our religion. Saving knowledge is not the reward of mental effort, Christianity is not a religion for intellectuals. The only way of a universal appeal is through experience; a man may know God without grasping the theory; the plan of salvation is no substitute for salvation in action.

But religion must be able to satisfy the due demands of thought, and the place and value of theology are clear. A doctrine of experience must be protected from the aberrations of the individual mind; we must not be in danger of supposing that any and every impulse is a divine prompting. Truth does not depend on our mood or our emotion. The little span of our faithless hearts is not the measure of God's love. There must be some corrective, and some encouragement to rise above our moods. This corrective in religion is supplied by theology, which relates for us our experience to wider aspects of thought and service, assists to a unity of mind and will, inspires us to plunge back into life to discover for ourselves the wider truth that doctrine imparts.

I am all for an intellectual grasp of truth. I believe that the mind

must move with the will. With deference to Karl Barth, I believe that we need not only a theology, but a metaphysic of religion. But it may be that the return to a valuation of experience characteristic of modern thinking is not wholly bad, that, with right safeguards, it may lead us to a new way of progress. Most of the great revivals of religion, whether by Luther, Wesley, Moody, or the Groups, have come through a fresh emphasis on personal experience. If life has come to many souls, even if profound thought be absent, it is at least a great and precious gift. When real religion appears then theology may follow—which is its proper order —and itself live afresh. For the absence of vital experience makes the deepest thought sterile.

For finding God in Christ men realize a larger and deeper experience of Him. They find that He is love. They meet that love acting by grace to their salvation. For religion is essentially a message of salvation. Forgiveness can mean nothing except it is experienced; otherwise it is a transaction on paper, the paper of a theological essay. He who forgives others, is forgiven, and knows it. The personal approach to the Cross brings home to a man his own weakness and unworthiness, as never seen before, while he feels within him God's saving love moving to his need. If Christ is Saviour from sin, He must be really saving men from it. For sin, as experienced, is not the vague generality of the theological by-word; it is usually something concrete; it is the vileness, the selfishness, the pride in our own hearts. It is something that happens. To believe in religion men must actually feel the temptation becoming vulnerable, the presence of a new power that makes a different man. Here only experience can speak with convincing truth. I know a working man who was the victim of drink and gambling and worse, his family neglected and starving, a wasted and evil life. Now all these things have lost their hold upon him; he has found strength that makes powerless before him those things that were invincible before: a new and changed life. He has no explanation but one. He knows no theology. He says, "Christ has done this for me". Here is the foundation fact. Here experience raises its pæan. It is a wonderful fact to-day that we may have a glimpse again of this. It *happens*! The saving power of Christ is authenticated when He is saving men and women, and in no other way.

This kind of fresh experience is necessary all the time and in each generation to give content and meaning to all that we know—then we may build up afresh, and theology comes to life. But let us have no suspicion of crude pragmatism. It is not true because it works. But in religion it would not be true if it did *not* work, for it is a doctrine not of thought and speculation, but of life.

How then is experience to be set in the way of knowing God, and how may men come to deeper knowledge? Surely we grow certain in the measure of our willingness to place the whole mind and soul before Him. Men have religious experience much and less, but Jesus showed that the way to full experience of God is self-surrender; he finds the truth who is seeking it that he may serve it utterly. To reason about religion is easier than self-offering. There is always a gap between the idea and the personal fact. We must hold fast to reason, but to reason too long is to lose reality, not to find it. To lay the soul before God is to go dangerously and painfully to the depths of personality, but "he that loseth his life shall find it". Now this agrees with the common experience of men, and is confirmed from unexpected quarters. Many of the humanists have come to a clear knowledge of this truth. They too feel that it is the gift of life that is required, though they are sadly uncertain as to what life

should be given to. Middleton Murry cries out, like Keats, to surrender himself to the "Beautiful Necessity", though that is only an offering to a heathen god. I'Anson Fausset, with no "religious" interest, writes in *A Modern Prelude*:

> Faith as conscious assent to religious doctrines can never be experienced by men and women in a modern world who are most vitally aware. But if Faith be recognized as a dedication of the whole self to the creative spirit . . . ! We are not required to believe any dogma which the mind denies, or to worship an anthropomorphic god. We are required only to surrender ourselves to the shaping spirit of life and co-operate with it.

That is humanism, but both have stumbled on the truth of self-surrender. We know through Jesus Christ that the "shaping spirit of life" is a personal love that responds and works in us. Deep and tremendous is this secret of self-giving, by which men find God to be love, and power and presence. And in this final step theology as such can help but little, for each man must venture for himself.

The dedicated experience is God's way of fulfilling His purpose in the world, and human experience becomes the medium of His plan. Life begins to work together with God in His purpose of continual self-revelation. It is surely by this type of surrendered living that the reality of the Holy Spirit grows manifest. It becomes true that "Every virtue we possess And every victory won . . . Are His alone". No doctrine of the Spirit can give the Spirit's power. It springs from the Spirit's power known in the Church's life.

The Spirit is God guiding the Church and moving in the affairs of the world. It is this assurance of the Holy Spirit that makes Christianity a growing revelation, thus distinguishing it from others, saves it from dead traditionalism, and calls every man to the spiritual adventure, where the track is not wholly laid down, and he can make a little of it for himself. The fact that the experience of each man and woman, if he will, may add a little to the world's knowledge of God, and to God's self-revelation, makes our religion distinctive, with a freedom, the rapture of a forward look, a springing life, a growing revelation. By consecrated experience, the Holy Spirit moves men and makes history, and, little by little, shapes the world to God's eternal purpose.

THE FAITH OF JESUS CONCERNING MAN.

By G. Currie Martin.

As the figure in a cameo gem stands out clearly against its background or, to use a more modern simile, like a flood-lit building surrounded by the obscurity around it, the Person of Jesus is revealed more perfectly when we regard Him as He stands in the midst of surrounding contemporary civilizations and systems of thought. For the purpose of this study the three that concern us most are those of Greece, Rome, and Judæa. We are accustomed to regard Greece as the birthground of democracy, and the leaders of its thought as in many respects the pioneers of the modern world; but this springs from the study of Socrates and Plato, and of orators like Pericles and Demosthenes, rather than from the Greek thought that was prevalent in the first century. We have to remember, for one thing, that the existence of slavery was considered to be the natural foundation of any society, and much that is written about the freedom of man and the fellowship of a true society refers only to a privileged class and not to humanity as a whole. As Prof. Gilbert Murray says:

> The ideal of the great beneficent human City, in which all men should not only live, but live well, had been crushed under the heel of Macedonian militarism[1].

The Stoics believed that God preferred to have free men rather than slaves, and therefore the best life that men could live was that of helping all living things to reach their highest goal. Prof. Murray in the same passage quotes a wonderful phrase which Pliny takes from Posidonius, *Deus est mortali juvare mortalem*. "For man to help man is God". The Stoic fight was first of all against all forms of evil, but in the practice of some of its followers it warred also against riches, rank, even culture, and every kind of convention. This harshness was entirely opposed to the spirit of Jesus, though He also felt, as did these philosophers, the dangers that were attached to wealth and formalism.

The Epicurean doctrine, looking for happiness as the goal of humanity, believed that evil alone made men unhappy. Man could alone be free when he was delivered from all forms of fear. As has been frequently pointed out by students of Greece, the purpose of Greek religion was to make men feel at home in the world; but there are two ways of finding ourselves at home in the world; one is by disregarding all the unpleasant things, or at worst stoically arming ourselves against them; the other is by discovering, beneath all their apparent divergences, a harmony that is the expression of a perfect love. The former was the way of Greek philosophy, the latter the method of Jesus. When we turn to certain details in the life of humanity, we find that the relations of children, women, and servants, whom even Plato spoke of as constituting one inferior class, are regarded very differently from the manner in which Jesus looked on them. Women were thought of as a means and not as an end. Menander, whom perhaps Paul quoted, and who therefore may be taken as a contemporary witness, says that "Woman is necessarily an evil, and he is a lucky man who catches her in the mildest form"; and again, "A free woman should be bounded by the street door"—her chief business is to keep house, stay at home, and look after her husband. No class of the community has more reason to be thankful to Jesus than have women, children, and slaves.

When we turn to the conception of man in the Roman world we find a universal testimony that the centre of all Roman institutions was the family, and as we know from their best writers it was in the home that the Romans learned the three great virtues which Cicero claims were the outstanding marks of their finest character—*Gravitas, Pietas, Simplicitas*. The same orator asks:

> Is there anything more hallowed, is there anything more closely hedged about with every kind of sanctity than the home of each individual citizen? For all of us this is a sanctuary so holy that to tear a man away therefrom is an outrage to the law of heaven.

The father bore supreme rule in this home circle, but it was generally a power that was not abused. There were many Roman women who formed beautiful companionships with their husbands, and Mr. Last[2], in his Study of Family and Social Life in Ancient Rome, points out how frequently on sepulchral stones the three letters *S. V. Q.* occur, signifying that the pair had lived their long life without a quarrel.

The slave population was a constant menace to the safety of Rome, and, as we know well from the literature of the period, many of the freemen were as great a danger—in fact their character was often so bad that

1 Peake's *Commentary*, 633.
2 *The Legacy of Rome*, 225 ff.

they were frequently reckoned as worse than the slaves themselves, this in spite of the fact that it was one of the honours of Roman society to make freemen into citizens of the Empire, famous references to which fact are found in the pages of the New Testament. "At this period", says Mr. Last,[1]

> the better side of the educated class found expression in what may generally be called Stoicism, not in Stoicism as a body and doctrine—for as such it had many obvious defects—but in Stoicism as an attitude or an outlook on life. In an age when men were being carried off their feet by the wild rush for wealth, when in the race they baulked and jostled their competitors in an access of unbridled selfishness, it was all gain that there should be a great class which believed that virtue is its own reward, that virtue is the one end in life, that virtue is the only title to power, and that in virtue even a slave may excel the highest in the land. To the brutal slave drivers whom Juvenal depicts Epictetus has a word to say. "Slave that you are yourself, will you not bear with your brother who is sprung from God, from the same seed and of the same heavenly descent as you ? Remember what you are and whom you rule—that they are kinsmen, your brethren by nature, the offspring of God".

In turning finally to Jewish contemporary thought we are on more familiar ground, as many aspects of it are revealed in the New Testament itself, but there are points of interest and importance that are only to be discovered in the literature that is peculiarly Jewish. It is impossible here, even if my knowledge were sufficient, to deal at length with the many interesting questions that this subject opens up in the theory and practice of contemporary Judaism. Undoubtedly it was the Synagogue and not the Temple, the law and its teachers rather than the ritual, that moulded the religious fellow countrymen of Jesus. "The Jewish religion of the time", says Dr. Montefiore[2],

> preached love of God and love of neighbour ; and though neighbour did not necessarily include the "foreigner", it did emphatically include the non-Israelitish settler and the proselyte. No one was to hate his neighbour in his heart or to bear any grudge . . . Orphan and widow were to be tended and looked after. If you were hated by your neighbour, you were to do that man a good and not an evil turn, and in no wise to leave him in the lurch, when the opportunity occurred. Uprightness and justice and fair dealing were strictly enjoined. The central and peculiar position occupied by the injunction, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself", was fully recognized, even before R. Akiba pronounced it the greatest principle of the Torah. Reverence for parents, respect for the old, compassion and generosity towards the poor and afflicted, were emphatically ordained. In all things the Jews were to remember that they were God's chosen and peculiar people, whose duty it was to be holy even as He was holy, to thank and to think of Him continually, and to glorify His name by all their deeds. So deeply did the laws about reverence, about sexual purity, and about compassion and kindness, sink into the consciousness of the people, that it became a saying later on that he who had no shame and no pity could not be a genuine member of the house of Israel.

Though this is true, we must not forget the harshness that was the frequent consequence of rigid adherence to the legal system. It led men to the belief that those who did not know the law were accursed, that is to say, it was almost as intolerant of ignorance as was much of Greek intellectualism. The prominence of men as sons of the Law led to a general low estimate of women which finds frequent expression in the popular literature, of which it is only necessary to quote one or two examples. In *The Testament of Reuben* we read,

[1] *Op. cit.*, 234, f. [2] Peake's *Commentary*, 621.

> Evil are women, my children; and since they have no power or strength over man, they use wiles by outward attractions, that they may draw him to themselves. And whom they cannot bewitch by outward attractions him they overcome by craft.

In *The Testament of Judah,* the writer says :

> The Angel of God showed me that for ever do women bear rule over king and beggar alike, and from the king they take away his glory, and from the valiant man his might, and from the beggar even that little which is the stay of his poverty.

In the *Wisdom of Sirach* there are many passages of a similar tone, of which it is only necessary to quote two :

> Any wound, only not a heart wound!
> Any wickedness, only not the wickedness of a woman.
>
> Better the wickedness of a man, than the goodness of a woman.

Though it must be added in fairness that the same book contains several passages in high praise of good women.

When we turn from these pictures of contemporary thought to the teaching and example of Jesus Himself, we find at once a strong and welcome contrast. His whole attitude to women was something new in the world. Undoubtedly he knew the literature of His own day, but He knew better the hearts of the people. Harnack was probably right when he said,

> It is not in the Old Testament that the essentials of Christianity are to be found,

but Jesus had the genius to select from the Old Testament the features that were best and truest, and to lay emphasis upon them. He appears both in His teaching and in His practice as the champion of woman. As Dr. Major said in the *Modern Churchman* :[1]

> His attitude towards women who were conspicuous sinners is not only chivalrous, inconceivably chivalrous for that age and people, but also an extraordinary contrast to the prevailing attitude of His religious contemporaries. No condemnation by such was too harsh or contemptuous for the adulterous and the prostitute.

Dr. Major follows the above passage with a quotation from an article by Dr. Montefiore, in which he comments on Jesus's teaching about divorce, and says :

> In these verses the originality of Jesus is made manifest. So far, in the Sermon on the Mount, we have found nothing which goes beyond Rabbinic religion and Rabbinic morality, or which greatly differs from them. Here we do. The attitude of Jesus towards women is very striking. He breaks through Oriental limitations in more directions than one. For (1) He associates with, and is much looked after by, women in a manner which was unusual : (2) He is more strict about divorce : (3) He is also more merciful and compassionate. He is a great champion of womanhood. And in this combination of freedom and pity, as well as in His strict attitude to divorce, he makes a new departure of enormous significance and importance. If He had done no more than this, He might justly be regarded as one of the great teachers of the world.

No wonder that women were among the most loyal and famous of His disciples, for from His hands they received their charter of liberty, that is to-day showing its fair fruit among all the races of the world.

The attitude of Jesus towards children is too well known to require stressing. When, however, He said that they were the inheritors of the

[1] *XX.* 335.

Kingdom of God, He surely meant something more than Christianity has often realized. He meant that they came straight from God and that if they were led astray it was much more the fault of their elders than of themselves. To Jesus the home was ideally the reflection of heaven, as Knox says in *The Gospel of Jesus*:[1]

> The family is by nature the social unit, and Jesus makes its terms dominate the whole series of His conceptions. His ideal is not a Republic like Plato's but the family extended to all mankind.

Of the relation of Jesus to the common people the Gospels give clear evidence. They heard Him gladly because His words were full of hope and grace, He loved them and He cared for all their many burdens, and sought to lighten them. Even their sins were only an added reason why He should befriend them, and when institutions like the Sabbath were allowed to raise barriers between God and human need He swept them aside by a word. Sickness, physical and mental, always appealed to Him, and He did everything in His power to render men and women healthy in body, mind, and spirit.

Jesus saw neither in sin nor suffering the result of God's will or purpose. Sin was not something that was inflicted on men by heredity. The doctrine of original sin was never mentioned by Him. It was not Adam that man had to blame for his evil doing, but his own will, and in this He differed from much of the theory then current, which was afterwards proclaimed by Paul. It was not that Jesus thought lightly of sin, but that He referred it to its proper source, the perverted will of the individual.

It is noteworthy that the heaviest condemnation of Jesus fell, not on sins that were the result of the abuse of natural instincts, but on those that were the outcome of evil thoughts and preconceived erroneous judgments. In this Dante correctly and scrupulously followed Him. It was the sins of Scribes and Pharisees, planned and purposely schemed, or those of selfish commercialism, like the traders in the Temple, on which His most severe censures fell.

That Jesus held a higher conception of humanity than that taught by His contemporaries is due to the fact that His conception of God was higher than theirs. To Him God was first, and before all else, the Father. This we can see at once elevated the whole thought of human relationships. It is true that He spoke continually in the realm of the ideal; fatherhood as He understood it was something new. The fatherhood of God could not be understood by arguing from the analogy of the best human fatherhood. It was a new and divine fatherhood of which He spoke, to which all human relationships were to approximate. The great saying of Paul in *Ephesians*, "The Father from whom every family in heaven and on earth derives it name and nature", is a perfect expression of His meaning. It is one of these utterances that the more we dwell upon it seems the more marvellous. It is at once a challenge and an inspiration, and Jesus knew it to be both for He declared that the purpose of the individual life was to become perfect as the Father in heaven is perfect.

This brings us to the central considerations of this subject—that the whole of what Jesus has to say about man centres in His thought of God.

(*a*) In the first place, the world in which man lives is his home, not a wilderness through which he is forced painfully to travel, as religion has so often represented it. The Father has Himself clothed the flowers of the field in beauty surpassing all the skill of human art. He cares for the tiniest objects of His creation as carefully as for the suns and stars that

[1] 76, 83.

make His universe splendid. His love extends over all, even to the tiny details of human life, and not even catastrophes like the sudden fall of some building are to be attributed to His anger or vengeance. The natural sanctuary for Jesus was the mountain top and earth's quiet resting-places, where he felt Himself nearer God than in temples made by hands. "God is spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth". Thus He seeks to draw men's hearts away from fear, and He shows them that death itself can only open new and fairer portals to rooms in the Father's house.

Perhaps this intuition and faith of Jesus as to the relation of His Father to the whole universe gave Him that power over physical and material things which seemed to His contemporaries miraculous. The promise that His followers would do greater works than Himself may be genuinely true, and in no sense opposed to modern scientific theories. It may be that advances in medical and other knowledge may be the promise and foretaste of a control over nature—or better perhaps a sympathetic insight into the working of nature—which Jesus in some intuitive way possessed. This may be for us "the far-off divine event to which the whole Creation moves".

(*b*) The Fatherhood of God is next to be considered in relation to mankind as a whole. God is represented as sending His rain upon the just and upon the unjust. His gifts, that is to say, are given without partiality. When men are told to love their neighbours, that may include their enemies. Changed relations among the various classes of humanity are totally altered by this fundamental conception. In the great parable in *Matt.* we are taught that kindly actions to the poor and distressed are reckoned as service rendered to God, and upon these rather than on orthodoxy of belief rest our eternal destinies. Jesus was much struck by the faith manifested by outsiders, and declared, for instance, of the Roman centurion that his implicit trust was greater than any faith He had discovered among the children of Israel. The implications of this saying are very far-reaching, for it does mean that God is in touch with all men, and that they can reach by the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world a degree of spiritual insight that often excels the spiritual wisdom of the more privileged. Further, God is the one vital link between both worlds, He is the God of the living and not of the dead, which points to immortality as His gift to men. That there may be degrees in the quality of immortality, as in the nature of sonship, we shall see later, but it seems quite obvious that to Jesus the actuality of divine sonship was a universal relation. The whole matter has been put well by Mr. Lionel Curtis in the following passage of his *Civitas Dei*[1]:

> The idea of God which he placed before them was the purified essence of Hebrew thought. The Jews had first given to the world their idea of the one and only God Who is also perfectly righteous. They had first seen His relation to men as that of a King to his subjects. Hosea and Jeremiah had seen it as that of a father to sons. But even they still thought of Jehovah as the God of retributive justice. The Jewish conception of God as a father was still limited by the thought of themselves as the children of God, of the Gentiles as somewhere outside that relation. By Jesus God was conceived as a father whose love for His children had no limits. It included the Gentiles as well as the Jews, and indeed all sentient creatures: "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father".
>
> The essential bond of society which unites men to each other and God is not primarily righteousness, as the prophets had taught, or justice, as

[1] 159, f.

Plato had assumed, but the love which results in righteousness and justice. To speak of God as a father, and of men as His children and therefore brethren, was the best image He could draw from physical life to express a spiritual truth. As letters of the alphabet are in origin pictures, so words are images chosen to convey ideas. Our tendency is to overlook the ideas, to dwell on the symbols and reason from them. By so doing, theology has spun the intricate webs which now make it so hard for us to see the significance of the images chosen by Jesus to convey His thoughts.

(*c*) While the universal fatherhood of God is a great and vital truth as the basis of the Christian religion, there is a special relationship between Him and those among the human race who voluntarily accept that sonship. This is a mutual and not one-sided relationship; men and women who acknowledge and accept their filial position have an insight into God's will and purpose not granted to others. God's message of redemption is that this true sonship is open to all who will receive it. The human analogy is made clear in the parable of the two brothers. When the one in the far country realized his sonship it was the father who revealed to him what true sonship meant. He was not to be a servant, but an honoured and full member of the family. The other brother, who outwardly seemed to have belonged to the family all the time, remained outside its true spiritual fellowship because he did not know the meaning of his father's love. This acceptance brings not only a new and enriched relationship, but renders possible a life of action and beneficence that was impossible before. The son of the father becomes known by his works, as well as by the new inward fellowship between father and son. This relationship is also a permanent one; no one can pluck them out of the Father's hand; as Dr. Wheeler Robinson says,[1]

> The trustful love of the child towards the father is a flowing tide across the deep, and not the ripple on the little pools along the seashore.

(*d*) But what of the relation of the Father to those who refuse the position of sons? The parable already referred to throws light on the question. The father's heart was unchanging and yearned after the absent boy all the while, being ready to receive him the moment the desire for return awoke in his heart. There was a broken sonship, but not a broken fatherhood. Herein lies the whole essence of the nature of divine grace. The relationship between men and God is broken by man's own action, not by God's purpose. Sinfulness is an intermittent element in human life and at any moment the barrier may be broken down by a change of attitude on the part of man. This is not only a changed attitude toward God but a changed attitude toward man's fellows. Jesus makes it quite clear that there is a sense in which divine forgiveness depends upon human forgiveness: "If you forgive not men their trespasses neither will your Father in heaven forgive you your trespasses". The whole matter is thrown back upon human action, and is not the result of an unforgiving, or autocratic Judge. We may say with Browning:

> I report as I may of God's work—all's love, yet all's law.

Sin abandoned, and its power conquered, brings joy to the heart of God, because this is the seal of the new relation being realized. But there are those over whom sin seems to have little power, and for whom its lure is not attractive. Why must we always understand the phrase about the ninety and nine righteous persons who need no repentance, as if it were spoken ironically? Did not Jesus, who believed in children as inheritors of the Kingdom, believe that there were also many who remained in it from their childhood onwards?

[1] *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, 285.

But there was a constant danger: the force of evil was very real. The language about demons and Satan in which He expressed His consciousness of that reality may seem to us fantastic, but that there are evil forces surrounding us, who among us can doubt?

Temptation is a terrible reality, and the might of evil does not always arise from within the soul. There is a spirit of evil as there is a spirit of good. This Jesus recognized and warned men against the risks from it to which they were exposed. The enmity is not one but manifold. By the time the Fourth Gospel was written this idea had hardened into the expression "the world"—a form of speech we can hardly believe ever fell from the lips of Jesus Himself. The world was His Father's creation, and the home of men; but the spirit that sought to make it something other, and to seize its treasures for selfish ends, was the essence of all evil—the enemy, at once, of beauty and of goodness.

(*e*) The perfect relation between man and God is seen in Jesus Himself. The whole picture contained in the Gospels is that of one who is conscious of unbroken sonship. This is all we need to know about the nature of Jesus. We may differ as we like about theological definitions, but to recognize in Jesus the perfect human revelation of God is more than enough for faith. The matter has always appeared to me to have been put admirably by Archbishop Temple in *Foundations*[1] many years ago:

> We do not know what Matter is when we look at Matter alone; only when Spirit dwells in Matter and uses it as a tool do we learn the capacities of Matter. The sensitiveness of eye and ear, the delicacy of the artist's touch, are achievements which we should never anticipate from the study of the lifeless. So, too, we do not know what Humanity really is, or of what achievements it is capable, until Divinity indwells in it. If we are to form a right conception of God we must look at Christ. The wise question is not, "Is Christ Divine?" but "What is God like?" And the answer to that is "Christ". So, too, we must not form a conception of Humanity and either ask if Christ is Human or insist on reducing Him to the limits of our conception; we must ask, "What is Humanity?" and look at Christ to find the answer. We only know what Matter is when Spirit dwells in it; we only know what Man is when God dwells in him.

Jesus was consciously dependent on God for all His activities. It was the works that He had seen His Father do that He did. The reality of His prayers must be preserved in our thought, or His life for us becomes meaningless. He even insisted that God alone was perfect goodness, and most of the theological attempts to explain away that saying are futile. There could be a perfect spiritual relationship between Jesus and His Father, and yet a knowledge that absolute goodness in the full meaning of that term was the attribute of God alone; for instance, absolute goodness must include absolute knowledge, and Jesus confessed on one occasion at least that such knowledge was not His. In so far, however, as perfect humanity is conceivable we have it presented for all time in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Count Keyserling has put the matter memorably:

> This brings us to the root of the recognition that the mere existence of a Saint is more beneficent than all the good actions of the world: this explains the ultimate significance of a Saviour. He gives an example to mankind: this is what Christ too intended. And in so doing He renders the extremest service which one being can render to another. He shows men their profoundest selves in a mirror: He makes their own ideal clear to them. Now they know whither they are to go, now they know the range of their possibilities.

But were this all, the presence of Jesus in history might be more of a

[1] 258, 259.

discouragement than an inspiration, and so the greatest assurance He gave to all that accepted the true position of sonship was the gift of the Father's spirit. In them moves the very living presence of God. However true it is that the Father's love is revealed in the majesty and beauty of outward nature; in the finest aspirations of men; in yet clearer terms in His obedient sons and daughters; and transcendently in Jesus Himself, the greatest of all truths is that by sharing with all who love Him His indwelling Spirit He can enable them to advance from achievement to achievement, even from glory to glory. This, and this alone, is the means whereby the new creation is brought into being both for individuals and for society. It is here that we have the assurance of the perfectibility of the individual and of society. Herein lies the promise and potency of a new society that will eventually produce the Beloved Community which is the purpose of God in the creation of man. It is this which inspires our hopes for the redemption of humanity, for a true and vital internationalism, and for all our striving towards a perfect social order.

I conclude with words from *Civitas Dei*[1]:

> The desire of men to serve each other was already existent and capable of infinite expansion. "Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." This presumption of the infinite duty owed by men to each other was no idle illusion. He saw it as destined to be realized and made the operative principle of human society. That vital principle partially realized in the minds of a limited number, is in fact what enables civilized society to exist at all. He compared it to leaven, the tiny ingredient which transforms masses of dough into wholesome bread, or to salt which preserves meat from corruption. Hence the importance that such minorities should be careful to keep their intrinsic property. Let them look to quality and ignore quantity . . .
>
> In discerning the principles upon which life was based the intuitive perception of Jesus was greater than any mind has ever possessed. So complete was His sense of life as a whole that He never parcelled it out into ethics, politics, and religion. He was merely concerned to consider how men should live. The principles He enunciated were on that plane which cannot alter with time or place. And no one will ever succeed in reconciling that teaching with authority, which seeks to balance society like a pyramid on its apex. Society, as conceived by Jesus, is made to stand with its base on the ground of experience as interpreted by the mind and conscience of man, with its point to heaven.

SIN AND FORGIVENESS.

By J. S. Whale.

I. *Sin as a religious concept.* When we speak of sin we use the language, not of philosophy nor of ethics nor of law, but of religion. Sin is moral evil seen in relation to God, the Father of our spirits. I have sinned against Heaven (*Luke* 15[18], *cf. Ps.* 51[4]). Without God there can be no sin (Fairbairn).

II. *The mystery of iniquity: Monism and Dualism.* Here we face the resultant problem which has vexed thought and tried faith through the centuries. How can there be any sin *with* God, if He be the source and ground of all that is? This is an aspect of that problem of evil which is not only the greatest difficulty theism has to face but is the starting-point of much anti-theistic theory. Not to the Christian only but to the absolute idealist evil is a standing difficulty; indeed, it belongs to a still wider problem, the relation of the One to the many, the Infinite to the finite, God to the world.

1 161, 167.

Of the many and varied theodicies which have grappled with it two contrasted types concern us here, neither of which is satisfactory to a truly Christian philosophy, yet each of which expresses truth it may not ignore. Metaphysicians, it has been contended[1], tend to some form of Monism. Seeking some unifying principle which will present reality as a whole and thus leave no loose ends or awkward facts, monistic systems tend to sacrifice the reality of individual experience to philosophic unity. Moralists, on the other hand, tend to some form of Dualism since evil is indubitably real, and its distinction from good the root fact in Ethics. The moralist abominates Pantheism, with its implicit logic that sin is unreal. The monist abominates Deism, with its implication that the world of existents is independent of the supreme source of existence. To quote Dean Inge's epigram, "The notion of a finite God is one that the moralist can never afford to forget nor the metaphysician to remember."

III. *Is moral responsibility an illusion? Sin as Appearance or Necessity.*

It is ironical that the classic statement of the pantheistic view comes from a great Jew, Spinoza. For him sin is an illusion due to our limited point of view, our inability to see things as they really are, *sub specie aeternitatis*. Since there can be no intrinsic disorder in the universe, it is our finite imagination, viewing the world *sub specie temporis,* which gives to evil a fictitious substantiality. Sin is the unreal assuming the semblance of the real, false appearance caused by "darkness in *us*." Moreover, since God is all and all is God, the finite ego is also an illusion; the creature is not an independent self, but, as merged in God, is only a mode in His mind. The reality of the finite subject being done away, to speak of sinfulness or goodness on its part is meaningless.

Objections are obvious. (*a*) The theory of sin as illusion leaves unexplained and inexplicable vital elements in our moral consciousness—an indefeasible sense of individuality, personal freedom and ethical self-determination; an inexpugnable sense of obligation and guilt. (*b*) We do not dispose of a positive and terrible fact in all human experience by explaining it as illusion or defective cognition. As Dr. Tennant points out[2], such a defect of cognition is itself an evil; "darkness in *us*" itself requires a theodicy.

Hegel's Absolutism is closely akin to Spinoza's and virtually leads back to it[3]. Here too, Sin is a mere appearance; so far from being absolutely evil it is relatively good, a necessary element in or step towards virtue; it is the necessary way whereby we move from non-moral to positive virtue, the Hegelian triad being Innocence (*Thesis*), Sin (*Antithesis*), and Virtue (*Synthesis*).

Again, the objections spring from common experience and are cogent. (*a*) Absolutism in all its forms ultimately involves the suppression of personalities, the dissolution of the reality of the finite subject and, therefore, of its experiences. If Sin is only a necessary stage it ceases to be what the Bible and the religious consciousness know as sin, namely that which has its seat and ultimate source in the Will, and for which the free subject's moral responsibility is inalienable. (*b*) The Hegelian system which resolves Will into Thought lays the foundations of a new determinism. If moral evil is an absolute necessity in the evolution of Spirit, guilt obviously ceases to be its correlative. If you make moral evil necessary, it ceases to be moral. It is the *possibility* of moral evil which is necessary to the good of the world, not its *existence*; if it is a necessity, it is not the reality which

1 P. Harthill, *The Necessity of Redemption,* 1.
2 *Philosophical Theology,* II, c. 7.
3 See F. R. Tennant, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin,* and Appendix, Note H.

experience knows it to be, and we are left with as big a problem on our hands.

The upshot of all such Absolutism is that it is never permissible to minimize the difference between God and man; God stands to the world and to man in an absolutely unique relation. "Vital to a theistic philosophy" says A. E. Taylor "is a real recognition of divine transcendence"[1].

IV. *God as "determinate"; the self-limitation of love.*

In what sense, then, does the freedom and self-determination of the creature (within a context of nature and nurture which is not self-determined) "limit" the divine omnipotence? Our wills are ours; God stands apart a hand's breadth to give His creatures room to grow; but if this is taken to mean that He is limited by "restrictions" arising outside His own nature, He is clearly not the source of all reality other than Himself; He is thereby not what we mean by God.

But, to quote Taylor again, "Omnipotence means only power to do whatever is consistent with God's own perfection." To ask, for example, whether God is limited by the impossible (such as making black white or truth falsehood) is to suggest that the eternal verities (*i.e.*, the laws of contradiction, identity, *etc.*) have a validity anterior to, independent of, and therefore binding on God; whereas the eternal verities depend on God and not *vice versa;* they do not exist *in vacuo* but in God[2]. Thus possibility is governed by actuality, which is God's being and perfection as holy love. He is not indeterminate (*i.e.*, a being for whom truth is not as yet truth, in the sense that He can "recognize," "establish," or "obliterate" it) but determinate. The only *prius* of eternal verities is the divine *I am that I am.*

Thus the God of theism and of religion is no Absolute transcending all distinctions, such as subject and object, right and wrong. Even for God, *omnis determinatio est negatio;* even for God, to exist is to be this and not that. If God is love He is not hate; if He is Holy Will he cannot be (*i.e.*, He *is* not) Caprice. In that, He wills an evolutionary order, *eo ipso* He does not will a statically perfect paradise peopled, not by free agents achieving moral ends, but by perfectly behaved robots all dressing by the left. It is not "possible" for God, being what He is, to have a developing moral world, a Realm of Ends, without free agents; hence the possibility, the "risk," of moral evil in His world. Sin is possible just because it is God's holy purpose of love that men should be free personalities, not pieces of inerrant clockwork. Sin is possible because the condition of obedience must necessarily be the possibility of disobedience; the freedom of the filial spirit presupposes that freedom to refuse the proffered love and fellowship of God which constitutes the very essence of sin.

Plainly, then, God does not will my sin, but only its possibility. The old scholastic distinction between antecedent and consequent volition, carried on by Protestant Scholasticism and by Leibniz, is here very suggestive. Evils are not willed by God as ends, but as the possible concomitants of the end. God does not will my sin as such; He is responsible only for its possibility, not for its actuality. "He concurs but He is not an accomplice"[3]. Since freedom to do the good is also freedom to do the evil, moral evil could not be suppressed in this world without its ceasing to be a moral world altogether; the very conception of a moral agent, having

1 Art. "Theism," *E.R.E.*, XII, 262a.

2 "The valid, abstracted from that of which it is valid, is a mental figment not an existent *prius.*" Tennant, *op. cit.*, II. 187, to which this paragraph is closely indebted.

3 *Cf.* the discussions of God's *concursus* in man's sin by the Lutheran Scholastics. They used the formulæ: *Deum concurrere ad effectum, non ad defectum; Deum concurrere ad materiale, non ad formale.* See Paul Althaus, *Grundriss der Dogmatik,* II. 66.

the right to will a self-imposed imperative of duty, logically involves the possibility of sin. It is the glory of man to walk the dim and perilous way of freedom; the burden of being free is peculiarly his; and therefore it is not enough to say that if God suppressed the possibility of moral evil, the moral order would remain unvindicated. We must add that the suppression by God of the possibility of moral evil would be to *do* evil, because it would be to prefer the worse to the better.

V. *The presuppositions of sin: freedom and responsibility.*

Evil, like Good, is an abstraction without an agent. Origen, the first systematic theologian in Christendom, realizing that evil originates in man, repudiated the dualistic doctrine of evil as substance (ὕλη). When we speak of sin we mean sinners, free agents who are individually responsible to God. To quote Dr. H. R. Mackintosh[1], "The sinful act has a character and is what it is only as it phenomenalizes a personal will or choice . . . . it is persons, not acts, of which in strictness guilt can be predicated," (a fact which the familiar distinction between, say, manslaughter and murder sufficiently illustrates).

It is on this basis that Dr. Tennant works out his "logically perfect" concept of sin, laying down the following conditions of its possibility[2]:

(*i*) The existence in the social environment of an objective standard whereof sin is a transgression. Without law there can be no sin. There may be imperfection; but sin and imperfection, so frequently confused, must be sharply distinguished.

(*ii*) Awareness on the part of the individual agent, and awareness *at the time* of his moral activity which is to be designated as sinful, both of the content of the moral law or standard, and of its bindingness on himself. Non-compliance which is due to ignorance is not strictly sin[3]. If sin is to be an ethical concept it must be correlated with self-determination; it cannot be made to include inevitable imperfection (like that of the human infant or the adult heathen) without forfeiting all that makes it *sui generis*. If this were not so, one logical consequence would be the purely pagan conception that Sin could be attributed to physical objects.

(*iii*) Turning from the cognitive to the conative side of human experience, a third condition of the possibility of sin is the existence in men of certain conative inborn dispositions, *i.e.*, natural instincts, appetites, and passions. Biologically considered, these are essential to the continuance and health of the race. They are natural and not abnormal; they belong to man as God has made him and are neutral and non-moral because non-volitional. They are the raw material of sin, the conditions of its emergence; but inasmuch as they are the basis of our highest virtues as well as of our basest vices they are as much the *fomes boni* as the *fomes peccati*. Tennant adds that it has been nothing short of disastrous that these conative tendencies have so often been identified with the activity of the will in regard to them. If sin be volitional (see (*iv*)), propensities which are non-volitional cannot be called sin; it is the will which shapes and not the raw material which is shaped, which alone calls for moral approval or disapproval. Tennant insists, in spite of his critics, that here is a sufficient explanation of the empirical universality of sinfulness.

(*iv*) Finally, volition is an essential condition; otherwise we might speak of animals as sinners. It suffices to quote Kant's famous words that there is nothing in the world or even out of it that can be called good without qualification, except a good will.

1 *The Christian Experience of Forgiveness*, c. 3.
2 See his *Concept of Sin*, and his *Philosophical Theology*, I. 109-110.
3 Compare *"Ignorantia juris neminem excusat,"* which is legal but not ethical.

I venture to offer two criticisms, in passing, of Tennant's valuable and masterly treatment of this whole subject:

(*i*) Granted the empirical universality of sin within the human race, it is difficult to see how any scientific explanation of it is possible without virtually taking away man's freedom, the very thing which makes sin *sui generis*. There is an irresolvable antinomy, as Tennant himself frequently points out in his *Origin and Propagation of Sin,* between sin as a universal fact of human experience, and the individual's sense of freedom and responsibility, his inalienable sense of guilt. It is this difficulty which leads Drs. H. R. Mackintosh, A. E. Garvie, and H. Wheeler Robinson to pronounce sin an inexplicable mystery.

> Just as soon as we advance to a universal cause of the universality of sin, we have made moral evil a necessary element in human personality as we know it, and robbed it therefore of its moral quality and religious condemnation . . . . Because man is a person endowed with some measure of freedom to choose between real alternatives, these powerful influences of the past and present entrenched in lines of habit are not enough to account for his actual sinning nor for the practical universality of sin within the race. They explain the form of the actual sins men commit, but not in the full sense why they commit them. Any such attempt to give an absolute and universal cause for sin would be to abandon the higher category of personality which constitutes man what he is[1].

We are still left with an unsolved mystery of iniquity which throws us back on personal freedom.

(*ii*) Though it is certainly a serious misinterpretation of Tennant's treatment of the problem of sin to describe it as naturalistic, one cannot help feeling with Garvie, H. R. Mackintosh, and others that it is inadequate from the point of view of religious experience. Sin, as the disturbance of man's filial relation to God, as the distrust and frustration of His proffered love, always results in estrangement from Him. Religion testifies that man, so far from being an end in himself, finds his true end and highest good only in God. His guilt is measured not by his blameworthiness, but by his having fallen short of the glory of God, God's manifested purpose for him. The standard of judgment is not human but divine, and the divine standard of judgment means that man's sin is to be measured not by his thought of himself but by God's knowledge of him. Hence, as Garvie points out[2], though the God who forgives and saves reckons our guilt not as the measure of the punishment we deserve but as the measure of the grace which we need, nevertheless the judgment applicable to sin must ever be the divine, not the human standard. The supreme wonder of the Gospel is that while its revelation of holiness judges us, its amazing grace saves us and restores the fellowship which sin has broken.

VI. *But* is *man free*? : *the psychology of volition* : *heredity* : *environment*. Granted that the correlative facts of freedom and responsibility are the necessary presupposition of sin and its correlative guilt, we have to face a sincere and widespread contention in the modern world that "sin is not our fault" because we are not free[3]. Considerations of space necessitate the barest possible reference to the threefold aspect of this problem.

(*i*) With regard to the classic issue as to the psychology of volition, it must suffice to say that thoroughgoing Determinism here is as erroneous

1 H. W. Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man,* 302-304 (3rd edition).

2 *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead,* 297-299.

3 See Haering's article, "Ist unsere Sundhaftigkeit unser persönliche Schuld?" (*Z.Th.K.,* 1922.)

as thoroughgoing Indeterminism[1]; the assumption that it is the strongest motive which determines the choice is as false as that of motiveless volition. Necessity and freedom are here strangely but indubitably commingled. If the character of the self which chooses determines selective interest, and interest attention, and attention desire, and desire motive, and motive action—this very action begets habit and so fixes the character with which this closed circle of volition started. By mistaken or wrong choice a man may indeed bring himself into bondage, thus hindering the true and permanent satisfaction of his whole enduring personality. Freedom is indeed lessened. But the fact remains that the self is always more than its previously formed character; it is not exhausted by the mere sum of its motives. That there are "reserves of psychic energy making fresh starts possible" (Garvie) is clear from the facts of conversion and reformation. When we say "personality" we mean "that which cannot be reduced to the purely natural sequence of cause and effect; that in which new beginnings are made" (Robinson).

(*ii*) The same principle applies to the problems of heredity and environment. Though the Augustinian doctrine of sin is now discredited, its one great virtue was its emphasis on the social solidarity of the human race; an emphasis which has been made by modern theology since Schleiermacher and Ritschl in terms of *nurture* rather than *nature*. Our modern problem is the relation of man's free inward disposition to the wider context of vitiated social life. We cannot ignore heredity and environment, simply because the source of sin cannot be discovered in the will abstracted altogether from its environment nor, therefore, in the individual independently of his organic connexion with the race[2]. Social inheritance is a demonstrably potent factor in the development of an individual; nurture is of incalculable importance in the life of a little child. Indeed, what Ritschl called a "Kingdom of Evil" is part of the social inheritance into which all men are born. Your failure matches mine and our lives, interlocking, form an organized system of evil.

Nevertheless the handicap due to environment is never the last word in the moral race which all men have to run from infancy to old age. The self, to quote Garvie again, is not a measurable actuality but an incalculable possibility; unexhausted moral reserves may always be disclosed even in a self whose development is bad because environment has been bad. That freedom is the ultimate and inexpugnable fact is the testimony of the awakened conscience with its inalienable sense of guilt and remorse.

VII. *Guilt and Forgiveness.*

If sin is a religious concept, its correlative is guilt; the sinner knows that he has alienated himself from the Holy One whose judgment must rest upon sin; he experiences the reaction of the divine perfection against his sin, and must needs cry, "Depart from me"[3]. Moreover the sense of guilt and enslavement to sin intensify one another, as the self yields again and again to temptation and the will weakens (*Romans* 7 is the *locus classicus*). Finally, the sting of death is sin, because here life says its last irrevocable word. It is in death, which A. E. Taylor has called the supreme external manifestation of temporality, that a man's life is seen for what it is, final and unalterable. Here conscience speaks with stinging clearness; life's failure here confronts us as fixed and irremediable. Death is, as Denney put it more than once, the sacrament of sin, if only because

1 See H. W. Robinson, *op. cit.*, 297 for a brief discussion of the issue which is as lucid as it is subtle. Also Garvie, *op. cit.*, 265-6.

2 So Tennant, *Origin and Propagation of Sin*, 38. See also 72-75.

3 On this sense of pollution and estrangement see R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, c. 8.

it is the outward sign of opportunities gone for ever.

Why, then, do Christians rejoice over death, confident that even it cannot separate them from God? The answer lies in the good news of forgiveness and redemption which is the very heart of the Christian religion. The amazing wonder of the Gospel lies in the divine initiative which restores the filial relationship which sin had so grievously interrupted. Grace is a sheer miracle. The good news of the Gospel is that death, which seals a man's irrevocable past, also seals the endless mercies of God; that the Father of mercies reckons our guilt not according to the measurement of the punishment we deserve (which is legalism) but according to the measure of our need (which is grace).

Love takes the initiative; this it was which the paganism of Celsus could not even understand, much less approve; indeed, as Harnack remarks, the cardinal difference between Christianity and the ancient religions lies just here. The Mysteries invited those who had led a good life and were whole; Christianity sought out the sinful and morally diseased. There have been many religions which know no divine welcome to the Sinner until he has ceased to be one. They would first make him righteous and then bid him welcome to God. Christ, however, first bids him welcome to God and so remakes him. The one demands newness of life; the other offers and imparts it. The one demands human righteousness as the price of divine friendship; the other gives the friendship, without money and without price, in order to evoke righteousness. "The Christian message of forgiveness declares that the Father puts us right with Himself in pure grace, at an inward cost of which Calvary is the climax and the measure."

THE SHAPE OF THE KINGDOM.

By Malcolm Spencer

At a recent debate in the National Assembly of the Church of England the Bishop of Jarrow is reported to have said it was not the business of the Church to make society fit for men; it was the Church's business to make men fit for society. We owe the Bishop a debt of gratitude for making a false doctrine so glaringly false that it was bound to be refuted. As no one hearing or reading this paper will be likely to hold the false doctrine momentarily espoused by the Bishop of Jarrow, there is no need to refute it formally. It may, however, prove convenient to take it as a starting point, since it provides us with a convenient vocabulary for our discussion. We are to try to conceive:

A.—*A Society Fit for Man as we are led by the Christian Faith to Think of him.*

Man needs a society in which he can live without falsity to his own nature, a society whose atmosphere he can breathe without it poisoning him, a society with whose methods and institutions he can willingly co-operate, a society whose fundamental presuppositions he can heartily approve.

As for the Bishop's antithesis whether man should be made fit for society or society for man, we recall the famous conundrum, Which came first, the hen or the egg? To go back as far as the ark, we may well suppose that it was hens and not eggs that went in two by two together, but to go further back, to the Creation, we are perhaps left in doubt! Probably in the first origin of things the hen and the egg were almost indistinguishable, each being such an embryonic form of the product which evolved out of them.

So with men and society in the beginning : and even to-day every given man is ninety-nine parts made by the society into which he is born. The remaining one part may win the approval of society and alter its permanent characteristics by a grain or by a hair's breadth. There are, of course, amazing exceptions. Here and there a man may arise who will in process of time change society fundamentally. It is, indeed, such an One of Whom we now seek to learn what shape we should give to the society which is to be true to the nature of individual man, as He has revealed it to us.

In doing so we may consider man at one time as the child of society, at another time as the parent of society. Each man of to-day is the child of the society of yesterday ; each generation of men becomes first the guardian of the society it inherits, then the parent of the society of the generation to come. In the one case, where individual man is conceived as the child of the society of the past, we have to ask what is likely to be the image stamped upon him by the society which moulds him, first as child in the home, then as boy or girl at school, then as youth or maiden entering the workshops of life : is it the image proper to his spiritual birthright? In the other case, when man becomes the responsible administrator of the society that now is, and to some extent the innovator of new social forms, when he is no longer the clay but the potter, what will he try to make of the society entrusted to him? In what spirit will he work? What sort of pattern will he take as his model? What manner of clay will he suppose himself to be handling?

The answer to those questions we at this Conference are bound to derive from our thought about the nature of man. We must take man as a being with all the dignity with which Christ endowed him, with the capacity for development which Christ saw in him, with the latent nature which Christ loved in him, and indeed also with all the flaws and defects and liability to temptation from which Christ came to redeem him. In other words the man who is to be taken as the raw material out of which society is to be shaped is no mere domestic animal, such as he was to the slave-owners of the past, no mere robot as the modern captain of industry sometimes tends sadly to regard him. He is neither the economic man of the theoretical economist of the nineteenth century, nor the political man whose individual nature is subordinated to the needs of the Fascist State. In shaping society we who are disciples of Christ must think of man always and only as the child of God, who must be treated as such in pupilage and inspired to act as such in his maturity. The only social order with which the Christian can rest content is one that is in accordance with the Christian doctrine of man.

B.—*Does this Mean a Christian Society?*

Considering what is here involved, it may be again useful to begin with a few familiar falsehoods as, for example :

i. that you cannot have a Christian order of society till you have a society of Christian people ;

ii. that when you have a society of Christian people it will matter very little what form of society you have, since men will deal with one another in a Christian fashion in any case ;

iii. that you cannot make people good by Act of Parliament, with the presumption that therefore :

iv. you cannot achieve any substantial good by changing the form of society, so that :

v. the thing to do is to make men Christian one by one and let social development take its own course.

The first mistake here lies in supposing that it is immaterial to the Christian what he does or fails to do in the social and political spheres, what he tolerates in the social institutions of his day, what he thinks to be society's ideal, what he seeks to accomplish by political means, or by what canons he judges political arrangements and events. There are two main types of villain who use this sophistry. The first is the layman who wants other people's hearts to be changed, but thinks his own is sufficiently changed already : and no one thinks that but the man who wants to be left alone in his own arrested self-development. Such men are often the chief stumbling blocks to the Christian reconstruction of society. The other type of patron of this falsehood is the timid or indolent minister who is partly afraid of his own ignorance, partly of the inherent difficulty of the subject, and just a little perhaps of the half-converted layman aforesaid.

Suppose, however, that we have accepted the responsibility for some effort to shape society according to the pattern given to us from the Christian Mount, that does not mean that we should proceed to establish the form of society that would impose Christian conduct upon all men. We have to reckon with the fact that whilst all men were made in the image of God all are not yet Christian. The shape which society must take at any given time is dependent upon that fact. The social order should from age to age reflect the degree to which men in general have become Christian. We must not fail to notice, however, that people who are not fully Christian are all the same very considerably open to reason and conscience, whilst, on the other hand, the most unmistakably Christian people have their off days and their blind spots. At such times and in such respects it is useful that society should have a momentum which sustains them in the habit of virtue like the fly-wheel of an engine which sustains the steadiness of its beat.

To take the latter point first, the behaviour of a man in modern society is a matter of great subtlety. It is inconceivable that any ordinary individual should have a big enough brain, let alone a big enough conscience, to work out for himself all his social obligations and constantly recall them. He needs an order of society which will crystallize for him the duties he would freely recognize in his best moments, and will insist upon his performing them at all times. I think it is Dr. L. P. Jacks who suggests that whilst most of us would normally be honest enough to pay for our railway tickets, the fact of there being a ticket collector might sometimes just clinch the matter.

So much for the man of usually sensitive conscience whom society saves from occasional lapses. On the other hand, there is the man of deficient conscience who may be educated by a legislative standard which is higher than the one he would normally set for himself and not so high that he cannot conceive it to be reasonable. Society cannot afford to have its usual standard of practice debased by the unrestricted action of those who would otherwise move on a lower level. There was a day when men normally went armed because those who would otherwise deal violently with them were permitted to be at large. Society then needed to be protected from the murderer and the marauder. Just in the same way society to-day needs to be protected from those who would otherwise use the veiled weapons of economic warfare to rob and destroy one another. There is even more to add than that. The spirit of cruelty and injustice are in themselves poisonous. Society cannot tolerate that men should be unchecked in dealing with one another with injustice or cruelty. At a given age a certain standard of righteousness and decency has been achieved and our social institutions need to maintain it.

There is then a certain level of goodness that ought to be maintained in the social order at any given date. What is that level? It is not a Christian level : not, that is to say, the level of the Sermon on the Mount. The social order should not require men to be ascetic or disinterested. It should not impose upon men the self-sacrificing standard which the Christian might voluntarily impose upon himself. It must not do these things because such conduct is not endorsed by the mind and conscience of the average citizen even at his best. On the other hand, there are standards of freedom from tyranny and fair play in work and reward for which the average citizen is prepared to stand. They represent the degree of his development toward the Christian ideal of disinterested love.

As an instance of the wrong kind of legislation imposing upon all men a standard of practice for which they were not morally prepared, take the Prohibition legislation of the United States of America with its consequent unhappy reactions upon American life, in the first place, leading to alternative forms of dangerous self-indulgence, and in the next place, leading to a widespread defiance of the law and consequent lowering of the respect in which law stood.

On the other hand, I believe that the form of society we have to-day is in many ways below the moral standard of the community—or at least of its thinking and therefore influential elements.

C.—*The Positive Standards for Political Action.*

If, then, it is wrong to impose upon all men the standard of conduct which their own reason and conscience does not endorse, what kind of moral standard should be regulative in political action? For political action is surely the question at issue, since the political sphere enspheres all other spheres of action. Here we note that our social life is indeed formed by the interaction of two quite different constraints. On the one hand is the constraint of the ideal vision which is the function of religion; on the other hand is the constraint of political pressure, which is the function of the State.

Throughout the Middle Ages Church and State worked in a kind of uneasy partnership in which first one then the other struggled for the ascendancy. The Church of those days was in part the true representative of religion, using the proper instrument of persuasion; in part, however, it was a rival to the State, coming into conflict with the State because using the State's own instrument of coercion. In the perfect relation religion never makes final terms with politics because it is always demanding a higher and higher achievement. On the other hand, religion may well hesitate to say at what point it will excommunicate the political authority because it falls below standard.

Once again we may get nearer to the truth of this by addressing ourselves to a familiar falsehood. The absurd injunction to keep religion out of politics may serve as a peg on which to hang the argument. Here, again, there are two quite different groups of people who use this intolerable phrase. On the one hand there are those who do really wish to make religion operative in the political sphere but find it convenient to conceal the fact underneath the veneer of loyalty to the conventional thought that the two should be kept apart. Such people are like the worshippers of the true God who ask leave to bow down in the House of Rimmon for appearance' sake, or like loyalists taking a pretended Oath of Allegiance to the usurping monarch whose sway they do not really recognize.

On the other hand, there are those who really do want to keep religion out of their politics for the reason that they want leave to disobey the

standards of religion in the sphere of collective action. They wish to hide their disloyalty to God by the use of a seemingly pious phrase. Surely it is only the atheist who can keep religion out of politics, and that only if it is true that he has no religion to contribute. Nor can we get away with the phrase by explaining that when we say politics we mean party politics, for party politics are either the politics of different political schools of thought whose principles ought to be in accordance with ultimate right and subject to the test of ultimate truth, or else they are the politics of self-interested classes which ought all to be condemned offhand. The phrase "party politics" usually means the politics of my opponent—my own party politics are matters of principle. No, however much room there must be for debate about the details of political programmes, there are standards by which political action must be judged. They are absolute standards. As such they are matters in the sphere of religion. What are they?

Surely if we are to consent to the forcible ordering of society at all, we must consent to it on the ground that we are seeking to organize the associated life of men in ways which are true to man's true nature, both as it is now and as it is yet to be. Man is, indeed, a creature of wants which have to be satisfied. He must eat and drink, he must be clothed and housed, he must have private property, if it be only a mouthful at a time. There is this material side to his life, and it is with that that the social order is first of all concerned. But whilst there is this side to man's nature and man's necessity, he is at all times more than a merely material being. Man is at all times a co-operator and an idealist. He delights to be in association with his fellow men; he wants that association to be friendly; he is moved by ideals of kindness and justice; he wants to realize those ideals more fully to-morrow than yesterday. He is aware of the pressure of his own conscience upon his action and he believes that others are subject to the same inner pressure. He feels able to reason about his conduct and expects others to reason about theirs. Thus he takes reason and conscience for granted as bases for his life of association with others. This moral and rational side of man is gained before ever he accepts the lordship of Christ. This, and this only, is the proper basis for political action. But it is a very good basis if we accept the estimate of human nature which Mr. Currie Martin yesterday held up to us as the mind of Christ. Put in another form, this is equivalent to saying that political principles properly derive from natural law and from the general content of man's natural, moral, and religious experience. In saying which I recognize that I have strayed on to the ground on which the pundits have established booths and businesses, and I therefore say no more.

Political practice should then be guided by the standards which the enlightened conscience and reason of mankind can endorse. The limits of political practice at any given time must, therefore, be set by man's average development at that time and the degree to which at any time he is generally swept aside from those standards by custom. There is a sort of general average of sinfulness which is one of the properties of any given age. Whatever we may say about original sin in theory, it is discernible in practice as a variable historic endowment of blindness, selfishness, and defect, limiting and rightly limiting a nation's political practice at a given time. Rightly, therefore, the Christian man should accept the limitation to political practice derived from his observation of this temporary factor in man's conduct.

On the other hand, the only possible goal in political development which the Christian can recognize is the goal set for him by the faith of Jesus concerning man. From this Christian view of men he would derive his political

ideal and he will depend upon his religious insight to show him how far his contemporaries can move toward that goal at a given date. Political actions must not be urged upon men on the ground that we as Christians believe them to be right. They must be urged upon men on the ground that the common conscience and reason of men will witness that they are right. In other words, we must lead society toward Christ by offering it proposals which can be commended to our fellows on the ground of their own moral conviction and reason, though it may be our own insight into Christian values which have led us to perecive that these are the things that ought to be done. This need not and should not prevent us from making it quite clear that such action is just one step on the road to that fuller practice of brotherhood to which Christ calls men as their highest happiness.

Here perhaps I may take up the statement that in a truly Christian state of society there would be no coercion and very little private property, whereas in the order of society we seek to establish now there must be such kinds and degrees of private property and such means of coercion as accord with the present development of man and favour his further development toward the Christian ideal. The claim that Christianity is ultimately an absolute pacificism and an absolute communism is not the one that I wish to emphasize, though it is one I believe. The point I wish to emphasize is the necessary difference between that ultimate ideal and the political practice which we should rightly approve at a given date.

I leave the instance of war aside as quickly as possible because the discussion of it arouses too high feeling for calm and rapid debate, but I observe with interest the gradual gravitation of the mind of the Rev. Leyton Richards towards the conclusion that whilst the personal conduct of the Christian must witness to a standard of pacificism that is still unattainable in the collective sphere, his political conduct must seek a middle course on which men of varied insight and development can agree. We thus get accommodation in the sphere of practice without compromise in the sphere of principle.

I will in a moment or two discuss the question of property along with a few similar questions a little more fully. Meantime I conclude this section by one or two remarks of a more general kind on the pressing need for a more comprehensive and realistic body of Christian teaching on these matters.

In this work the Anglo-Catholic school of Christian Sociology with its recent output of books and its quarterly, *Christendom,* are setting an example which we might well emulate. The Christian Social Council which is producing books and manifestoes on these lines would warmly welcome a larger contribution from other ecclesiastical quarters. Some of the members of the staffs of the Free Church Colleges who teach Christian Ethics and Social Philosophy are just now being drawn into closer cooperation with one another and with the Research Department of the Christian Social Council for this very purpose.

D.—*Examples of the Gradual Embodiment of Christian Principles in Social Life.*

I give in this section a few rough sketches of the way in which Christian principle has gradually shaped the life of society. Mr. Currie Martin has already referred to the way in which Christ changed the whole outlook of the world upon women and children. He at once established a new relation between men and women and a new respect for childhood within the Christian society. This has gradually changed the spirit and thought

and customs of the whole world. To this instance I add three others and then make a comment which bears upon them all.

1. *The Care for man as man,* exemplified in the early Christian hospitals, and later in other kinds of Christian institutions for the care of those in suffering, was first applied only in the care of Christians for their own fellow members of the Faith. Later we note successively the enlargement of the Christian family to include the whole community (the accepted ideal from the time of Constantine onwards); and the gradual transference of this responsibility from the Church to the State in later days.

The present-day provision of Unemployment Assistance, inadequate as it is, is a symbol of this undertaking to provide a reasonable minimum standard of life for every man, whatever his ability to earn it. The critical question for to-day is, shall we make that provision meagre for fear of being victimized by the unworthy, or shall we err on the side of generosity for fear of dishonouring a willing worker?

The Archbishop of York has recently laid it down that society is put to shame unless the condition of an unemployed man is such that, though not preferable to ordinary employment, it will satisfy his human need to adequate physical sustenance, to interesting occupation, and to some way of contributing to the service of his fellows. Merely to provide maintenance allowances is to do no more than to treat the unemployed man as an unfortunate animal. The challenge is a stinging one.

It is significant, too, that a recent manifesto, jointly issued by several young Anglo-Catholics in association with a corresponding body of Roman Catholics, has demanded a physical minimum standard of living for all men sufficient to enable them to live a proper human life, in terms which include the following:

> There must be allowed and respected a complete liberty, unhampered by any secular and/or political control in the practice of the spiritual life, and the acquisition of the material necessities which are a means to it. . . .
>
> All must be in receipt of sufficient means to be free from that perpetual anxiety concerning their livelihood which distracts their minds from primary things. . . .

2. *The Expansion of human liberty.*—Essentially, Christianity conceives man as a child of God who should be moved from within; yet also a child of sin who must be coerced from without by the State. Against the over-emphasis of the latter necessity, Protestant emphasis was laid upon human freedom, working out first to the establishment of political democracy, then to the winning of legal freedom for the individual; then to the emancipation of slaves and other wronged social groups; and now for the same reason education is more and more conceived as the release of each individual's personal capacity and genius.

To-day it is coming to be generally recognized that lack of economic freedom of those in subordinate positions in social life is making any other freedom that they possess of very little effect. We are reminded of Judge Darling's remark that justice in this country is free to everyone just as the use of the Ritz Hotel is free to everyone who can pay for it. When we come to consider the way in which economic freedom is to be secured for men we raise questions about the probable interference with existing property rights, about which more needs to be said.

3. *The subordination of property rights to personal rights.*—Here we note first the acceptance by the early Christians of the varied property rights approved by the Old Testament, coupled with a clear recognition of the danger of property privilege and the duty of sharing; and next the limitation

of all property rights in Christian history to rights of use (rather than absolute possession) contingent upon the acceptance of responsibility for the wellbeing of others—the Christian doctrine of stewardship. Christian tradition insisted also on the generous use of surpluses and the avoidance of exploitation of any kind. Then there befell the accidental escape of property from these limitations in the modern world, under a false impression that this would promote social progress.

Hence the need to-day to check the tendency of economic development toward social inequality by a definite political policy. This need will be widely accepted; but any proposals that may be made for realizing social equality will have to reckon with the fact that a deep sense of injustice would be stirred up by acts which would be considered as the unjustifiable confiscation of private property, whilst those who would not be involved in any sacrifice of personal privilege would fear the relaxation of the compulsion to work, if economic independence were secured too easily.

That being so, it is unlikely that society would be willing to take any large step towards the limitation of private rights in property at the present time. For whilst the proposal to meet the problem in this way would seem to some to be inspired by Christian conscience, it would arouse the determined opposition of other Christian consciences. Recognizing this, there is now a trend toward agreement amongst all the different schools of Christian economic thought to refrain from immediately pressing a revolutionary socialist proposal. A recent Conference of the Christian Social Council on the Christian Approach to Economic Reconstruction, at which the Socialist Christian group was well represented, reached a conclusion from which no one dissented, along these lines. The Conference decided to try to redress the balance of economic inequality by measures of financial reform rather than by changes in the ownership and control of the means of production. In agreeing to this, however, some reserved their opinion that such changes of ownership would in the long run be found to be required by sheer necessity and on the ground of Christian principle.

Commenting now on the reasons that have hindered the fuller expression of the Christian impulse in these three directions, in addition to the complexity of the problem and the strength of vested interests, I find another important factor to be reckoned with, and one which is more closely connected with the Christian doctrine of man. I refer to the widespread failure to realize the religious significance of the material side of life. The moral will to secure right relations amongst men is not sufficiently reinforced by a deep religious appreciation of the way in which man's material needs are bound up with his spiritual development. Mr. George Lansbury has said somewhere that the worst indictment of our present social order is not the material inequalities which it inflicts upon men but the spiritual deprivation which results from the divorce of many from surroundings and occupations which minister to the spiritual side of man's nature. Industrialized man is predisposed by his environment and by his occupation to be spiritually inert. Men need sunshine and quiet and beauty and contact with nature and the opportunity to exercise their creative powers with a sufficient amount of freedom and leisure if they are to reach their true development.

The Christian Church needs a deeper appreciation of the spiritual significance of these facts, a deeper passion to secure for each man his heritage along these lines if the industrial problem is to be faced with adequate courage and insight. For this, Christian people need to develop a habit of associating their joy in the material side of life far more commonly with the thought of God as the author of it. They must more commonly regard these experiences as religious experiences, quite as much as the experi-

ences which come to them in fidelity to conscience. For, as we have agreed, all forms of experience can afford us religious experience once we recognize the place of God at the centre of them.

To do this may be to take one of the biggest steps forward toward the right ordering of our social life. Without it this generation may fail to feel as deeply as it ought to feel the call of God to deal with this economic problem. Many leaders of thought have recently recognized that the Church of our generation will stand or fall by its ability or its failure to deal with this matter. Just as at the beginning of the nineteenth century the call came to the Church to preach its gospel all over the world, so the call comes in this century to work out the implications of the gospel in the economic sphere. I turn finally to the challenge here implied.

E.—*The Great Issue of To-day.*

John Macmurray has pointed out that the economic institutions of the modern world are inspired by totally different principles from the political institutions. Whereas political life has tried, however, imperfectly, to embody the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, the tendency of economic life is to establish exactly their opposites—coercion, inequality, and strife. This tendency of economic life has been counterbalanced by political interference, but economic life is to such an extent based upon the other principles that it cannot forever brook such interference. Things have come to a pass in most industrialized countries where the economic practice that has been adopted must presently destroy the political institutions that have been built up on a truer reading of human nature unless the economic life can first be brought deliberately under the control of principles which have inspired political development. In several European countries we have seen the subordination of political ideals to economic necessity. This country must face the same issue ultimately, and probably very soon.

As an instance of the authoritative acceptance of this view in ecclesiastical high places, I quote the following paragraph from the latest Papal Encyclical, *Quadragessimo Anno* :

> It is patent that in our days not alone is wealth accumulated but immense power and despotic economic domination is concentrated in the hands of a few, and those few are frequently not the owners, but only the trustees and directors of invested funds, who administer them at their good pleasure.
>
> This power becomes particularly irresistible when exercised by those who, because they hold and control money, are able also to govern credit and determine its allotment, for that reason supplying, so to speak, the life blood to the entire economic body, and grasping, as it were, in their hands the very soul of production, so that no one dare breathe against their will . . .
>
> This concentration of power has led to a threefold struggle for domination. First, there is the struggle for dictatorship in the economic sphere itself ; then the fierce battle to acquire control of the State, so that its resources and authority may be abused in the economic struggles ; finally the clash between States themselves . . .
>
> Unbridled ambition for domination has succeeded the desire for gain ; the whole economic life has become hard, cruel and relentless in a ghastly measure. Furthermore, the intermingling and scandalous confusion of the duties and offices of civil authority and of economics have produced crying evils and have gone so far as to degrade the majesty of the State.
>
> As regards the relations of peoples among themselves, a double stream has issued forth from this fountain-head : on the one hand, economic Nationalism or even economic Imperialism ; on the other, a not less noxious and detestable Internationalism, or international Imperialism in financial affairs, which holds that where man's fortune is, there is his country.

Examining the defective ethic of economic life more closely, and using the Christian teaching to bring out the contrast more sharply, I can see:

(*a*) Instead of seeking first the Kingdom of God, *i.e.*, a network of right relationships, we have sought first the multiplication of goods. Right relationships, Jesus said, would have brought with them a real sufficiency of material things, whereas the material plenty that has been produced along the other line has resulted only in the accentuation of strife and the threatened breakdown of international order.

(*b*) We have made an idol of wealth in general and of monetary wealth in particular. It is generally assumed and will sometimes be explicitly argued that the maintenance of the standards of the wealthy must be the first object of statesmanship, because only then can there be opportunity for the poor to gain a livelihood by ministering to their wants. The Bible principle would be to make sure that there is a sufficiency for the poorest classes in society and let the degree that the wealthy enjoy be dependent upon the prior prosperity of the poor—it must indeed always depend upon their exertions. But we have gone further and made financial wealth as free of responsibility as it could possibly be made, with the result that there is now floating about in the world about £2,000,000,000 of what the City calls bad money, that is, mobile money that can be employed capriciously at any time for good or ill. In this we have made an idol of gold, a fetish of saving. Hence the blindness which generally besets our political vision to-day—for Christ foretold that blindness would be the inevitable result of making a fetish of saving.

In our time the flagrant neglect of the necessary principles of human co-operation is so apparent and its results so dangerous that Christianity has a unique opportunity of once more assuming the moral leadership of the world if Christian teachers will espouse the cause of reason and justice. The subordination of social to economic, and economic to financial, considerations can now be demonstrated to be a mad offence against both the reason and conscience of mankind, an absolute reversal of ends and means. But if supposed financial and economic necessities are once dethroned from their position of ascendancy, we have the opportunity to take the cultural ends of man as the directing principle of economic, as well as of political, development. On these lines Christianity may become the pioneer of a new political era.

The world has a right to look to Christianity for leadership at a time like this, chiefly for two reasons. The first is that nothing less than the courage of a great faith is needed to abandon the dictates of expediency and shape public policy firmly on high principle. It is only men of Christian faith who have any warrant for being quite sure that human nature is essentially such that it will respond to an advance towards the social freedom and economic co-operation which are the opposites of the evils that have brought us to our present pass.

The second reason is that it needs men who find their deepest satisfaction in doing right and are not afraid of the risk involved, to take up a cause in which so many powerful vested interests are sure to be arrayed against them. Though it be true that a right reform of our economic life would bring about a more happy condition for the rich as well as for the poor, there will be many who will not believe it, and will be chiefly stirred by the possible losses in which they may be personally involved. Hence the need for strong and disinterested Christian leadership, not afraid to stir up opposition.

But the greatest need of all is faith.